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2ABSTRACT
The Higher Education Systems of the People's Republic of China
and the Republic of China: A Comparative Study
This study explores the tension between the preservation of cultural and
political identity and economic modernization in the higher education systems
in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)
between 1949 and 1993.
Chapter One introduces the research problem, theoretical orientation,
main argument, and organization of this thesis.
Chapter Two examines the historical context of the higher education
systems of the PRC and the ROC, and identifies the similarities between the
pre-1949 higher education system and the two contemporary Chinese higher
education systems.
Chapter Three analyzes the contemporary (domestic and international)
contexts of higher education in the PRC and the ROC. The chapter highlights
the monolithic, state-supported, official value systems of both countries; the
domestic relations between the ruling party, the state, the economy and the
people; and the international relations of the two countries, as these affect the
higher education systems.
3Chapter Four investigates the cultural tasks of both higher education
systems, and reviews the ways in which they have institutionalized different
forms of cultural and political identity.
Chapters Five and Six analyze the economic tasks of both higher
education systems. Chapter Five examines the importation of science and
technology, and the social values of science and technology in both countries.
Chapter Six examines the processes of institutionalizing, in higher education,
different foreign models of science and technology.
Chapter Seven reviews the patterns of similarities and differences
between both higher education systems, and explores the specific and the
broader implications of the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
AND OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
1.1 PURPOSE
This chapter offers an overview of the thesis. This chapter will highlight,
firstly, the background of the research problem; secondly the theoretical
orientation of the thesis; and thirdly the main argument and its development
in the thesis.
1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND COMPARATIVE FRAMING OF
THE THESIS 
This section states the research problem, and the comparative framing of the
thesis.
The higher education systems of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and the Republic of China (ROC) inherited a common cultural history which
was rooted in Confucianism. However, these two higher education systems
have been caught in a tension since 1949: the rejection of foreign values when
these are seen to be a challenge to the existing political leadership; and the
acceptance of economic links with foreign countries for practical purposes.
This tension is present in the history of pre-1949 Chinese higher
education. China for more than two thousand years perceived herself as a
nation with a self-sustaining economy and an advanced civilization. Between
the 1840s and 1940s, the Chinese political leadership faced challenges from
15
Western cultures, and at the same time needed to import technology from
Western countries. In this period, the imperial Chinese government
endeavoured to strike balances between the maintenance of cultural identity,
economic improvement, and Western influences. The struggle can be summed
up in the Chinese saying of the late 19th century: "Chinese learning for
morality and Western learning for utility" (zhang ti xl yOng).
This tension between the selective refusal of foreign values and the need
to establish economic relations with foreign countries did not disappear in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC after 1949. Despite the change
in the contents of national beliefs, this tension still exists in, and arises from
the specific circumstances of, the PRC and ROC. These specific circumstances
are the domestic and international contexts in which both higher education
systems are institutionalized.
The PRC and ROC are comparable in a variety of ways. For example,
they might be compared as "opposites" — as socialist and capitalist (on an
assumption that they have very different educational systems). Alternatively,
a comparison might be set up around their degree of divergence from a
common history (and a common education system).
This thesis seeks to investigate the similarities and differences in their
higher education systems. Again, this might be done in a variety of ways,
some very descriptive and straightforward. For example, such a project might
be undertaken by asldng how the two systems are financed, staffed and
evaluated. By careful fieldwork, among other techniques, our knowledge of
the two higher education systems might be advanced.
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However, this thesis is framed in a slightly more complex way. The
thesis begins in a specification of some aspects of the socio-political and socio-
economic context of the higher education systems and against this background
attempts to make sense of the similarities and differences of the higher
education systems; and to interpret the implications of this comparative
analysis for some existing theories (of educational convergence, modernization
and dependency).
Four aspects of the external context of higher education systems are
identified, on the expectation that these aspects of social context are likely to
be sources of contradictions, conflicts and dialectical relations. These sources
are, in both countries, the different emphases in past and present central value
systems; the preservation of the socio-political status quo; participation in the
world economy; and relations with each other and with other countries in the
international community.
The PRC and ROC have common historical roots in Confucianism, but
currently have different monolithic, state-supported, official central value
systems. The PRC upholds Chinese socialism, and resists capitalism as this
was represented by the United States; whereas the ROC advocates the
teachings of SCui YbdAn, and at the same time accepts capitalism and opposes
communism as this was represented by the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the PRC. As a consequence, the diplomatic relations of the PRC
or ROC became dichotomized particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, and no
economic or academic links were developed by the PRC and ROC with their
diplomatic enemies.
17
Secondly, both the PRC and ROC have struggled for a balance (between
the preservation of cultural and political identity, economic modernization and
the impact of foreign influences) during their gradual incorporation into the
capitalist world economy. Currently, both Chinese countries maintain
economic links with those countries which practise or practised opposing value
systems. Since 1949, the ROC has developed a state-capitalist economy in
which market regulation and state intervention coexist. In the 1980s, the ROC
began to establish economic links with the former communist bloc including
the PRC and USSR.' The PRC also normalized its relations with the US and
Western countries and began the open door policy in the late 1970s. In 1989,
the US was the third largest trading partner of the PRC; the value of imports
and exports between the PRC and US was US$ 1.23 billion (11%) out of PRC's
total US$ 11.17 billion? Therefore, the line of demarcation between national
friends and foes of the PRC and ROC in the 1980s was not as marked as it had
been earlier.
The economic participation of these two Chinese countries in the world
market challenged the simplicity of their earlier political and economic
positions. In the ROC, martial law against communist activities in Taiwan was
lifted in 1987, and the "Period of Mobilization and Suppression of Communist
Rebellion" was also terminated in May 1991? In the PRC, market forces,
which had been banned for nearly three decades, re-emerged after the early
1980s. In the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992,
the party leaders resolved to change the planned economy into a "socialist
market economy" in which market mechanisms were permitted to coexist with
18
public ownership within the socialist framework. 4
 The private sector, once
forbidden, is now recognized as a significant component of the socialist
economy.' Thus the classical revolutionary simplicities of the PRC and ROC,
which had been a significant part of their national identity, were strongly
affected by political and economic developments from the 1980s, and created
opportunities for the emergence of political challenges to the respective
Chinese leaders in the late 1980s.
Thirdly, the PRC and ROC have attempted to preserve the socio-
political status quo and their official value systems as far as possible in the late
1980s. There were widespread student movements for domestic political
reform in both countries at the end of the 1980s. In June 1989, a student
demonstration took place and was militarily suppressed in the Tianarunen
Square in Beijing. This demonstration was not the first, but the fifth, in the
PRC since the opening up of its economy to the West in 1978. 6 In the ROC,
Taiwanese students and teachers, modelling themselves upon the Tiananmen
Square student demonstration, publicly requested domestic political reform in
Chung Cheng Square in Taipei in March 1990. This student demonstration
was the first since the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 (and since 1949).
The Taipei authorities delayed their formal dialogue with the student leaders
until the end of the presidential election on 22 March, 1990. As a result, the
current president of the ROC was finally elected by the National Assembly,
not by the people. In contrast to the result of Tiananmen Incident, the
protesters in Taiwan were finally dealt with peacefully.
The fourth aspect of external context of the higher education systems
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of the PRC and ROC is their political relations in international arenas.' Before
1971, the Taipei authorities were taken to be the legitimate government of
China in the United Nations. After 1971, the Bèijing authorities replaced the
Taipei government and represented "China" in the United Nations. Since then,
most of the ROC's former allies including the US, Japan and South Korea have
established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Other international agencies
like UNESCO and the World Bank have also developed relations with the
PRC, instead of the ROC. The current attempts of the ROC to rejoin GATT
and the United Nations as a member are severely opposed by the PRC.
Thus, these four aspects of external context of higher education systems
are related to the domestic forces, economic, socio-political and cultural, and
international economic and political factors affecting the development of the
PRC and ROC. These factors may contradict or be in tension with each other.
Further complexities arise from the interplay of these forces during the
struggles by these two Chinese governments to balance their external relations
with other countries, their maintenance of cultural and political identity at
home, and through the different ways in which they defined modernization.
Against these aspects of external context, this thesis will examine these 
struggles and will seek to identify patterns in the development of the higher
education systems in the PRC and ROC in the last forty-four years. 
1.3 THEORETICAL ORIENTATION OF THE THESIS 
Since the struggles between cultural transmission and economic modernization
in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC are complex, it is useful
20
to establish a theoretical orientation for the analysis.
Among the initial assumptions of the writer of this thesis was the idea
that existing theories which addressed issues of economic modernization and
cultural tradition and the role of higher education systems would be powerful
theoretical guides for a two-country comparative study. In particular, it was
assumed that modernization theory or dependency theory would permit a
dear specification of a problematique and would permit some subsequent
location and explanation of the differences and similarities in the higher
education systems of the two countries. It will be suggested, at length later,
that this initial assumption was false.
It was then assumed that educational convergence theory would not
only permit some explanation of the balance between economic modernization
and cultural transmission, but also that it would be likely to predict the
patterns of higher education systems that might be found. The evidence in
this thesis, it will be argued later at length, indicates that this initial
assumption was also false.
The critiques of these three theories will be an integral part of the 
Conclusion of this thesis. 
However, an approximation of the theoretical approach as required —
one stressing dialectic and contradiction; and one stressing similarities in
education systems — was identified in a theory of world system relations and
in mid-range theorizing about educational isomorphisms. Neither of these
theories proved, finally, to be completely adequate. Again a critique of both
will be offered in the Conclusion.
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But all five theories provide a point of entry into the comparative
problematique of the thesis, and all five theories are rehearsed in the first
chapter. All five theories present some specification of the relations between
economic modernization, international politics, cultural identity and
educational pattern — though in different balances and with rather different
emphases as will be seen in the next section.
1.3.1 Educational Convergence Thesis 
The educational convergence literature argued that higher education systems
converge; that is, they will move toward the training of technical cadres as
countries industrialize regardless of the political orientations, ideologies, and
historical origins of societies. For example, Burton Clark argued that an
increasing "commitment of education to technical and professional
preparation" is a characteristic of industrialized society.' The main function
of higher education is to produce highly trained manpower to create economic
growth in industrial societies.' This kind of manpower, as suggested by
Ungku A. Aziz, comprises scientists and technologists to sustain the progress
of research and development; and administrators, managers and social
scientists for the organization and supervision of resources (human and
material) in the production of goods and services.' 0
 Jean Floud and A. H.
Halsey even argued that the investment in education for the exploitation of
modem technology is a "dominant pattern" in the development of education
in industrialized societies, irrespective of their different socio-political
structures and national histories." This pattern was believed to be common
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to capitalist countries and socialist countries (i.e. the USSR): they were
industrialized.'
Theorists of educational convergence suggested that the shape of higher
education in industrialized countries is marked by three standardized relations
between higher education, economic modernization and society.
First, the general shape of higher education in industrialized countries,
as suggested by Ladislav Cerych and Dorotea E. Furth and Burton Clark, has
been shifted by industrialization from an elitist to a mass orientation.' This
change helps produce more trained personnel for meeting the needs of labour
markets in industrialized economies, and enhances social mobility.
Second, in order to sustain economic growth, industrialized countries,
as observed by Floud, Halsey and Clark Kerr, institutionalized innovation and
research in their higher education systems. As a result, a new social class,
knowledge elites who are academicians or technocrats with higher degrees, is
formed."
Third, the tasks of moral education and cultural transmission are
subordinate to the production of technical cadres in higher education in
industrialized countries. Burton Clark echoed Max Weber's view,' and
suggested that "the ideal of [the] expert" has taken precedence over "the ideal
of the cultivated man" in industrialized societies." As a result, the role of
higher education in cultural transmission is diminished.'
The pattern of the relations of higher education, economic
modernization and society in industrialized countries, it was proposed by Seth
Spaulding and Joseph Herman, would be replicated in developing countries
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because the same kind of forces operated in both types of countries." These
forces in industrialized countries, as suggested by Peter Wright, are: a skill-
oriented labour market; the development of mass higher education; the
demand for accountability of higher education to the government and the
public; new ideas about higher education such as competence, capacity or
enterprises; and forces of internationalism." The training-oriented model, as
suggested by Spaulding and Herman, was transplanted through colonialism
or neo-colonialism, for example, into Southeast Asian countries; or through
voluntary borrowing in Japan."
Thus, higher education in both developed countries and developing
industrializing countries, as implied in the educational convergence thesis, is
mainly an agent of economic modernization for the production of technical
cadres to improve and sustain economic growth.
This thesis will return in the concluding chapter to give an account of
the deficiencies of the educational convergence thesis. The next section will
outline the theories of modernization and dependency.
1.3.2 Theories of Modernization and Dependency 
This thesis will later argue that, like educational convergence theorists,
scholars of modernization and dependency, despite their provision of a
framework in which higher education in developing countries is set in both
international and domestic contexts, are deterministic in predicting the
outcomes of domestic developments under international influences.
Modernization theorists depicted a linear path of modernization for all
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societies. They assume that the world is dichotomized into traditional and
modern sectors, represented respectively by Third World and Western
countries. Third World countries can be modernized by following the
trajectories set by Western countries; for example the path of social transition,
as identified by Talcott Parsons and Marion J. Levy, from 'traditional' to
'industrial' societies; 1 and the stages of economic growth as classified by W.
W. Rostow.22
Modernization theorists also suggested, following the Western pattern,
that to modernize a country means the dissolution of its domestic traditional
values and their replacement with Western ones embedded in domestic socio-
economic structures created by Western countries. Modernization theorists
perceive traditional attitudes, values and institutions as obstacles to the societal
and institutional change during the process of modernizalion;23 and perceive
the state as an agent to remove these obstacles."
In a different way, dependency theorists predicted a linear and
deterministic picture of economic development in Third World countries, and
undervalued their cultures.
Dependency theorists dichotomized the world into two sectors: core and
periphery. They argued that core and peripheral countries are engaged in the
unequal exchange of capital, and predicted that the economic dependency on
core areas by peripheral countries means their underdevelopment. The
agent of exploitation, as suggested by Andre Gunder Frank, is the
"Iumpenbourgeoisie" who are local leaders or elites of periphery countries, but
who also hold values, attitudes and interests consistent with those of core
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countries. Change in socio-political structures is created by these local
leaders or elites to defend the economic interests of core countries.
Some scholars perceived education as part of those socio-economic
structures in peripheral countries (e.g. India' and Vietnam') which are used
by core countries to strengthen further their economic control over peripheral
countries. Higher education institutions particularly of peripheral areas, as
suggested by Robert F. Arnove, are points of mutual contact with core
countries, and also points of penetration? In other words, higher education
in developing countries, as implied in theories of modernization and
dependency, becomes one of the agents of cultural and economic imperialism
by developed countries.
However, these three classical theories (educational convergence,
modernization, and dependency), as will be seen, do not fit the descriptive
data in the comparative study of the higher education systems of the PRC and
ROC. The thesis will return to examine the deficiencies of these three theories
in the concluding chapter.
Needed for the analysis of countries like the PRC and ROC are theories,
such as Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of world systems and Robert Cowen's
idea of educational isomorphisms, which address cultural diversity among
higher education systems of different social and cultural origins; which
secondly help us to understand higher education systems as institutional and
knowledge enterprises affected by both domestic and international influences;
and which thirdly permit analyses of the role of the state as an actor in
shaping higher education.
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These two theories described in sequence in the next two sections frame
the theoretical orientation of this thesis.
1.3.3 Immanuel Wallerstein's Concept of the World System 
Wallerstein asserts that the world system consists of the capitalist world
economy and the interstate system. The single capitalist world economy
comprises three tiers: core, semiperiphery, and periphery.' All countries,
induding socialist? are engaged in the capitalist relation of unequal
exchanger
 in the endless pursuit of accumulation of capital and labour.'
The "political superstructure of the capitalist world-economy," as further
suggested by Wallerstein and Peter D. Phillips, is the interstate system, which
reproduces the hierarchical economic relations between core and peripheral
countries.'
Countries in the international community, Wallerstein argues, compete
with each other in two areas: economic and cultural. But the results of
competition vary with the performances of the states.
In contrast to dependency theorists who predicted the
underdevelopment of Third World countries, Wallerstein argues that the
reliance on core countries by non-core ones does not necessarily lead to their
economic underdevelopment. In the interstate system, member states possess
different capacities to intervene in the operation of the world market, and at
the same time are subject to various degrees of constraint arising from the
mutual relationships of states.' The economic development of countries is
related to the performance of their states, whether core cotmtries % or non-
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core ones. Wallerstein sees the relative economic status of countries (as
peripheral, semiperipheral or core) in the world economy as dynamic, and
change of status is not unidirectional. Countries, by adjusting their economic
strategies to regulate the inflow and outflow of capital, can alter their status,
for instance, from peripheral to semiperiphery,' semiperiphery to core, or
vice versa.'
Moreover, Wallerstein suggests that the flow of economic goods
between states is affected by changes in international political relations, like
the PRC-USSR split in 1960 and the American-Soviet detente in the 1980s.'
Unlike modernization theorists, Wallerstein suggests that Western
economic domination in non-core countries does not necessarily lead to
cultural domination. Despite his former equation of "modernization" to
"Westernization," Wailerstein suggests that the world system is a "complex
of cultures.' In the world system of "cultural multiplicity,' countries
encounter two cultural dialectics: simultaneous creation of "a homogenous
world and distinctive national cultures within this world"; and of
"homogenous national cultures and distinctive ethnic groups" within the
countries.
Within the world of cultural diversities at the international, national and
sub-national levels, the states, as suggested by Wallerstein, play contradictory
roles at dual levels: to maintain "cultural diversity" at the international level,
and to sustain "cultural uniformity" at the national level. In particular, the
states control a great deal of physical force to resist the formation of global
"cultural homogeneity," and to promote "cultural uniformity" within their
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territories." The masses or local leaders of the second or third generation in
non-core countries can plan and organize powerful politico-cultural resistance
against ideological diffusion from Western countries.'
Despite the possible usefulness of the Wallerstein's concepts of world
system in understanding the dialectical economic, political and cultural
relations between states, Wallerstein is expected to be imprecise' in two
areas: tensions between cultural transmission and the economic tasks of higher
education; and the politico-cultural resistance against foreign cultures in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC. This thesis will deal with the
first limitation of Wallerstein in the next section, and the second later in the
thesis.
1.3.4 Robert Cowen's Concept of Educational Isomorphisms
This section will focus particularly on Robert Cowen's concept of educational
isomorphism — educational similarities, "static patterns of educational
phenomena; analyzed on a worldwide basis.' The discussion serves as a
link between Wallerstein's concept of world system (which is utilized as the
general theoretical orientation of this thesis) and the complex relations of the
economic and cultural tasks of higher education in countries like the PRC and
ROC in the world system.
Many countries in the world system, as suggested by Cowen, exhibit
educational isomorphisms which arise from four forces that may conflict: the
search for cultural identity and authenticity; the establishment of international
educational relations between nation states; economic improvement; and the
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search for equalization of educational opportunity." Under different
historical, social and economic forces, these four aspirations in various
countries lead to different patterns of conflicts, and different educational
decisions.'
For example, Cowen suggests that in the educational systems of new
revolutionary countries (like Algeria or Angola), cultural transmission is in
tension with economic improvement.' Some of these new revolutionary
countries framed the content and the selection of their educational principles
with a new transnational revolutionary principle, Marxism-Leninism.' These
revolutionary states redefined their educational principles and aims in a
dialectical way: to reject that part of the national history which contradicts the
current "revolutionary ideology," and to re-assert the "authentic elements in the
culture of the people" to build a new future; and, on the other hand, to
address the problems of modernization. Therefore, free and compulsory
education is used as a means to meet economic needs, while at the same time
it is employed to strengthen the "processes of cultural transmission of the
revolutionary ideology.' Schools do both economic and cultural tasks, often
with great difficulty.
However, the tension between the search of cultural identity and
economic development in many countries is complicated by their international
educational relations. To develop such relations can be perceived by many
governments as a solution to economic development, but may pose new
problems of cultural identity. Clashes of cultural messages, as suggested
by Cowen, occur in the schools of these countries which are engaged in
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borrowing or lending educational systems.'
Despite the usefulness of the idea of educational isomorphisms in
understanding the dialectical relations between the preservation of cultural
identity and economic modernization in education, and between equality and
selection, Cowen, like Wallerstein, is not precise about the processes of placing
checks on international economic and educational relations. He is also
expected to be imprecise about the effects of these dialectical relations on the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC.
Thus the task of this thesis is two-fold. First, the thesis, as mentioned
earlier in this chapter, will look for patterns in the development of the higher
education systems in the PRC and ROC. Second, the thesis will offer (in the
conduding chapter) critiques of the theories of educational convergence,
modernization, and dependency, and will refine Wallerstein's concept of the
world system and Cowen's idea of educational isomorphisms.
Overall, then, on one dimension, this thesis is an extended essay in
choosing among, and in rejecting or refining these theories. The final chapter
makes these choices dear.
On another dimension, sustained throughout the thesis, this is an
extended essay in establishing in a theoretically significant way just what the
patterns of higher education in the PRC and ROC have been, are, and are
becoming.
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1.4 THE MAIN ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will develop these themes against a main argument despite the
conventional and frequently stressed differences between the social and central
value systems of the PRC and ROC since 1949, both higher education
systems have been affected in their curricular and institutional structures by
the establishment of different external links with foreign countries and the
rejection of those foreign values which were deemed challenging to the central
value system' by the respective Chinese political leaders.
The first part of the main argument will be tested in Chapter Two,
which suggests that pre-1949 Chinese higher education faced the tension
(between the development of external economic relations with other countries
and the selective rejection of foreign values) that later affected the higher
education systems of the PRC and ROC.
The 1911 revolutionaries ended the emperor political system of imperial
China, but did not institutionalize opposition in the new republican system,
and therefore did not manage to transform the traditional socio-political
culture of China into one marked by political pluralism.
Both contemporary Chinese higher education systems inherited this
problem. The discussion of pre-1949 Chinese higher education provides a
striking pattern of similarities to the two contemporary Chinese education
systems in university curriculum and in the establishment of institutions, and
is therefore a basic reference point to which this thesis will frequently refer.
The second part of the main argument is tested in Chapter 3: the tension
between the establishment of external links with foreign countries and the
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selective rejection of those foreign values (which were deemed challenging to
the central value system by the respective Chinese political leaders) in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC has been framed domestically
by their national economic and socio-political problems; and, at the same time,
internationally by their political and economic relations with other countries.
This chapter will concentrate on the social construction of the central
value systems of these two Chinese countries, the mechanisms to keep the
official values alive, and the apparent and actual contradictions which emerged
at domestic and international levels.
Against this understanding of both historical and contemporary contexts
of the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC, Chapter 4 argues that
the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC, despite their redefinition
through revolutionary domestic and international relations and their
contradictions at both domestic and international levels, were both more
"closed" than their economies; i.e. both Chinese higher education systems have
transmitted the revolutionary ideals and values of the first-generation leaders
over the last forty-four years.
The fourth and fifth parts of the main argument concerning the
economic tasks of both Chinese higher education systems are developed
respectively in Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 argues that despite differential strategies in the utilization of
science and technology and in their importation from abroad for economic
purposes, the PRC and ROC injected imported science of technology with
domestic socio-political values.
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The argument in Chapter 6 is that the higher education systems of the
PRC and ROC were marked by curricular and infrastructural adjustments for
the accommodation of foreign science and technology for economic purposes.
However, the PRC and ROC differed in their strategies. Education for science
and technology in higher education of the PRC preceded its modernization,
but in the ROC it followed modernization. Science and technology education
was used in the PRC to create national modernization. In contrast, science and
technology education in the ROC was adjusted to meet the demands of its
industrializing economy.
Finally, Chapter 7 as the conclusion of this thesis suggests that the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC exhibited patterns. These
patterns are identified. It is also suggested that these patterns contradict the
assumptions or predictions of the theories of educational convergence,
modernization, and dependency; and are not adequately explained by theories
of the world system, and educational isomorphisms. Moreover, some
conclusions of the thesis are refined by the results of the interviews conducted
in the PRC and ROC at the closing stage of this research (see Appendixes 1.1
and 1.2).
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE PRC AND ROC
2.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical contexts of higher
education of the PRC and ROC. The chapter highlights those antecedents in
pre-1949 Chinese higher education which were similar to those found in both
contemporary Chinese higher education systems (1949-1993). In particular, the
chapter discusses the characteristics of traditional Chinese socio-political
culture, and the interactions between pre-1949 Chinese higher education, the
state, and Confucianism.
Pre-1949 Chinese higher education can be divided into two major
periods: classical (before the 1840s) and transitional (between the 1840s and
1940s). Chinese higher education between the 1840s and 1940s is referred to
in this thesis as "transitional" for three reasons. Firstly, this period saw the
introduction of Western philosophy and Western institutions into classical
Chinese higher education. Thus began the struggle between the preservation
of cultural identity and the development of external links for economic
modernization in Chinese higher education. Secondly, at this time the role of
Chinese higher education shifted from the recruitment of literati officials to the
production of technical cadres. Thirdly the end of this period marked the
emergence of two separate contemporary Chinese higher education systems
which were illuminated by different ideological visions and developed in
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different social systems.
The argument of this chapter is that pre-1949 Chinese higher education
faced similar tensions between the development of external links with other
countries and the selective refusal of foreign values which (were deemed
challenging to the official ones) later occurred in the higher education systems
of the PRC and ROC. The social revolution in China in 1911 did not solve the
tension. The Chinese revolutionaries in the 1910s ended the longstanding
monarchy, but did not institutionalize opposition in the political structure.
Therefore, they did not manage to transform traditional Chinese socio-political
culture (which emphasized loyalty to numerically few political leaders and
observance to social norms prescribed by them) into a culture marked by
public political pluralism. Thus both the "new" societies — the PRC and ROC -
- inherited this problem.
The argument is developed in the following manner. First, it is
suggested that the government of Imperial China played a dominant role in
determining the scope and direction of the development of classical Chinese
higher education. The imperial state created a macro-context in which the
contacts between Chinese and foreign cultures were minimized, and
deliberately created a context in which classical Chinese higher education
stressed Confucianism which emphasized moral education. Second, the
incorporation of foreign methods and technology into China did not
necessarily mean the synthesis of the Chinese Confucian value system and
Western value system in transitional Chinese higher education between the
1840s and 1940s. During this period, Chinese higher education made changes
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in curricular and institutional structures for accommodating Western learning,
and at the same time the state controlled these structures for the transmission
of central values to students.
This chapter is organized into two parts: classical Chinese higher
education; and transitional Chinese higher education.
2.2 CLASSICAL CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION 
By the 1840s, China, ZhOnggu6 (The Middle Kingdom), had had commercial
and cultural contacts with many countries in the previous 2000 years.
However, classical Chinese higher education did not contain any foreign
elements, and evolved only around the Confucian tradition.
This section attempts to explain the self-development of classical
Chinese higher education through the description of the relation between
Imperial China and foreign countries, and through the demonstration of the
interplay between classical Chinese higher education, Confucianism and the
imperial state. Confucianism is used in this thesis to refer to a broad tradition
which was developed around the major teachings of Confucius (KOng-if, 551-
479 B.C.) in Imperial China before 1911.1
This section argues that the Chinese imperial state confined the scope
and emphasis of the development of classical Chinese higher education at two
levels: inter-cultural and intra-cultural.
At the inter-cultural level, the imperial state adopted a policy of unequal
transmission of cultures, i.e. China exported its culture to other countries, but
limited the contacts of foreign cultures with the Chinese culture in China. The
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imperial state believed that China was the economic and cultural core of its
"world" - East Asia, and rejected any infiltration of foreign cultures into the
imperial systems.
At the intra-cultural level, the imperial state suppressed other schools
of thought in the political structure, and constrained dassical Chinese higher
education to evolving mainly around Confucianism through the creation of
relations between education, Confucianism and the imperial government.
Therefore, classical Chinese higher education had a strong institutional
structure to transmit Confucian values and to resist the infiltration of non-
Confucian traditions including technical education.
The detailed categories of this section are: the international relations of
Imperial China; the sociology and education philosophy of Confucianism; and
the institutionalization of classical Chinese higher education. The examination
of the international relations of China is to show its cultural policies towards
other countries. The discussion of the sociology and education philosophy of
Confucianism offers an explanation for the imperial state's preference for
adopting Confucianism as the central value system. The analysis of the
institutionalization of classical Chinese higher education is to demonstrate how
the imperial state transmitted the central value system across different
dynasties.
2.2.1 Sino-centric International Relations of Imperial China 
This section describes the international relations of Imperial China and offers
an explanation for why and how it preserved its cultural and political identity
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at the international level. This thesis suggests that the policy of unequal
cultural transmission of Imperial China was a reflection of its Sino-centric
worldview, and was demonstrated in its cultural and economic policies
towards foreigners in China or abroad.
The Chinese policy of unequal cultural transmission, this section first
argues, was an expression of its Sino-centric worldview, i.e. China perceived
itself as the core of its "world" and other countries as peripheries. The Sino-
centric perception of Imperial China, sometimes called "dynastical cosmology"'
or "Sinocentric cosmology,"" started with two premises: China as the centre of
its "world," and its emperors as "sons of Heaven" and rulers of all countries.
The Sino-centric worldview of China had roots deep in the classical Confucian
thinking of the 6th century, B.C. and lasted for more than two thousand years.
According to Confucius, China was a cultural centre of its "world"; and those
tribes or countries without Chinese rites were described as "barbarians" (y0
and were regarded as inferior to China.' Chinese rites were supposed to have
the power to civilize other cultures,' but not to be eroded by other cultures.'
In the 12th century A.D., the Japanese were called the "barbarians of a small
island."' In the 18th century, the Chinese Emperor Qian Long of the Qing
Dynasty called the British merchants "barbarian merchants" and their vessels
"barbarian vessels." He declared that China was self-sufficient because it
possessed "all things" and there was "no need to import" the products of
outside barbarians.'
The perception of China as a cultural centre of its world was reinforced
by other factors. Haiguang Yan has suggested that China found it difficult to
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accept other cultures because it perceived itself as a self-sufficient system in
which both spiritual and material constructions were superior to those of other
countries, and on which they depended.' Samuel S. Kim has pointed out that
the geographical barriers surrounding China reduced the contacts between
Chinese and foreign cultures; and that no rival civilization in Asia could
compete with the Chinese culture!'
Moreover, China regarded herself as a political power centre of its
"world," and particularly as an overlord receiving tribute from its vassals
within the "redistributive world-empire" in East Asia!' Like Japan, Korea
began to pay tribute to the Chinese court during the SOng Dynasty (960-1279
A.D.) .12 The founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) even
believed that the previous Chinese emperors were endowed with supreme
power by Heaven to rule over the world. He also emphasized that the
Chinese formed "the central power within [the empire perceived by the
Chinese] to govern the barbarians, while the barbarians submitted to the rule
of the Chinese."'
The Chinese policy of unequal cultural transmission, this thesis further
argues, was demonstrated in the control of the interactions between the
Chinese culture and foreign cultures by Imperial China. China exported its
culture to other countries. Overseas students in China received Confucian
education, and took Confucianism and Buddhism back to their home
countries." As a result, the cultures of other East Asian countries, like Korea
and Japan," were influenced by Chinese characters and Confucianism." In
the 15th century, A.D., the export of Chinese culture to other countries with
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the help of military forces was perceived by the Chinese authorities as a
mission of cultural transformation.' Furthermore, China assaulted those
countries including Nepal which resisted China's cultural exports in 17%
A.D."
On the other hand, China limited the infiltration of foreign cultures as
indicated in its economic policies towards foreigners in China. Although the
Chinese attitude of ethnocentricism did not exclude economic links with other
countries, a series of control measures was adopted to minimize foreign
influences. The measures included high taxes on foreign goods," limitations
on the freedom of movement for foreigners who were seen as the carriers and
transmitters of foreign values and beliefs in China," the prohibition of
intermarriage between Chinese and foreigners,' and the requirement to
practise Chinese customs and ceremony in the court of Imperial China.'
The total rejection of foreign cultures, this thesis finally argues, took
place in the political structure rather than in the civilian life of China. In the
Later Han Dynasty (58-75 A.D.), Emperor Ming opened up China to Indian
Buddhism. Since the introduction into Imperial China, Buddhism, as noted by
Bertrand Russell in 1922, had been the only foreign religion tolerated in the
Chinese civilization.' Buddhism was allowed to exist even when
Confucianism first faced the danger of being "polluted" by Buddhism and
Legalism promoted by Confucian Wang Tong in the Sul Dynasty (581-618
A.D.).
However, the importation of foreign value systems may challenge
indigenous political leadership of Imperial China. When Confucianism, the
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central value system of Imperial China, was threatened by replacement in the
political structure with Buddhism and the possibility of the "Indianization of
China" in the Mid-Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.)," Confucian political leaders,
like Han Ya, began to criticize Buddhism severely by appealing to the Chinese
tradition and the Confucian authority.' Finally, Buddhism was purged from
all governmental systems under a decree issued by Emperor Wii Ze•ng in 845
A.D.' In contrast to the religious persecutions in the Near East and Europe,
the purge of Buddhism in China was aimed only at the clergy and their
property. No suppression was launched against Buddhist lay believers.'
Despite its influence on the daily life of the Chinese people, Buddhism was not
permitted to influence the political dimension of China,' and failed to modify
the Sino-centric perception of the imperial state.'
Although there were inter-cultural conflicts between Confucianism and
Buddhism in the political structure of China, the imperial state isolated
classical Chinese higher education from foreign influences by means of the
creation of a macro-cultural context which was limited in its contacts with
foreign cultures. The next section will examine the domination of
Confucianism over other domestic value systems within the Chinese culture
of China.
2.2.2 Confucianism and the State 
This section focusses on the sociology of Confucianism, and then discusses the
relations between the imperial state and Confucianism. This section argues
that at the intra-cultural level, Chinese emperors adopted Confucianism as the
54
central value system to legitimize their political leadership, and suppressed
other value systems which would challenge the domination of Confucianism
in the political structure.
Confucianism advocated a value system which helped the Chinese to
conform to the existing socio-political order of Imperial China through the
practice of personal and social morality in a hierarchical society. First of all,
Confucians justified the existence of a hierarchical society in Imperial China
by advocating that Chinese society was marked by five major relationships of
human beings: between emperor and subordinate, between father and son,
between husband and wife, between old and young, and between friends. The
first relation was dynastic; the last one was social; and the other three were
familial. All relations were vertical and non-egalitarian, except the last. These
relations were "ascriptive," in Talcott Parsons' sense, because they are based
on physical and non-achievable social attributes such as sex, age, and
kinship.' Moreover, there was another social stratification in accordance
with economic status inside Chinese society. The classes of people were
ranked in the order of "scholar-official, farmer, artisan, and merchant.' The
high status of scholar-official was also reflected in an old Chinese saying: "the
pursuit of knowledge is superior to all the other occupations."'
Secondly, Confucians believed that the socio-political status quo and
harmony of Imperial China would be preserved if the Chinese people
conformed to the existing order of "superordination and subordination" among
the five relationships.' The state of Imperial China was "personified by the
emperors" who claimed to rule on the strength of popular support and "a
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mandate of heaven," and who relied on the cooperation of literati officials.'
The imperial Chinese society, as suggested by Confucius, would be
harmonious if all citizens observed their own personal and social duties.'
The responsibilities of citizens were broadly summed up in their practice of
the principle of zhOng shO, i.e. faithfully fulfilling their duty to the best of their
abilities, and benevolently using themselves as a measure to treat others.36
It was reported that there were 300 rules of ceremony and 3,000 rules of
demeanour for a sage to observe. In particular, Confucianism suggested
that the promotion of two great moral rules - filial piety to parents and loyalty
to the emperor - would help people conform to the socio-political status quo
of the imperial Chinese society. Confucianism could be regarded as the
"champion of familism and feudalism."' Therefore, the Confucian tradition
provided a rational justification of the social system for its leaders in Imperial
The emperors of China, this thesis further argues, utilized a central
value system to legitimize their political leadership, and to promote socio-
political harmony among the Chinese empire. China, as noted by John A. Hall
and G. John Ikenberry, had a weak state infrastructure, and many social norms
were created and reinforced through a kinship system.' The founding
emperor of the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.), Qin Shit Huang, adopted the idea
of Prime Minister, Li Sr, to use Legalism' as an ideological instrument to
consolidate the political unity of the first Chinese empire which was united by
military forces. Therefore, Qin banned all other schools of thought. Above all,
he ordered books to be burned in 213 B.C. and 460 Confucian intellectuals to
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be buried alive in 211 B.C.'
However, the Qin dynasty lasted only 15 years, and Legalism was
replaced by Confucianism as the central value system during the Han Dynasty
(206 B.C. - 220 A.D.). In resolving not to suffer the fate of his predecessors
whose dynasties lasted a very short time and accepting the advice of
Confucian D?5ng ZhOngshe, Emperor WU of the Han Dynasty issued an
imperial edict to establish the ideology, by banning other schools and
upholding only Confucianism as well as its Five Classics in 176 B.C.
Leaders of the Legalist school were discharged from the government in 141
B.C. Moreover, in the national university a wholly Confucian curriculum was
established to train officials. Following the example of Emperor Wit, Emperor
Tai ZOng of the Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), issued an imperial edict to
promote the Confucian classics. After these two imperial edicts, Confucianism
was used frequently as an ideological tool for political unity by many
founding emperors of the successive dynasties up to the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911 A.D.)."
Confucianism, after being adopted as the state ideology, had a low
tolerance of other schools of thought which did not support the imperial
leadership. Indian Buddhism, as discussed earlier, challenged the status of
Confucianism, and was purged from state systems in 845 A.D. In the twelfth
century A.D., Neo-Confucianism split into two irreconcilable philosophical
currents: the dualistic and rationalistic axue school (Study of Principles) led
by Zhu-xi and Chêng brothers, and the monistic and idealistic Mnxuê school
(Study of the Mind) led by Li' Xiangshan and Wang Yangming. They
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competed with each other in re-interpreting the classics. At last, the Lfxuê
school won the battle because Lixue was a useful version of Confucianism for
the emperors of the Yuan, Ming and 'Zing dynasties. Lixue did not advocate
extreme political activism. On the contrary, it provided ideological support for
autocratic emperors. Like classical Confucianism, it urged zealous self-
cultivation through the study of past precepts and precedents.
Thus, Confucianism was used as a central value system by Chinese
emperors to rationalize the hierarchical Chinese society and to legitimize their
political leadership. As a result, Chinese culture, particularly the political
system, was marked by the domination of Confucianism over other domestic
and foreign value systems. The next two sections will discuss the domination
of Confucianism in Chinese education.
2.2.3 Education, Confucianism, and the State 
This section describes the relations between education, Confucianism as a
central value system, and the state in China. The description will centre on
the philosophy and role of Confucian education. This section argues that
Confucian education emphasized its cultural task for the recruitment of literati
officials more than its economic task for the production of personnel of
technical skills for the agricultural economy.
Confucian education, it is first argued in this section, was essentially
moral education which emphasized the cultivation of the moral qualities of
learners. Common to Confucians was an educational premise that human
nature was malleable, and could be improved by education. In particular,
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Confucius advocated that all people, regardless of their class origins, were
cognitively malleable and their educational achievements depended on their
learning attitude.' Moreover, most people, according to Confucians, were
morally malleable and close to one another "by nature," and they diverged as
a result of learning and repeated practice.'
Later, the theme of moral malleability, rather than cognitive malleability,
was articulated by Confucians. Mencius (Meng-zi, 372-289 B.C) asserted that
human nature was originally good,' while Xim-zi (active period: 298-238
B.C.) regarded human nature as being innately evil.' Mencius believed that
ordinary people could be trained to become sages.' The antithesis between
good and evil human nature was harmonized differently by Däng ZhOngsha
(c.179-104 B.C.)51 and Zha-ii (1130-1200 A.D.).' Despite different
approaches, these Confucians agreed that moral goodness was the target of the
development of human nature, and that people could improve on their nature
through learning and training.
The emphasis on moral development by Confucianism shaped classical
Chinese higher education, it is further argued in this section, to be one which
preferred moral education to vocational education. Confucianism mainly
comprised a set of moral teaching and precepts. A list of virtues was
recommended by Confucians. For Confucius, the major elements of self-
cultivation included wisdom (zh1), benevolence (ren), and courage (yOng);
for Mencius, benevolence (rên), righteousness (yl), propriety (11), and wisdom
(zh1)." Han I'll of the Tang Dynasty (618 - 907 A.D.) added trustworthiness
(x1n) as the fifth quality in Mendus' list.' The methods of self-cultivation
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were numerous, but they were associated with self-control in thought, speech
and deeds in relation to others in a society.'
Confucius, despite his instruction to pupils in the six arts, gave priority
to Rites and Music over Archery, Charioteering, Writing and Numbers? The
content of his instruction was centred around culture, ethics, devotion of soul,
and trustfulness? The "textbooks" for students were the Four Books and the
Six Classics? These "textbooks" embodied numerous moral teachings
through which students could develop their human nature. Confucians
believed that these teachings could enable students to acquire perfect wisdom,
to master the moral principles with regard to government and the
administration of a society."
In contrast, Confucianism seldom mentioned the agriculturally
dominant context of Imperial China. When asked about husbandry and
gardening, Confucius openly admitted that he was not as useful for that as an
old gardener." Mencius even differentiated the role of mental work and
menial work in a hierarchical society. He advocated that those who labour
with their minds should govern; those who labour with their strength are
governed by others.'
This section finally argues that the state of Imperial China utilized
Confucian education as a political means to consolidate the leadership of the
aristocratic dass through the training of literati officials to staff the imperial
government. First of all, Confucian education was perceived as a meritocratic
means to ease the tension between aristocrats and commoners in a hierarchical
society. Confucius believed that education was to regulate the path of
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personal and social duties which were performed in accordance with the
nature conferred by Heaven." He also proposed education for people as one
of the government's principal strategies for sustaining a nation." For the
government, the educational task was to develop the moral qualities of people
within the hierarchical framework and to train them to acquire obedient
attitudes towards their superiors. Through the education system, the imperial
state could recruit submissive literati officials to staff the government.
Confucian education was a means by which commoners had an equal chance
to develop their potential for moral advancement and move up the social
ladder through self-cultivation. The promotion of self-cultivation in Confucian
education is a socio-political means to achieve harmony in a society. The
purpose of self-cultivation was to achieve reverence, and bring peace and
security first to their fellow people, and then to the whole people."
In summary, the imperial state, despite its toleration of the infiltration
of Buddhism into people's daily life, created a cultural and political context
which was limited in contact with foreign influence. Among the Chinese
schools of thought in the same culture, the imperial state also adopted
Confucianism as the central value system to rationalize the hierarchial socio-
political status quo and legitimate the political leadership of emperors.
Confucian education emphasized moral education, but not technical skills.
However, the quick change of the central value system within two decades
(221-207 B.C.) from Legalism in the Qin Dynasty to Confucianism in the Hän
Dynasty suggested that the inter-relations between Chinese education, the
state, and the central value system, could be changed as a matter of choice by
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the state. The next section will examine how these inter-relations were
consolidated across different dynasties (206 B.C. - 1840 A.D.).
2.2.4 The Institutionalization of Classical Chinese Higher Education 
This section describes the institutionalization of the transmission of
Confucianism in dassical Chinese higher education. The section argues that
a strong institutional mechanism was established by the imperial Chinese state
in classical Chinese higher education to transmit Confucianism to students.
This in turn protected the interests of Confucianism and the imperial state.
The institutional defence of classical Chinese higher education was reflected
in state control over classical Chinese higher education in three dimensions:
administrative structure; the allocation of staff and students; and the
examination system.
State controls over the educational administrative structure, the
allocation of staff and students and the examination system are chosen in this
section to demonstrate what types of personnel were produced in the classical
Chinese higher education system. In particular, the imperial state with
emperor as head of state was a major creator and keeper of the state education
system in China. The allocation of staff and students indicated the distribution
of educational manpower by the state for given purposes and the types of
personnel who were trained for these purposes. The examination system is
selected because examination contents indicated what students should have
learned, and examination results gave a comparative scale of how well
students mastered the contents prescribed by the imperial Chinese state in
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examinations.
2.2.4.1 State Leadership in Educational Administration
The imperial Chinese state, this section argues, was the major actor in the
creation and maintenance of the relations between classical Chinese higher
education and Confucianism. Classical Chinese higher education was subject
to the direct administrative control of the imperial state.
The classical Chinese higher education system was first established by
the imperial state in China in the 2nd century B.C. The Imperial University
(Taixuê) was established in the capital, Changan. In 124 B.C., fifty young
people who were over 18 years old, with good physical looking, and with high
moral standard were admitted to the study of classical learning and were
trained to be government officials." Later, provincial higher education
institutes (pIngudxuë) were established in different provinces.'
Moreover, special ministers were assigned by the emperor to supervise
the teaching staff. At the beginning of classical Chinese higher education, the
Taichang (one of nine top ministers of the government) exercised his control
over teaching staff. The teaching staff comprised five doctors of the Five
Classics (one for each Classic) in 136 B.C. The faculty was expanded to
fourteen doctors by Emperor Guang WU of the Later Han Dynasty (25-56
A.D.). The faculty members, after passing numerous state-controlled
examinations, were appointed by the imperial government.
Later, despite several challenges for the diversification of fields of study
to include subjects other than Confucian studies," the whole classical Chinese
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higher education system was still under the leadership of the imperial state.
Since the greatest challenge came in the early Tang Dynasty, its classical
Chinese higher education system is used as an illustration of state leadership.
In the early Tang Dynasty, the classical Chinese higher education
system was divided into two levels: central and provincial. The schools within
the central system were sub-divided into those directly administered by the
Ministry of Education (GudzIjian), and those under other ministries. Directly
under the Ministry of Education were Confucian schools and specialized
schools. Confucian schools included the School of National Youth (GuOzixuê),
the Imperial University (Taixue), and the School of Four Gates (Simênxuê);
while specialized schools comprised the School of Law, the School of
Calligraphy (Shaxue), and the School of Mathematics (Suanxue). Under other
ministries, but still related to the Ministry of Education, were the School of
Humanities Appreciation (ChOngwênxue Quan) and the School of Promoting
Humanities (HOngwênxuè Quan) for the study of Confucian classics by the
children of the royal kin and the most senior officials; the School of
Metaphysics (ChOngxuanxud Quail) for the study of metaphysics; and the
School of Medicine (Y1Xue Quart) for the recruitment of court doctors.'
Thus, the classical Chinese higher education system was marked by a
vertical administrative hierarchy: geographically from the capital to other
provinces; and in term of accountability, from faculty members to state
ministers, and fmally to the emperor as head of state. The next section will
discuss how the imperial state controlled the areas of study through the
allocation of teachers and students in classical Chinese higher education.
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2.2.4.2 Allocation of Teaching Staff and Students
Despite the diversification of the fields of study, a major purpose of classical
Chinese higher education, it is argued in this section, was to protect the
propagation of Confucianism, and the interests of the privileged class. This
was reflected in the allocation of more educational input (teachers and
students) for Confucian studies than other subjects in classical Chinese higher
education. The data for the analysis of the distribution of staff and students
were drawn from the Tang dynasty which faced the greatest challenge of
diversification.
There were three indicators to support the argument of this sub-section.
First, more staff members were allocated for Confucian studies than non-
Confucian ones. One of the two deputy-ministers was allocated specifically
for Confucian studies." Within the system directly under the supervision of
the educational minister, the ratio of the total number of doctors (bOshl) and
assistant lecturers (zhjiao) between Confucian and non-Confucian studies was
34 : 10 (see Table 2.1). In other words, 77.3% of teaching staff were allocated
to Confucian studies. Second, most of the students were trained in the
Confucian tradition. In terms of student enrolment, the ratio was 2,100: 110,
i.e. 95% of the students were trained under the Confucian tradition (see Table
2.2). Third, in the provincial academy, one doctor, with the help of one
assistant, was fully responsible for teaching the Five Classics.' These three
indicators suggest that, despite the broadening of the field of study, classical
Chinese higher education was still highly Confucian.
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Table 2.1 Number of doctors and assistant lecturers in different types of
higher education institutes in the Tang Dynasty.
TYPE OF INSTITUTE DOCTORS ASSISTANTLECTURERS TOTAL STAFF
School of National Youth 5 5 10
Imperial University 6 6 12
School of Four Gates 6 6 12
School of Law 3 1 4
School of Calligraphy 2 1 3
School of Mathematics 2 1 3
Source: XiU Ouyang, Xin Tang Sha: Biz'iquan Zhi, Vol. 48, Part 38, pp.16-
18. It is in Xin Tang sha (History of the New Tang Dynasty)
(Beijing: Zhônghud, 1975), Vol.4, pp.1265-1268.
Table 2.2 The quota and the dass origin of students enrolled in different
imperial schools in the Tang Dynasty.
TYPE OF INSTITUTE QUOTA BASIC CLASS ORIGIN
School of National Youth 300 3rd-rank official or above
Imperial University 500 5th-rank official or above
School of Four Gates 1300 500 from 7th-rank official or above, 800from excellent commoners.
School of Law 50
8th-rank or below; or academically goodSchool of Calligraphy 30 commoners
School of Mathematics 30
Source: Xiil Ouyang, Xi?: Tdng Shic Xudnfil Zhl, Vol. 44, Part 34. It is in
Xi?! Tang Shzt (History of the New Tang Dynasty) (Beijing:
Zhônghua, 1975), Vol.4, pp.1159-1160.
The partial distribution of staff and students for Confucian studies also
reflected the patrimonialistic nature of dassical Chinese higher education. The
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interests of the privileged dass in China were defended, in Max Weber's sense,
through personal networks and cliques? and through school networks
controlled by the state. First of all, the type of higher education received by
students depended on their class origin, particularly, the ranking of their
fathers in the state hierarchy (see Table 2.2). The higher the rank of their
fathers, the more chance the children had of access to a more privileged school
for Confucian studies, and hence the greater possibility they had of access to
high official posts.
Moreover, the children of the relatives of the emperor could easily gain
access to classical Chinese higher education in the court.' In contrast, the
children of commoners had very little chance to get official posts of high rank
through education as a meritocratic means. If these children succeeded in
obtaining a place in classical Chinese higher education, most of them were
enrolled in specialized colleges, rather than Confucian colleges.'
The partial allocation of students and teachers for Confucian studies
was the second type of institutional defence to safeguard Confucianism as the
central value system, and the interests of the privileged class in China.
2.2.4.3 Civil Service Examinations
The system of civil service examinations, it is argued in this section, was the
third type of institutional defence which firmly consolidated the relations
between the imperial state, Confucianism and classical Chinese higher
education.
The examination system directly linked classical Chinese higher
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education with officialdom. An oral civil service examination system (chajil)
emerged in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.- 220 A.D.) to select officials. Later, the
oral examination system was replaced with a written civil service examination
system (Kejil) in the Sul Dynasty (581 - 618 A.D.) in order to minimize the
subjective selection, and to stop the development of an hereditary
aristocracy." The importance of Confucian examination was intensified by
Wang Anshf who introduced a pyramidal tripartite university system, Three-
Hall System (Sanshe), in 1071.' Only extremely bright graduates would be
awarded high-ranking posts." However, the Three-Hall system was
abolished in 1104 A.D. Written examinations were quickly reinstated after
Wang lost his power. The candidates for the examinations were students
coming from the imperial higher education system. Later, extremely
distinguished people could also be recommended for examinations by
provincial officials in the early Tang Dynasty.'
Moreover, Chinese civil examinations which were used to recruit state
officials were Confucian-oriented. The Confucian classical writings set the
content for students to study and for examiners to ask questions. The basic
texts were the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics, which contained about
400,000 characters, to be memorized by students." The Five Classics were
believed to contain ideas derived from a variety of disparate strands of
thinking, and could be referred to for solving political and moral problems.8°
Commentaries on the Classics were also induded as part of the syllabus.'
The more Classics they successfully passed, the higher rank they were
awarded in the government hierarchy. Those who failed the examination
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were allowed to repeat it or were dismissed. The subjects of examination were
numerous. Except the jinshi (belles lettre) examination which was
concerned with current national affairs and policy-making matters, most
examinations tested the candidates' ability to memorize classical texts."
Behind the Chinese civil servant examination system was the
consolidation of the relations between classical Chinese higher education,
Confucianism and the imperial state. The standardized textbooks reinforced
personal and social ethics, and promoted filialty to parents and loyalty to
emperors through different dynasties. The examination system was an
actualization of Confucian moitocratic principles and provided a channel for
people to procure high official posts in a hierarchical society. On the other
hand, the examination system became a vehicle to achieve, to nurture and
sustain the strength of Confucian classical learning.' The formation of a
literati-dominated bureaucracy began to replace China's hereditary aristocracy
in the government hierarchy. The literati bureaucrats staffed the government
from the SOng dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) down to the demise of (ring Dynasty
(1616-1911 A.D.)." The literary curriculum and examination lasted nearly
two thousand years until they were abolished by the Ckng government in 1905
A.D.
In conclusion, this section has described the relations between classical
Chinese higher education, Confucianism, and the imperial state of China. It
has been argued that traditional socio-political culture in Imperial China was
marked by limited toleration for foreign cultures, and was paternalistic.
Classical Chinese higher education was institutionalized in a Sino-centric
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context, and deliberately linked with Confucianism by the state to defend its
political interests. Classical Chinese higher education emphasized its cultural
tasks more than economic tasks. This resulted in the formation of the literati
tradition which emphasized the pursuit of moral development, but which was
detached from the agricultural economy of China and from international
interactions. In contrast to Western education, Classical Chinese higher
education depreciated professional education, particularly in science and
technology.' The weakness of classical Chinese higher education was fully
revealed by the military challenge of foreign countries near the middle of the
19th century. How Chinese higher education changed when China was forced
to open up to Western countries is the major concern of the next section.
2.3 TRANSITIONAL CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION 
This section describes the development of transitional Chinese higher
education in China between the 1840s and 1940s. The section highlights the
struggles between Chinese education and Western learning.
The argument of this section is that the incorporation of Western
educational methods and learning into transitional Chinese higher education
between the 1840s and 1940s did not necessarily mean the synthesis of Chinese
and foreign value systems in the struggles between Chinese education and
Western learning. The struggles were initiated by the technological inferiority
of China, and were about the balance between Confucian education and
Western learning in Chinese higher education. Behind the struggles was a
mixed perception of the cultural superiority and technological inferiority of
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China. The heart of the struggles was the Chinese fear of the replacement of
the Confucian value system with a Western one which might penetrate,
together with Western learning, into the Chinese system.
In the second half of the transitional period (1910s-1940s), the concept
of loyalty to numerically few political leaders and observance of social norms
prescribed by them, this section further argues, prevailed in China, despite the
abolition of the monarchical political system by the first social revolution in
1911, and despite the change in the content of central value system. Between
1911 and 1920, the Republican government incorporated Confucianism into the
Three People's Principles. Although the political leadership of China was split
into two after 1921, the Chinese Communist Party adopted socialism as the
party's ideology; and the Chinese Nationalist Party . still upheld the
Three People's Principles.
Finally, this section argues that Chinese higher education in the whole
transitional period had both the institutional flexibility to accommodate
Western learning for the improvement of the national economy, and
institutional defences to preserve the cultural and political identity prescribed
by the existing political leaders.
The detailed categories in this section are: technological inferiority of
China, four major responses to the struggles in transitional Chinese higher
education, and its institutionalization. Discussion of each category shows the
tension between openness and closure to Western learning in the transitional
Chinese higher education system. In particular, the discussion of the
technological inferiority of China serves as a link between classical and
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transitional Chinese higher education because the lack of military technology
forced China to expand the scope of its higher education to include Western
learning. But this opening up to Western learning created struggles between
the preservation of Chinese identity and the pursuit of national construction.
Therefore, the summary of the Chinese responses to the incorporation of
Western learning gives an overall picture of these struggles and helps locate
the "core" of these struggles. The analysis of the institutionalization of
transitional Chinese higher education is used to demonstrate the existence of
the tension between the cultural and economic tasks of higher education
between the 1840s and 1940s.
2.3.1 The Technological Inferiority of China 
The cohesive relation between classical Chinese higher education,
-Vnos.
Confucianism, and the imperial governments which had lasted for morewo
thousand years, this thesis suggests, was broken by an external factor which
was strong enough to shatter all components of the relation. The external
factor was the military invasion which seriously threatened the survival of
China because of its technological inferiority, and challenged the Sino-centric
perception of China.
From the 1840s, the ethnocentric perception of China as the core of its
"world" was in crisis. During the late QIng Dynasty between the 1840s and
1860s, the imperial government faced a series of military defeats and signed
several treaties to concede some portions of its empire to Western countries."
The defeats shattered the ethnocentric perception of the imperial state, and
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forced it to admit its technological inferiority and educational backwardness.
Li HOngzhOng, one of the top government officials, admitted that the
technology of making artillery and ammunition could not be achieved by
China, and these weapons could not be found in Chine In his 1889 edict,
Emperor Quang xa expressed his admiration for Western technological
advances and military achievements. He officially pronounced that Westerners
were no longer barbarians but "superiors.'° Moreover, the Emperor
desperately conceded that Chinese scholars were without a solid and practical
education, and Chinese artisans were without scientific instruction."
In order to strengthen the technological infrastructure, China adopted
a strategy to import Western methods and technology from the 1840s. In 1846,
Wei Yuan (1794-1857) was the first to suggest that China should incorporate
Western military techniques to strengthen national power. Wei proposed a
strategy of "using barbarians to attack barbarians, using barbarians to negotiate
with barbarians, and learning the superior techniques of the barbarians to
control the barbarians" in 1846." In less vigorous terms, the strategy was to
learn Western techniques, and then use them to strengthen China and to guard
against any potential Western military assaults.
The importation of Western methods and technology meant the
modification of the Sino-centric perception of the imperial state as the core of
its "world." First, China expanded its "world" and included Western countries
as competitors who were more advanced in military and technological arts
than China. Second, China realized that a literati government, and an
agricultural economy, were not sufficient to save China from the military and
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economic aggression of technologically advanced Western countries. Third,
the Confucian value system which had served so admirably in Imperial China
to maintain harmony in a vast agrarian society suddenly became vices in the
industrial conditions created by Western Europe. Most of what Chinese
believed gave them their cultural identity as Chinese seemed to be "irrelevant
or worse in the new world."'
However, the modification of Sinocentric perception initiated a series
of struggles between Confucian education and Western learning in the
transitional Chinese higher education system. The next section will examine
these struggles.
2.3.2 Struggles of Transitional Chinese Higher Education 
This section outlines the struggles between Confucian higher education and
Western learning in the transitional Chinese higher education system between
the 1840s and 1940s. The struggles over the importation of Western learning,
it is argued, reflected the Chinese fear of the replacement of the Confucian
value system with a Western one. This section will highlight four major
Chinese attitudes to Western learning: rejection, revolution, supplement, and
synthesis. A discussion of each attitude shows the struggle about how to
locate Western learning in the Chinese higher education system.
The "rejection" strategy emphasized complete resistance to any change
in traditional Chinese values and systems, and total refusal of any importation
of methods and technology from the West The proponents of this strategy
were some state officials like Wei MI and Yir Lingchên in the late 19th
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century." The Boxer Uprising in the 1900s against foreigners and Chinese
Christian converts was another resistance movement against Western
influence.
In contrast to "rejection" strategy, the "revolutionary" strategy was to
overthrow entirely the Chinese value and political systems induding the
Confucian value system, and to replace them with Western ones. Hong
Xiquan was the first one to replace Confucianism with Christianity during
the Movement of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tiangu6)
between 1850 and 1860." Then came the May Fourth Movement in 1919
which downplayed Confucianism and urged its replacement by Western
science and democracy. Individual advocates of complete acceptance of
Western cultures included Fa Sinide and HU SM.'
Between the "rejection" and "revolutionary" strategies were the
"supplement" and "synthesis" strategies. The "supplement" strategy was to
improve conditions for the survival of China by means of the imitation of
'Western means," but to keep strict adherence to "Chinese values" - Confucian
values. In 1898, Emperor Quäng XII issued an edict to support this strategy."
In the same year, Zhang MidOng espoused the dichotomization of "Chinese
learning for morality" and "Western learning for utility" (zhöng if 3d yOng)."
The "synthesis" strategy was similar to the "supplement" strategy in
advocating for the importation of Western techniques, but was different from
it in allowing the interactions of Chinese values and Western ones. Liang
Qichao advocated that Western learning had socio-political values which were
good to the training of Chinese students.' Chi Yuanpei, the Minister of
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Education of Republican China in the early 1910s, attempted to "equate" some
emphases of Chinese education with those of Western learning.'
These four strategies ("rejection," "revolution," "supplement," and
"synthesis") represented four different attitudes to the handling of Confucian
moral virtues and Western techniques in Chinese education. Common to the
four strategies were the recognition of the weakness of classical higher
education which biased towards moral and literati learning, and the realization
of the importance of science and technology to the development of the Chinese
national economy.
However, the four strategies differed in the terms in which China
should deal with science and technology from the Western world, and to what
extent (see Table 2.3). The "rejection" approach reflected the persistent
perception of ethnocentric superiority. Its proponents believed that China had
enough resources to build a scientific-technological tradition as the West had.
They totally rejected any learning from Western nations. The "revolution"
strategy was in favour of the total acceptance of the Western learning while
the supplement and synthesis strategies suggested selective adoption.
Table 2.3 Comparison of the four strategies to the tension between Chinese
learning and Western learning in this thesis.
STRATEGY CHINESE VALUES WESTERN LEARNING
Rejection Kept intact Totally rejected
Revolution Totally rejected Totally accepted
Supplement Kept intact Selectively adopted
Synthesis Allow interaction Selectively adopted
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Moreover, the four strategies differed in their location of the Confucian
value system, particularly with respect to the scientific-technological tradition,
in transitional Chinese higher education. The "revolution" approach attempted
to overthrow the Chinese value system, while the other three still regarded
them as essential. The "synthesis" approach allowed interaction between
Chinese and Western values, but the "supplement" approach kept Chinese
values intact as did the "rejection" approach.
These four attitudes of the Chinese people to Western learning, this
thesis argues, reflected Chinese fears of the complete loss of the perception of
China as the core of the "world." China realized that it was no longer a "mini-
empire" in the world, and that the age of tribute from countries in East Asia
was over. Her links with Western countries were in the form of treaties.
China had to cede parts of its declining empire to other countries, and national
survival was frequently threatened by foreign military aggressions. In other
words, China acknowledged that it had already lost its "core" status (economic
and military) in a larger world.
China, despite her wish to strengthen national power, lacked competent
military technology and high-level manpower as a result of classical higher
education which was literati-oriented and weak in linking with the domestic
economy. A quicker way was to import Western learning into Chinese higher
education or send students abroad to acquire necessary skills.
However, China did not want to lose its last stronghold — Chinese
civilization which was marked by the Confucian tradition.. The proponents of
the four strategies to Western learning made three common assumptions.
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They firstly assumed that the importation of Western methods and systems
would cause the diffusion of Western values (democracy and individualism)
into the existing higher education system. Secondly, Western values were
assumed to be in conflict with Confucian values (loyalty to superordinates, like
emperors; and social harmony). Finally, the advocates of the four strategies
assumed that the triumph of Western learning and technology over Chinese
learning and technology implied the victory of Western values over Confucian
values. The replacement of the Confucian tradition by a Western one, then,
meant two things to the Chinese people during the transitional period: the loss
of an essential cultural mark of the Chinese people in the world; and more
importantly the upsetting of the socio-political and cultural framework with
which the Chinese people had lived for more than two millilenia. The
complete loss of the Chinese worldview was not welcomed by the Chinese.
The sudden disruption of the social psychology of the Chinese was the heart
of the struggles between openness and dosure to Western learning during the
transitional period.
Hence, China was caught in the dilemma between the selective rejection
of Western values when these conflicted with Confucian values and the
development of external academic links with other countries. The
institutionalization of the transitional Chinese higher education system, not
surprisingly, shows this tension, and will be examined in the next section.
2.3.3 The Institutionalization of Transitional Chinese Higher Education
This section describes the institutionalization of transitional Chinese higher
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education. The section highlights the development of external links with other
countries and the selective refusal of foreign values in the transitional Chinese
higher education system.
The argument of this section is that the "supplement" strategy to deal
with foreign learning (keeping the Chinese central value system intact, and
importing foreign methods to solve problems) prevailed in transitional Chinese
higher education. The prevalence of the "supplement" strategy was marked
by the coexistence of the forging of external links with foreign countries and
selective rejection of foreign values in transitional Chinese higher education.
For the sake of the improvement of national defence and strength, the Chinese
state adjusted its higher education system to incorporate Western models of
educational structure, and encouraged exchange of personnel and students.
On the other hand, the Chinese state implemented compulsory measures in the
form of formal and informal ideological training so as to safeguard the central
value system.
The discussion in this section is complicated by two events of the early
20th century: the changes of political leadership, and also the content of the
Chinese central value system in mainland China in 1911 and 1921; and the
establishment of the higher education system in Taiwan by the Japanese in the
1920s. During the transitional period, transitional Chinese higher education
was subject to different political leadership in different stages: the imperial
government of the late Qing Dynasty (1840s-1910); the government of the
Republican China (1911-1920) after the abolition of the longstanding
monarchical system in the social revolution in 1911; and the divided
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governments (communist and nationalist, 1921-1949). Moreover, Taiwan was
ceded to Japan between 1845 and 1945. The Japanese administration
established a colonized higher education system in Taiwan between 1918 and
1945. Therefore, the analysis of the development of transitional Chinese higher
education in these three periods (and in two places — mainland China and
Taiwan) will be grouped together under the categories: institutional flexibility
for practical purposes; and institutional defence for the preservation of cultural
identity.
These two categories are used in this thesis as two sets of indicators to
show the tension between the development of external academic links and
selective refusal of foreign values in higher education. The indicators for the
incorporation of foreign learning included the establishment of new
institutions, change in curricula, and the exchange of teaching personnel and
students. Each of these three indicators shows the institutionalization of
utilitarian borrowing of knowledge.
The institutional defences induded the establishment of compulsory
courses for ideological and political education. This shows how the Chinese
government implemented the transmission of official values to students over
specific periods.
2.3.3.1 Institutional Flexibility for Practical Purposes
Between the 1840s and 1940s, the nature and range of Chinese higher
education, it is argued in this section, were broadened with the introduction
of Western subjects, particularly practical ones, in mainland China and Taiwan.
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The broadening was caused by the shift of the task of higher education from
simply recruiting civil officials to training people for the national defence and
strengthening of China. In contrast to classical Chinese higher education, the
transitional Chinese higher education system had a considerable institutional
flexibility to incorporate foreign educational resources for the training of local
Chinese students at home or abroad for practical purposes.
2.3.3.1.1 Establishment of New Institutions
The first indicator to demonstrate the incorporation of Western learning into
transitional Chinese higher education was the gradual establishment in
mainland China and Taiwan of new institutions modelled upon foreign
countries. These new institutions included the establishment of specialized
colleges, and the legitimization and designation of higher education as the
third level of education, and the establishment of missionary colleges.
In mainland China, the establishment of specialized technical colleges
between the 1860s and 1898 was an initial attempt of transitional Chinese
higher education to borrow a Western model of technical education. Three
types of specialized colleges were established to serve different national needs.
First, language colleges, like the Béijing Language Institute (1862),' were set
up for equipping personnel with foreign language and knowledge so that
China would not be deceived in dealing with foreign countries. Second,
military and maritime colleges were established in Tanjtn (1885) and
QuAngdang (1887). Third, technical and engineering colleges began to appear
in the late 19th century.' All had four-year courses.
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Moreover, the nature and functions of Chinese higher education in
mainland China were legitimized and governed by state regulations. Chinese
higher education was designated as the third level of education in the tripartite
education system in contrast to the traditional two layer system (primary and
higher education) in China. The system began in 1898 with the Capital
University Academy Regulation (Jingshi Daxuëtäng ZhAngcheng),1" and was
confirmed by the ZbudIng Academy Regulation (Muding xuêtang
Zhängchêng) in 1902,1°5 and by the Republican University Decree in
1912.106 The Zbuding Academy Regulation explicitly admitted that the new
higher education system was modelled upon the systems of "Europe, America,
and Japan."107 The first university was the Capital University Academy
(Tmgshi Daxuetang which was established in 1898 and is now called the Wing
University). After it, many universities were set up. The 1912 Republican
University Decree explicitly spelt out the basic functions of higher education:
to teach higher learning, to train people, and to serve national needs.
In the Republican higher education system in mainland China, new
practices, like unified entry requirements, the credit system, graduation
examinations, and a curricular structure for all universities and independent
colleges, were introduced."' Similar to the American pattern, the curriculum
was organized within colleges and departments. Students began with general
study in the first year, followed by professional study in the subsequent
years.no Later, the degree system was introduced into transitional Chinese
higher education in 1931.111
Another foreign influence on transitional Chinese higher education in
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mainland China was the rapid growth of foreign universities established and
run by missionaries from Western countries in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. A treaty signed on July 28, 1868 permitted Americans to set up
missionary schools in the regions they lived. Apart from primary and
secondary schools, numerous missionary colleges were set up. 112 The foreign
missionary universities dominated transitional Chinese higher education in
quantity in the early 1920s. Before 1920, there were 24 missionary universities.
In 1921, these universities were combined to form 16 universities with 2,017
students. 113 However, foreign colleges still outnumbered the Chinese
universities. Before 1921, there were only 8 Chinese universities: 3 public and
5 private. In addition, only Christian universities provided higher education
for girls in mainland China."
In Taiwan, the higher education system was introduced by the Japanese
colonial administration in 1918. It established five special colleges and one
university between 1918 and 1945. Like those in mainland China, these
institutions formed the third tier of education in Taiwan.
2.3.3.1.2 Change of Curriculum
The second indicator to show the incorporation of Western learning into
transitional Chinese higher education was its change of curriculum to
accommodate Western fields of study, particularly science, in mainland China
and Taiwan.
In mainland China, there were 8 fields of study and 46 departments in
transitional Chinese higher education before the founding of Republican China
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in 1911.115 The eight fields were classics (Confucian), politics and law,
humanities, medicine, science, agriculture, engineering and commerce. The
years of graduation were three or four years. The Confucian Institute was also
established as the highest level of Chinese higher education for research.
Between 1912-1921, the number of fields of study was specified to be seven,
with science and humanities as the major subjects. 116 The previous emphasis
on Confucian classics was ruled out. The Confucian Institute was also
replaced by university research institutes. In 1929, education was included as
the eighth field of study in transitional Chinese higher education under the
University Act issued by the Ministry of Education under the leadership of the
Chinese Nationalist Party."'
The requirement for the status of higher education institutes became
stricter in mainland China after 1912. Between 1912-1921, an institution could
only be called a university when it had the fields of humanities and science;
or when it had the fields of humanities, law and commerce; or when it had the
fields of science and any combination of medicine, engineering and
forestry.
offered at least 3 fields of study. One of the fields of study must be science,
the other fields may be engineering, or agriculture or medicine."' In other
words, science and technology became the focus of the institutionalization of
Republican Chinese higher education.
Like the Republican government in mainland China, the Japanese
colonial administration emphasized science and technology in the curriculum
of higher education in Taiwan for practical purposes: military, economic, and
118 In 1929, an institution could not be called a university unless it
84
political. The Japanese government used Taiwan as a military research base
to explore the resources of Southeast Asia' and as an agricultural base to
supply crops for the domestic market of Japan. Politically, the Japanese
colonial administration regarded those who studied humanities and politics as
potential challengers to the colonial rule, and therefore limited Taiwanese
students in taking these subjects.'
The practical orientation of the higher education system in Taiwan
under Japanese rule was indicated by the specialties of colleges in Taiwan: the
Medical College of the Taihoku Imperial University (1918) to train physicians,
the Taipei College of Economics (1919) to train business personnel, the Central
Taiwan College of Agriculture (1919) to train experts in farming and forestry,
the Southern Taiwan College of Technology (1927) to train engineers and
technical personnel, and the private Taipei College for Girls (1943) to train
female teachers and professionals. The Taihoku Imperial University was
established in 1928, and comprised five faculties: humanities and politics;
sciences; agriculture; medicine; and engineering. However, the majority of
students were Japanese, and only about 20% of students were native
Taiwanese.' Among 357 students in the Taihoku Imperial University in
1944, 268 (75.1%) were Japanese and 85 (23.8%) Taiwanese. More than 80 of
these Taiwanese students took the study in medicine as their major.'
2.3.3.1.3 Exchange of Personnel and Students
The third indicator to reflect the incorporation of Western learning into the
transitional Chinese higher education systems in mainland China and Taiwan
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was the exchange of teaching personnel and students with foreign countries.
In mainland China, foreign educators like W. A. P. Martin were
permitted to teach the Western subjects in which no Chinese were qualified to
instruct.'24 In 1917, there were more than 20 American educationists
employed in the Cknghui University which was famous for its emphasis on
science and technology.'
Moreover, mainland China began to send students to study abroad in
the late 19th century for practical reasons. The first group of 30 Chinese
students was sent by the Qing government to study abroad in 1872."
During the period 1872-1875, 120 students aged 12-16 were sent to the United
States for 15 years to receive foreign secondary and higher education in
military training, maritime affairs, sciences, and manufacturing.'
As reflected in the countries to which China sent its students, Western
techniques were more important than the WO customs and national dignity.
In 1877, 30 students were sent to England and France to pursue studies in
maritime administration.' The military defeat of China by Japan in 1900
further encouraged overseas study. Surprisingly, a proposal for sending
students to Japan was submitted to the Emperor in 1899, and 55 students were
sent to receive military education in Japan in 1902. 129 Later, 15,000 students
were sent to study in Japan in 1905.1"
Between the 1910s and 1920s, the new Republican government also sent
students to receive foreign training. Students were sent "to learn such science
and arts" which were "not taught in China."' Successful students had to
pass the provincial and state examinations before studying abroad.' It was
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estimated that about 3,000 students studied under the spirit of "education
through industry and thrift" (QingOng JiAnxue) in France within 1918-1922."
Among them were many famous Chinese communist leaders like 7113u Enlãi,
Nie ROngzhèn and Deng Xiaoping. Students were also sent to the former
USSR to receive technological training. Noted examples were two Chinese
Communist leaders, Ye Jianying and Lid BOcheng.'
In the late 1920s, the objectives in allowing students to study abroad
were more utilitarian. Students who attempted to study science and
engineering subjects, as suggested in a circular of the Ministry of Education in
1926, were given top priority in applications for overseas study. 135 This
principle of sending students was reaffirmed in the 1931 educational
policy.' The exchange of teaching personnel and students in mainland
China was, however, interrupted by the Japanese military aggressions in 1937
and civil wars between the Chinese communist and nationalist parties in the
1940s.
In Taiwan, exchange of teachers and students was conducted mainly
between Japan and Taiwan. The higher education institutions in Taiwan
employed mainly Japanese staff and enrolled mainly Japanese students who
lived in Taiwan. The Taihoku Imperial University (which was established in
1928 and is now called the National Taiwan University) is an example. In
1944, its teaching staff was predominantly Japanese; out of 173 staff members,
172 were Japanese, and only 1 was Taiwanese.' Because of limited access
to higher education in Taiwan, many Taiwanese students went to Japan for
further studies; e.g. in 1940, there were 310 Taiwanese students received higher
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education in Japan.'
It can be concluded from the above discussion that traditional Chinese
higher education was opened up by the Chinese authorities in mainland China
and by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan for practical purposes,
with an emphasis on science and technology. The transitional Chinese higher
education system was adjusted so as to incorporate foreign models of higher
education, and to utilize foreign human and material resources to train
Chinese students at home or abroad. The importation of Western values
provided stimuli to some domestic social changes in China during the
transitional period. As observed by Y. T. Tsur, foreign-trained students sent
by the Qing government brought back to China Western ideas and ideals, and
helped restructure the political system of Imperial China from a monarchy to
a republic along "modern lines" in the 1911 revolution.' However, foreign-
trained Chinese students and foreign educators in China did not manage to
transform its long-standing monarchical socio-political culture. The teachings
of revolutionary leaders replaced Confucianism, and became the new socio-
political norms imposed on their people. In other words, despite its
institutional flexibility in incorporating foreign educational resources,
transitional Chinese higher education was also marked by a concern for values
in mainland China. This will be discussed in the next section.
2.3.3.2 Institutional Defence for the Preservation of Cultural Identity
This section argues that the change in the contents of the central value systems
in mainland China in the second half of the transitional period (between 1911
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and the 1940s) did not necessarily break the relations between transitional
Chinese higher education, the state and the central value system. Rather, the
Chinese state established institutional defences in the transitional higher
education system to transmit the central values prescribed by the Chinese
political leaders. These institutional defences included the compulsory
ideological requirements imposed on Chinese students at home and abroad.
(It should be noted that the use of higher education to transmit Japanese
culture by the colonial government in Taiwan between 1918 and 1945 is
beyond the scope of this thesis.)
Transitional Chinese higher education remained a state channel to
transmit central values to students before and after the Chinese revolution in
1911. The imperial government of the late Qrmg Dynasty emphasized the
Confucian teachings of loyalty to the emperor, and respect for the Confucian
tradition in higher education.' The Republican government replaced
Confucianism with the Three People's Principles of San Ybdan as the central
value system. The study of party doctrines and military training were
incorporated into compulsory courses in the transitional Chinese higher
education system.'"
After the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the
transitional Chinese higher education system was split into two: part of the
system was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party; and the other by the
Chinese Nationalist Party. However, both parties, despite different central
value systems, utilized the higher education system under their jurisdiction to
propagate their party ideologies.
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The Chinese Communist Party established its higher education system
to propagate communism and train its party cadres. The Fltinan Self-study
University (1921) and Shanghai University (1922) were examples in the initial
stages. The Milian Self-study University was a research centre of Marxism
and Leninism, and a pilot base for the introduction of communist higher
education on Chinese soil. The IiiInan Self-study University preached the
communist ideals: the balance between cognitive and physical development,
the reduction of the gap between mental and menial labourers, and the
importance of productive labor during study.' At a later stage, the Anti-
Japan Military and Political University (1936) was established with the
indoctrination of students with a communist political orientation as one of its
most important objectives. 1 " In response to the Party's decision on making
productive labour one of the major activities for all schools in 1939, the
Deputy-President of this University, Lu6 Rulqing, set a productive index for
the University, the teaching staff and students to achieve!' Moreover,
students of the Yanan University were required to take compulsory courses
like "Chinese revolutionary history." For both political and economic reasons,
students had to allocate 20% of their study time for participation in productive
labour in rural areas.'
In the Nationalist higher education system, Stan Yixian became a model
teacher as Confucius did in classical Chinese higher education. General
education for children and youth had to be based on San's teachings!'
Especially in higher education, the teachings of Stan Ybdan and the doctrines
of the Chinese Nationalist Party replaced the Confucian Five Classics and Four
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Books, and became part of the general education curriculum in 1931.1'
Students were also required to attend the annual commemoration activities for
Sim and revolutionary events.'
Like Communist higher education, applied subjects and productive
labour were emphasized in the Nationalist curriculum. According to the
education regulations of the Nationalist government, to employ applied science
as a means to actualize the Three Principles of the People was one of the
essential objectives of Nationalist education.' The curriculum of science
should emphasize the knowledge and techniques of material production.
Productive labour was also encouraged as a measure to consolidate students'
foundation of people's livelihood. In the name of the improvement of their
physical health and self-discipline, military training was imposed on
students.'
Finally, ideological reinforcement was also imposed on Chinese
students who were sent by the Chinese governments to study abroad. The
first batch of students sent to the United States by the Qing Dynasty between
1872 and 1875 were commanded to study Confucian writings, like the Five
Classics, the Great Learning and the Classic of Filial Piety.' The students
were also required to practise Chinese traditional bowing courtesy to their
supervisor. In July 1881, most of them were called back to China by the
government for reportedly not bowing their heads to the highest official
appointed by the (ring government.'
Under the leadership of the Republican government in the 1910s,
Chinese overseas students even had to submit their diaries to the Board of
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Education of the Republican government for monthly inspection.' Later,
the Nationalist government also exercised ideological screening of students
who pursued overseas training. In 1931, both government-sponsored and self-
supported students were required to have a good record of not violating the
"Three Principles of the People in speech and deeds" in order to get the
permission to study abroad.'
To sum up this section, the Chinese state, at various stages during the
transitional period, linked transitional Chinese higher education with the
Chinese national economy and national survival. Emphasis was put on science
and technological education, rather than on literati subjects. Because of a lack
of competent resources to develop modem education to cope with national
problems, the Chinese authorities opened up the transitional Chinese higher
education system to incorporate foreign educational models and resources, and
sent students to receive training abroad. Therefore, transitional Chinese higher
education reflected a high institutional flexibility to absorb foreign experience.
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities set up institutional defences
to reinforce the indoctrination of central value system. The change in the
central value system did not break its relationship with transitional Chinese
higher education. Rather, the prevailing central value system, once adopted,
was kept intact and transmitted to students. Thus, the incorporation of foreign
methods and learning did not necessarily mean the synthesis of the domestic
central value system and foreign value systems.
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2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter Two has described the historical contexts of the higher education
systems in the PRC and ROC. The chapter has argued that classical Chinese
higher education (before the 1840s) was institutionalized in a context in which
exposure to foreign influences and the accommodation of domestic non-
Confucian traditions (including technical subjects) were limited by the imperial
Chinese state. The importation of Western learning into transitional Chinese
higher education (between the 1840s and 1940s) also did not necessarily mean
the incorporation of Western value systems into the official Chinese value
system.
The most obvious crisis was that Republican China (1911 - 1949) still
lived in the legacy of the threat of potential attacks by foreign countries. Both
the Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party utilized this
legacy as a strategy to mobilize their followers to resist, for example, the
Japanese invasion in 1937.
Moreover, the political structure in Republican China between the 1910s
and 1940s did not tolerate political pluralism, as had Imperial China. Despite
San's admiration of the political systems of Western countries, 15' a multi-
party system was not institutionalized in the Chinese political structure under
the leadership of San and his party, the Chinese Nationalist Party. Rather, the
Chinese Nationalist Party competed with the Chinese Communist Party
between the 1920s and 1940s by offering their own versions of cultural and
political identity for Chinese people. Finally, both parties militarily suppressed
each other in the civil wars in the 1940s. As a result, the Chinese Nationalist
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Party moved its seat to Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party successfully
brought forth the second social revolution in mainland China in 1949.
As compared with Imperial China and Republican China, the struggles
for cultural and political identity in the PRC and ROC after the second
revolution in China in 1949 were much more complicated in their uses of
strategies ("rejection," "revolution," "supplement" and "synthesis") towards
foreign value systems. From 1949, the PRC adopted the "revolutionary"
strategy to replace traditional Chinese culture with Marxism and Leninism,
and applied them in Chinese contexts. Between 1949 and 1978, the PRC also
adopted a "rejection" strategy against all Western values, and treated the US
as a chief enemy of the former socialist bloc. From 1978, the Beijing authorities
allowed Western economic values (such as market forces) to exist, but still
kept the PRC's political system intact. In other words, the PRC still rejects
Western political values (such as the concept of loyal opposition). However,
the US and the Commonwealth of Independent States (formed by the member
states of the former USSR) are both diplomatic friends of the PRC.
Like the Chinese Communist Party in the PRC, the Chinese Nationalist
Party transplanted the teachings of San Ybdan into Taiwan to replace the
Japanese cultural legacy and indigenous Taiwanese cultures in 1945. The ROC
ruling elite has attempted to preserve Chinese Confucian values along with the
introduction of Western economic values. Western political values were
rejected until the lifting of martial law in 1987. However, in the last forty-four
years, the ROC also consistently refused any diffusion of communist ideas
particularly from the PRC, although the ROC developed non-diplomatic
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relations with the PRC from the 1980s for domestic purposes and for the sake
of the international recognition of the ROC's political status.
Yet, this is still too simple a description of the contemporary struggles
between the preservation of cultural and political identity and economic
modernization in the PRC and ROC between 1949 and 1993. The complexity
of these struggles underlying the domestic developments and international
participation of both countries will be the focus of the next chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN
THE PRC AND ROC: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
3.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the contemporary contexts in which
the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC have been institutionalized
since 1949. The chapter highlights the social construction of the state-
supported central value systems in both countries, their domestic and
international relations, and the emergence of contradictions in these two areas.
This chapter presents the second part of the main argument of the
thesis: The tension between the selective rejection of foreign values (which
were deemed challenging to the central value system by the respective Chinese
political leaders) and the establishment of external links with foreign countries
in (the higher education systems of) the PRC and ROC has been framed
domestically by their national economic and socio-political priorities; and, at
the same time, internationally by their cultural, political and economic
relations with other countries since 1949.
The line of argument in this chapter is as follows. The domestic
relations (between the ruling party, state, people, and economy) and
international relations of the PRC and ROC have undergone two major
transformations in the last forty-four years: first and secondary. The "first"
transformation of the PRC or ROC refers to its total redefinition of domestic
and international relations, and to the creation of social structures in the 1950s
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(the founding period of the PRC and ROC). "Secondary" transformation refers
to the partial and supplementary revision of these relations and associated
structures after the 1970s (during which the US switched its diplomatic
relations from the ROC to PRC).
This chapter is, therefore, broadly organized as a survey of the domestic
relations between the ruling party, state, people and economy in the PRC and
ROC, and their international relations between 1949 and 1993. These two
broad categories are chosen to test the argument of this chapter.
In particular, domestic relations are selected because their
institutionalization in economic and socio-political structures indicates the type
of domestic economic and political values and interests of the political leaders
in a country. International relations are chosen firstly because they indicate
a country's choice of foreign partners in economic and political arenas; and
secondly because a change in international relations of a country, this thesis
asserts, may cause a change in related domestic social structures.
Each broad category (domestic or international relations) is further
divided into first transformation, contradictions and secondary transformation.
"First" transformation of the PRC and ROC is chosen because these processes
of change, as defined in this thesis, represented the total redefinition of
relations and structures, and therefore can serve a reference point for the study
of subsequent transformations. "Secondary" transformation is selected because
an analysis of the domestic and international relations in the PRC and ROC
shows the areas they would or would not change under the new interplay of
domestic and international influences. "Contradiction" is used as a concept
121
firstly because the developments of domestic and international relations in the
PRC and ROC were not linear, but were under the influences of contending
forces (e.g. between domestic and international; and between domestic
economic and domestic socio-political); and secondly because the handling of
contradictions by the respective Chinese ruling elites reflected their preference
and interests in the formulation of national policies towards their people and
foreign countries.
This thesis will discuss the domestic and international relations of the
PRC and ROC in sequence. It should be pointed out that in spite of the
separate discussions of these two levels of influences in this chapter, the
adjustments in internal and external relations of the PRC and ROC were an
interplay of domestic and international influences.
3.2 DOMESTIC RELATIONS OF THE PRC AND ROC: THE FIRST 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
This section describes the central value systems, socio-political and economic
structures, and the methods used to institutionalize the central value systems
in the PRC and ROC, particularly before the 1980s.
This section argues that after assuming powers in the 1950s, the ruling
elites of the PRC and ROC redefined the relations between the ruling party,
state, people and economy to provide moral grounds for the legitimation' of
their leadership. These redefined relations in both countries were developed
through the sodal construction of the respective central value systems.
These newly redefined relations were institutionalized in political and
social structures so as to consolidate the leadership of the ruling elites. In
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order to maintain their political leadership, the ruling elites of the PRC and
ROC used four methods of national mobilization to create social and political
cohesion amongst people: the provision of a common vision; the specification
of external opposition forces; the transmission of the official value system and
the suppression of opposing value systems; and social control.
3.2.1 The State-supported Central Value Systems and Basic Social
Structures in the PRC and ROC 
In the early 1950s, the political leaders in the PRC and ROC resisted the
formation of a "homogenous world," and carefully constructed their own
central value systems to provide a moral mandate to govern their people. In
the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao
Z.&IC:mg attempted to replace Confucianism with Chinese socialism, adapted
from German Marxism and Soviet Leninism, in mainland China in 1949.
Chinese socialism was officially adopted in the "Common Programme" (which
served as a national constitution until 1954) as the central value system from
1949.2
 The climax of Mao's breaking away from the Confucian past took place
in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
Like the CCP in the early 1950s, Jiang Jieshl and the Chinese Nationalist
Party (CNP) transplanted the Three People's Principles of San Ybdan
(Nationalism, Minzil; Democracy, Minquan; and People's Livelihood,
Minsheng)3
 from mainland China to Taiwan after the conclusion of Japanese
rule in 1945; as Jiang had invoked those Principles at the constitutional level
in mainland China in December 1946. 4 Jiang also declared the political claims
of the CNP about its leadership over the "people" in Taiwan in 1949. The
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"people" consisted of a majority of local-born Chinese (about 6 million) in
Taiwan which had been ruled by Japan for 51 years (1885-1945), and a
minority of mainlanders (about 1.2 million) who moved with the CNP from
mainland China and settled in Taiwan between 1949 and 1950.5 JiAng claimed
that the government under the leadership of the CNP represented the sole
legitimate government of "all China" (including Taiwan, and mainland China)
in the international community, and that Taiwan was only a province of the
ROC.'
The political and state structures of the PRC and ROC were marked by
extensive party networks penetrating almost all aspects of the government and
people; and by the concentration of power in the hands of few political
leaders.
The PRC, according to its constitution, is a "socialist state under the
people's democratic dictatorship," and its basic system is "socialist."' Within
the political system of the PRC, the relations between the CCP, the state and
the people were defined through the concept of "democratic centralism." The
CD?, according to the PRC's constitution, is "the core of leadership of the
whole Chinese people' and gains its power to rule from the people through
the National People's Congress which is supposedly the highest political
organization.' The CCP is organized hierarchically from the Politburo headed
by the Secretary-General in the capital, down to the party organizations at the
levels of province, municipality, county, and basic production and service
units.w, ii Parallel to the CCP is the state hierarchy which extends from the
central State Council headed by the Premier to state organs at every level. All
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state organs are responsible for administration and are under the "unified
•
leadership of the central authorities."'
The ROC, according to the constitution, is a "democratic republic of
people." Its socio-political structure was developed partly from San's Principle
of Democracy" which depicted the relationships between the ruling party,
the state and the people in the ROC. The CNP, following San's idea of 5 state
powers (judiciary, legislature, executive, examination and control) established
a central government comprising 5 state administration institutions; and each
of them exercises one of these powers." However, the CNP suspended 4
people's rights advocated by San (election and removal of central government
officials, and initiation and revision of laws produced by the central
government) at the national level between 1949 and 1987. As in the PRC, the
political power was concentrated in the Central Standing Committee of the
CNP. Party cells and branches were established in almost all levels of the
government, the judiciary, and the armed forces."
Common to the political structures in the PRC and ROC was the
domination of the respective small groups of political leaders — ruling elites"
— those who hold strategically influential positions of the highest echelon in
the national political structure, and who have institutional powers to make
decisions about national policies and to enforce the implementation of these
policies. Specifically, members of the Politburo, particularly the Secretary-
General, President, and Premier, are ruling elite members in the PRC; and
members of the Central Committee of the CNP including the Party Chairman,
President and Premier are members of the ruling elite in the ROC. Amongst
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these ruling elites in the PRC and ROC, there were charismatic leaders who
dominated the political arenas: for example, Mao ThdOng (1949-1976) and
Deng Xiaoping (after 1978) in the PRC, and Jiang Jieshi (1949-1975) and Jiang
jinggue, (1978-1988) in the ROC.
However, the PRC and ROC differed in their economic structures. The
economy of the PRC, as spelt out in the 1949 "Common Programme," was
characterized by the state ownership of much property, planning by the central
government, and the subordination of the private sector to the state.' In the
1993 revised constitution, the PRC authorities under Deng Xiaoping's
leadership still stressed the primacy of public ownership, but at the same time
permitted market mechanisms to operate within the socialist framework."
In contrast to the PRC, the (planned) economy of the ROC emphasized
market forces. The CNP, urdike the CCP in the PRC, does not interfere with
the economic policies initiated by the state. 19 Public utilities and enterprises
of a monopolistic nature are under government operation. Private wealth and
enterprises are permitted by the state as long as they are not "deemed
detrimental to a balanced development of national wealth and people's
livelihood.' The Principle of Livelihood, according to the ROC economist,
Li Kwoh-ting, makes the ROC economy "neither a capitalist system nor a
communist one."21
Unlike the CCP, the CNP has allowed state technocrats (like scientists
and engineers) who have technical knowledge and political power to have
almost full autonomy in the financial and economic sectors since the 1950s.22
Like the imperial Chinese government, civil servant examinations are used to
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select public functionaries in the ROC. Constitutionally, no one can be
appointed to public offices unless they pass state qualification examinations.
Also, practice in specialized professions is permitted only after they pass state
professional examinations.' According to Peng HuSi g, the proportion of
technocrats in the state cabinet increased to two-thirds in 1984.24
Nevertheless, these technocrats administered the ROC in accordance with the
constitution which was based on the Three People's Principles. As indicated
in their reports, these state officials frequently claimed that they used these
principles as guidelines in their formulation of state policies.
In sum, the CCP and CM' justified the legitimacy of their political
leadership on moral bases by constructing a new central value system; and
redefined and institutionalized the domestic relations between the party, the
state, the people and the economy in new social structures. However, to
consolidate and maintain their ruler, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, it
will be suggested in the next section, maintained their respective central value
systems by means of persuasion and coercion so as to make people to observe
the newly defined social norms.
3.2.2 National Mobilization and the First Social Transformation in the PRC
and ROC 
This section describes the methods used by the ruling elites of the PRC and
ROC to transmit the revolutionary patterns of social norms. This thesis argues
that the PRC and ROC used national mobilization as a strategy to create
"homogenous national cultures," and social and political cohesion amongst
their people. The PRC and ROC employed four methods of national
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mobilization to keep their central value systems alive, to help their people
exhibit socially acceptable behaviours, and therefore to maintain their political
leadership.
The means included persuasive methods (the provision of a common
vision and the specification of external opposition forces) and coercive
methods (the transmission of the central value system and the suppression of
the propagation of opposing values; and social control). In particular, the
common vision, the fight against national enemies, and the daim of superiority
of official beliefs over others have become part of the central value systems in
the social transformation of the PRC and ROC.
In order to obtain political mobilization and maximize the possibilities
of mass manipulation, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC utilized their
central value systems to provide their people with a common vision. The CCP
utilized socialism to explain why people in Imperial China were exploited by
landlords, to provide the people with an identity as members of working class,
and to suggest ways to free them from capitalist exploitation and
oppression.' The CNP attempted to restore the cultural and political identity
of mainlanders who moved to Taiwan, and native Taiwanese who had been
ruled by Japan. The CNP appealed to the Principle of Nationalism which
emphasized Chinese as a race and as a nation.' Moreover, Sun and Jiäng
Jieshi believed that the Principle of Nationalism could help bring economic
prosperity, national independence, and freedom to the Chinese race through
raising the ethical standard of the Chinese.'
However, the PRC and ROC took different routes. The CCP hoped to
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lead their people away from feudal and imperialist oppression, via a primitive
stage of socialism, and finally to communism. The CNP tried to mobilize their
people, first, to construct Taiwan as a model province, then to recover China
from the communists, and finally to strive for a stage of "all under heaven."29
Another persuasive method to bring people together by the ruling elites
of the PRC and ROC was to unite the nation by the specification of enemies.
The ideological enemies of these two countries refer to competitors who held
or hold central value systems antagonistic to those of the PRC and ROC; and
particularly to imperialism and capitalism represented by the US for the PRC,
and communism represented by the USSR and PRC for the ROC. In the PRC
press, the CCP promoted amongst its people the concept that the first national
enemy was the US in the 1950s, and the USSR in the 1960s.' In the ROC in
1960, Premier Chen Cheng of the ROC even intimidated his people with
messages about the potential "bloodbath in Taiwan" which might be launched
by the PRC.92 In February 1988, President Li Dènghui stressed that "the
Chinese Communists [have] never repudiated the use of military force to
'liberate' or reunify Taiwan."'
The provision of a common vision and the specification of opposition
forces were persuasive ways to unite people to work for specific goals in the
PRC and ROC. However, the persuasion of the CCP and CNP did not
necessarily result in massive response and action by their people, in the
elimination of domestic rival powers from the political structure, and hence in
the creation of socio-political cohesion amongst the people. Therefore, coercive
methods were also needed.
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The first coercive method to achieve social harmony in the PRC and
ROC was the preferential treatment of the official value system, and the
suppression of antagonistic ones from within and without.
The ruling elites of the PRC and ROC defined which official ideas were
to be encouraged in public arenas including schools and official mass media.
In the PRC, to be a Chinese, as argued by former Party Secretary-General, FM
Yaobang, is to have socialist "revolutionary ideals, morality and discipline" and
to live within the socialist political and economic structures. Most
important of all, a socialist Chinese is one who supports socialism and
particularly the party's leadership; propositions conspicuously emphasized in
the Four Cardinal Principles of Deng Xiãoping since 1979•" These principles
are so important that they were written into the 1982 constitution and into its
1993 revised version.' Every Secretary-General had to repeat Deng's formula
and stress its importance on crucial occasions.'
As in the PRC, piing Jieshf argued that to be a Chinese is to possess and
actualize Chinese morality in loving the nation and the people, in serving
them, and in discipline. The core of the nation is the past culture, customs
and ethics. Particularly, the Principle of Nationalism is to make the people
aware of their nationhood, to accept mutual responsibility as fellow citizens,
and to learn that "the continuity of the blood and food of the lineage" defines
the fate of the nation.' Schools and mass media are, according to Robert G.
Sutter, the channels for the promotion of the instructions of the President and
the policies of the CNP.'
On the other hand, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC defined which
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ideas and activities ought to be suppressed or redirected in their societies. In
the PRC, the top political executives discouraged antagonistic ideas and
activities. Rival power sources, like capitalist and religious institutions, were
eliminated, contained, neutered or assimilated. Despite the protection by
the constitution, freedom of speech and belief is in actuality subordinated to
socialism. Any "disruption of the socialist system by any organization or
individual is prohibited" by the constitution.' Like those opposition
intellectuals during Mao's leadership, the arrested student leaders who argued
for Western democracy and anti-corruption in the 1989 Tiananmen incident
were charged with counter-revolutionary rebellion. The breaking of this
student movement by military force "marked the limits of the political change"
for the existing party leaders.'
In contrast to the PRC which promoted communist ideals, the ROC
suppressed the propagation of communist ideas and activities, particularly
before 1987. The CNP was authoritarian,' and allowed no opposing forces
to challenge it until the late 1980s. In 1951, Jiang Jieshf indicated that those
who did not support the anti-communist activities would be regarded as
"enemies and undesirable elements of the nation?" The martial law against
communist activities was in effect between May 1948 and October 1986, and
some constitutional rights, like rights of establishment of new parties, freedom
of speech and press, were suspended up to the late 1980s. Books by Marx, like
Capital, were available to the public in Taiwan only after the lifting of martial
law in 1987.44
The second coercive method to maintain social cohesion and political
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conformity in the PRC and ROC was their mechanisms of sodal control to deal
with domestic opposition forces, and to compel people to adapt to the values,
norms, and behaviours which were defined by political leaders in the
respective socio-political structures. Social control refers to forms, mechanisms
and processes in society whereby "society 'gets into' the individuals to form
sodal personality", and also refers to "the cultural, economic and social
structures of the societies themselves within which these processes take
place."' The ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, this thesis suggests, used
these processes to ensure that individual members of society conformed,
willingly or reluctantly, to the existing sodo-political status quo.
Both the PRC and ROC have a strong "infrastructural power" to
penetrate society and to organize social relations.' In the PRC, the CCP
extended its Leninist party structure to every level of ordinary life in the PRC.
A propaganda department was established under the Secretary-General, and
the party organization paralleled the administrative subdivision from the state
to the county level. Party organizations existed, for instance, in people's
communes, factories, schools, and mass communication agencies. The
Communist Youth Leagues were very active on school campuses, particularly
when politics took command.
As in the PRC, the CNP had a vast network of agencies to control the
activities of transmitting value systems in the ROC. Like the CCP, the overall
organizational structure of the CNP is, as noted by some scholars, "Leninist"
in structure and in its "democratic-centralist principles" of organization.' The
"Leninist" structure is the realization of Jiang Jieshrs belief that the Party is the
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brain of all government organs.' The ruling party also controlled and
regulated a broad spectrum of the social and political life of people in
Taiwan. One of the duties of the National Security Council was to ban
communist activities in Taiwan. The opposition party, the Democratic
Progressive Party, which emerged after 1987 accused the National Security
Council of spying on their activities. Moreover, 12.5% of the entire Taiwanese
population were recruited as party members in 1989; the percentage was larger
than that of the PRC (less than 5%). The local cells of the CNP manipulated
local electoral processes to ensure party members were elected.' The local
Youth Leagues of Anti-Communism and Saving the Nation were official party
organizations in the higher education system of the ROC.
Through such techniques, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC socially
constructed a central value system to which people were supposed to conform,
and shaped a socio-political framework according to this official belief system.
The socio-political contexts in which higher education of the PRC and ROC
was institutionalized were publicly monolithic and were determined by the
ruling elites. However, the socio-political contexts of these two Chinese higher
education systems were complicated by the societal contradictions evolving
around their central value systems, and by the development of the
international relations of the PRC and ROC. The next section will first
examine the societal contradictions which led to the supplementary revision
of the revolutionary domestic relations in these two Chinese countries.
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3.3 SOCIETAL CONTRADICTIONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE PRC AND ROC: THE SECONDARY SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION 
This section describes the societal contradictions which emerged and the
revision of some of the domestic relations in the PRC and ROC. This section
argues that different societal contradictions evolved in the course of the
construction of the central value systems in the PRC and ROC. The domestic
(either socio-political or economic, or both) relations which were formerly
redefined in the revolutionary stage were partially revised in both Chinese
countries because of new domestic and international developments after the
1970s. In particular, the PRC emphasized economic, rather than political,
reforms, and incorporated market mechanisms in the socialist economy;
whereas the ROC stressed political adjustments and institutionalized
opposition in the political structure. In other words, during the secondary
social transformation, the PRC changed some of its socialist economic values;
whereas the ROC adjusted some of its socio-political values.
3.3.1 Societal Contradictions and the Secondary Social Transformation in
the PRC 
This thesis suggests that the intricate relations between central value system,
state, party and economy in the PRC created three societal contradictions: the
adaptation of socialism in the PRC; the relations between market mechanisms
and public ownership; and the power distribution between the CCP and the
state.
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3.3.1.1 Chinese Socialism: the Versions of Mao and Deng
The first and foremost contradiction concerns the adaptation of socialism to
suit the specific circumstances of the PRC. The political leaders of the PRC,
this thesis argues, recognized that Marxism and Leninism did not completely
suit the Chinese context, but still claimed to adhere to these principles for
forty-four years. The ruling elite of the PRC supplemented Marxism and
Leninism by Mao's version before the late 1970s, and then by Deng's version
from the late 1970s.
Mao attempted to adapt Marxism and Leninism to the PRC's context.
He introduced the concept of class struggle to construct a new Chinese society
which had formerly been rooted in Confucianism (emphasizing social
harmony). However, he proposed, as noted by Franz Schurrnann, an ever-
changing and ever-expanding set of particular ideas, derived from the
dialectical combination of ideological thinking with concrete problems in
different contexts.' For example, Mao, unlike his socialist predecessors,
promoted the ideas of people's communes during the Great Leap Forward
Movement in the late 1950s. He emphasized the importance of the peasantry
and the army, and of the coordinated political education of party cadres and
citizens. He also introduced thought rectification campaigns to remove
opposition forces.° During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao put
politics in command. In other words, Mao's version of Chinese socialism was
temporal and situational. New strategies of adaptation would be needed when
new circumstances emerged in the PRC after his death.
Deng offered a second version of Chinese socialism after the PRC
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established diplomatic and economic relations with Western countries in the
late 1970s. Under his leadership, the CCP rejected the adoption of class
struggle as a party line in 1978. Deng introduced the Four Cardinal Principles
(four persistences in adhering to the Socialist road, upholding people's
democratic dictatorship, the leadership of Communist Party, and Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism) as a new definition of Chinese socialism. Later, he said
that the PRC was in the "primitive state of socialism" and suggested that the
PRC should develop "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Yet he has not
offered any specific definition of Chinese characteristics.' From the reports
and speeches of the ruling elite of the PRC, this thesis suggests that the PRC
leaders usually equated Chinese characteristics with the demographic and
economic conditions of the PRC — which included the very largest population
in the world and economic backwardness. The ambiguous definition of
Chinese characteristics, however, allowed the PRC to reintroduce the private
sector and incorporate Western capital and technology into the Chinese
socialist economy after the implementation of the open-door policy in 1978.
Despite the rejection of Marx's concept of class struggle and despite the
dismissal of Mao's version, the ruling elite of the PRC still kept in the 1993
revised constitution Mao's version (Marxism-Leninism and the Thoughts of
Mao), and at the same time incorporated Deng's phrases, like "socialism with
Chinese characteristics" and "socialist market economy."' The ruling elite of
the PRC did not abandon socialism completely, or want it to be totally foreign
— it had to be adapted to the Chinese context. As a result, tensions in theory
and practice between conflicting versions of Chinese socialism occurred. The
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oscillation in the adoption of market forces, which will be discussed in the
next section, was one such tension.
3.3.1.2 Private Sector and Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist
Economy
The second societal contradiction of the PRC, this thesis suggests, is the
existence of the private sector in a socialist economy. In the early 1950s, the
private sector was allowed to exist under Mao's early leadership. Later, all
private enterprises and organizations were nationalized after the manner of the
Soviet economic model; i.e. these private institutions transferred their
ownership to and were run by the state.
From the late 1970s, Deng launched an economic reform which
contradicted Mao's strategy by re-introducing the pre-1949 practice: market
forces. June Dreyer suggests that Mao espoused equality and attempted to
minimize the income gaps between people; whereas Deng advocated
prosperity, and permitted some people to get rich first? Under Deng's
leadership, the private sector began to re-emerge within the socialist
framework gradually in the early 1980s and rapidly from the late 1980s. In
1989, there were 90,581 registered private enterprises which had a labour force
of 1.6 million people. In December 1992, citizens are officially allowed to
possess the means of production which previously and exclusively belonged
to the state and collectivity. People are also allowed to employ or be
employed as labour on a contract basis in private enterprises.'
The return of most former socialist countries including the USSR to a
market-oriented economy created complications for Deng's economic reform.
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The global decline of socialism suggests that it had ceased to be a viable
economic strategy. Deng recognized the contribution of market mechanisms
to the revival of the PRC's economy in the late 1980s, and at the same time
maintained the basic socialist framework.
The tension between state control and market forces in the PRC from
the early 1980s was reflected in the reclassification of its economy. The
emergence of the private sector forced the ruling elite of the PRC to re-name
its economic development: in the 1980s, the "primitive state of socialism" and
as a "socialist commodity economy"; and in the 14th Congress of the CCP in
October 1992, a "socialist market economy" in which market mechanisms are
permitted to exist with public ownership within the socialist framework.'
3.3.1.3 Political Struggles in the Ruling Elite of the PRC
The third societal contradiction of the PRC, this thesis suggests, was the
oscillations between the integration and separation of party and state powers.
Not uncommon in the politics of the PRC in the last forty-four years were
power struggles between members of the ruling elite for the maintenance of
or access to supreme leadership power. These power struggles arose from the
intertwined relations between party and state powers under the concept of
"democratic centralism" in the PRC. The National People's Congress, despite
being the highest political body and despite its large membership (more than
2,900 members in 1993)," was dominated by extremely few political leaders.
The power struggles in the PRC, this thesis argues, led to further
reinforcement of the integration, rather than separation, of party and state
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powers, and the creation of personality cult in the socio-political culture in the
PRC. Mao defeated Lid Shaoqf and Deng respectively in the late 1950s and
early 1970s over economic policies. At the peak of his political career, Mao
was head of the party, state, and army. His pictures or statues could be found
in public places and on campuses.
In the 1980s, Deng dominated the political structure without obvious
rivals. He banned the personality cult of leaders, dead or alive, in 1980.' In
spite of this, his followers quoted his words in most important occasions as
much as Mao's devotees did. Deng also attempted to strengthen the state by
separating it from the core of the CCP. In the National People's Congress in
1988, only two members of the Politburo, as noted by John Kohut,
concurrently took up top government posts. However, the separation
between the party and state was not successful. The party and government
positions were often occupied by the same persons."
After the student movement in 1989, Deng faced leadership challenge
by the conservatives comprising old revolutionaries including Chen Win over
the issue about the introduction of market forces. The concentration of
power, then, recurred in the Eighth National People's Congress in March, 1993.
Like Mao, Jiang Zemin was elected to hold concurrently the three highest
posts: the Secretary-General of the CCP, the President of the PRC, and the
Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Most of the members of
Politburo were also designated to take up key executive posts in the State
Council." Kohut has argued that the re-integration of party and state powers
in 1993 was Deng's deliberate act to bolster Jiang as his successor."
139
These three societal contradictions (the continuous adaption of socialism,
and oscillations in the adoption of market mechanisms and in the integration
of party and state powers), this thesis suggests, indicate that the ruling elite
of the PRC has not yet developed a successful strategy to handle the problems
arising from the specific circumstances of the PRC. However, the CCP does
not want to return to the situation of pre-1949 China. Deng has explicitly
expressed his fear of the PRC's return to a condition of semi-colonization and
semi-feudalism if the PRC abandons socialism.'
Moreover, these societal contradictions indicated that economic reform
took priority over political restructuring in the PRC after the implementation
of the modernization programme in 1978. The CCP, as pointed out by Keven
J. O'Brien, made no significant political reform even under Deng's leadership,
although the CCP began to legalize political powers and circumscribe the
authority of individual political leaders!' The CCP granted only small
influence to non-CCP forces, and did not encourage political competition.
Therefore, the domestic socio-political contexts of the PRC (in which its
higher education system was institutionalized) have allowed no opposition to
exist in the last forty-four years, whereas the economic context has been
changed from a planned economy to a "socialist market economy" since the
late 1980s. In contrast, the socio-political contexts of the ROC (in which its
higher education was institutionalized) were at first monolithic, and later were
marked by political reforms in the last decade. This will be discussed in the
next section.
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3.3.2 Societal Contradictions and the Secondary Social Transformation in
the ROC 
This section argues that despite the fact that there was no conspicuous
leadership challenge to Jiang Jieshf and his son, the claims of their leadership
over Taiwan (the government of the ROC as the sole legitimate government
of "all China" and Taiwan as a province of the ROC) have created four major
societal contradictions in the ROC in the last forty-four years. These ironies
were the political status of Taiwan; the suspension of certain civil rights which
were endorsed by the constitution; the conflicts between mainland- and local-
born Chinese in the political structure; and the institutionalization of
opposition in the political structure to preserve the legitimacy of the leadership
of the ruling party, the CNP. These contradictions and the revisions of
domestic relations — Taiwanization and institutionalization of opposition — in
the ROC indicate that its ruling elite emphasized political reform, and that the
ROC leaders began to change the basis of leadership legitimation from moral
appeals to institutional mechanisms of direct election."
3.3.2.1 The Political Status of Taiwan in the Eyes of the CNP
The first, and fundamental, societal contradiction is the claim of the ROC
about the political status of Taiwan. The CNP insisted on its claim of political
leadership over "all China" (including Taiwan and mainland China) from 1949.
The jurisdiction of the ROC, however, covers only the Taiwan island, and 3
other small islands (Penghu, Matsu, and Kinmen). The ruling elite believed
that mainland China was only "temporarily" lost to the Chinese communists,
and would be recovered. These political claims helped the CNP justify the
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creation of a dual political and administrative structure on the island: national
and provincial.
At the provincial level, native Taiwanese were citizens of the Province
Taiwan; whereas the mainlanders, despite their "temporary residency" for
more than four decades in Taiwan, were also citizens of their original
provinces in mainland China. Moreover, a provincial government was
established and people were allowed to participate in local elections.
At the national level, Taiwan was one of the provinces of "all China"
and native Taiwanese were only a small proportion of the total population of
"all China." Both native Taiwanese and mainlanders were citizens of "all
China." In the national elective bodies (the National Assembly, Legislative
Yuan, and Control Yuan), members should be elected from the provinces of
"all Cliina."
The dual political structure (provincial and national) in the ROC created
three other contradictions: the suspension of people's rights; conflicts between
mainlanders and native Taiwanese over political interests; and the relations
between the ruling party and opposition forces. These three societal
contradictions will be discussed in sequence.
3.3.2.2 Suspension of People's Rights
The second societal contradiction in the ROC particularly before the late 1980s
was the suspension of some people's rights which were endorsed by the
constitution and advocated by the Three People's Principles. The CNP, after
moving its seat to Taiwan, adjusted the re-election of the President and Vice-
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President to escape the maximum of two terms of office imposed by the
constitution." Also suspended were general elections of the President and
members of the three national elective bodies: the National Assembly,
Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan. As a result, these three political
organizations have been dominated for four decades by the deputies who were
elected in mainland China and had no constituencies in Taiwan."
The CNP also denied other rights of people to form opposition parties,
and to have freedom of speech and assembly before the late 1980s. The
domination of the CNP in the political and state structures, which will be
examined in the next section, also excluded most of the native-born Taiwanese
from occupying high rank positions in these structures. Conflicts between
mainlanders and native Taiwanese emerged as a socio-political problem in the
ROC.
3.3.2.3 Intra-ethnic Conflicts Between Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese
This thesis argues that the third societal contradiction of the ROC is the CNP's
political policies towards the native Taiwanese. This contradiction produced
intra-ethnic conflicts between mainland- and local-born Chinese in Taiwan.
Over the last four decades, about 85% of the population in Taiwan were native
Taiwanese; and not more than 15% were mainlanders.' These two major
groups of Chinese differed in their spoken language, pattern of residence,
occupational roles," goals and cultures.'
In the early 1950s, the mainlanders who moved with the CNP to Taiwan
from China in the early 1950s controlled the political structure and restricted
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the political opportunity of the native Taiwanese to secure high positions in
party and state organizations. The local-born Taiwanese, as observed by John
Kaplan, dominated the manufacturing, commercial and trading sectors of the
ROC, and limited economic opportunity for those mainlanders outside the
government's
Later, the CNP broadened its local base of political support by
recruiting as many party members from the native Taiwanese as possible. In
1988, 80% out of 2.5 million members of the CNP were native Taiwanese.'
The native Taiwanese also recognized that the main way to join the
governmental structure was to become members of the CNP."
On the other hand, the CNP restricted the access of the local-born
Taiwanese to high positions in the party, government and armed forces. The
top and strategic positions were mostly occupied by mainlanders. The CNP,
as argued by Zhang GuOxing, used the concept of Taiwan as a province to
protect the political interests of mainlanders at the expense of local-born
Taiwanese.' In 1969, only 7 (7.1%) out of 99 seats in the highest policy-
decision body, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, were
occupied by native Taiwanese? Moreover, the old guard (mainlanders) of
the CNP, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, had occupied the seats of three
national elective bodies (National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control
Yuan) without election for more than four decades.
3.3.2.4 Taiwanization and the Institutionalization of Opposition
The fourth societal contradiction of the ROC, this thesis argues, is the
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maintenance of the legitimacy of the leadership of the CNP through sharing
limited political power with those who were formerly excluded from the
political and state structures. In order to redefine the legitimacy of its
leadership, the CNP introduced the policy of Taiwanization and the
institutionalization of opposition in the socio-political structure of the ROC.
This thesis defines Taiwanization as the process of recruiting more
native Taiwanese into the higher echelons of the ruling party and government
in the ROC; and the institutionalization of opposition as the legalization of the
incorporation of opposition forces against the prevailing ruling party.
These revisions of the relations between the ruling party, state and
people in the late 1980s were triggered by new international political and
domestic socio-political developments in the ROC from the early 1970s.
At the international level, the government of the ROC was no longer a
legal representative of China in the international community after the United
Nations expelled the ROC and recognized the PRC as an official member in
1971. The ROC also faced diplomatic isolation by many countries which
established links with the PRC. All these diplomatic failures of the ROC
invalidated the CNP's claims of leadership over "all China" (induding
mainland China and Taiwan); and challenged the existing institutional order
and dual political structure (national and provincial) on the island.
At the domestic level, the economic prosperity of Taiwan and the
emergence of a well-educated middle class of local-born Taiwanese (including
young entrepreneurs and professionals) in the 1970s initiated changes in the
political structure of Taiwan. In 1993, more than 60% of the people in Taiwan
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were classified by the government as middle-class." These new elites, as
pointed out by Sheng Shing-Yuan and Ting Tin-Yu, demanded more chances
to participate in urban and political affairs, and even expressed their wish to
reform the existing political structure.' Urban problems like housing
arrangements and environment preservation are becoming political issues.
International and domestic political pressure, therefore, forced Premier
Jiang ringgud• to bring more native Taiwanese into the upper ranks of the
party and government in the late 1970s. It was believed that the recruitment
of more native Taiwanese would ease conflicts with mainlanders over political
interests, and hence would maintain the legitimacy of the CNP leadership over
Taiwan. The percentage of native Taiwanese in the Central Standing
Committee of the CNP was increased from 14.3% in 1969 to 21.7% in 1976,
and to 44% in 1987.83 In 1984, Jiang promoted Li Denghui to be the first
local-born Taiwanese Vice-President. LI also became the President in 1988.
The enhancement of political competition in the ROC lagged behind
Taiwanization by more than a decade. No significant political reforms took
place until 1987. Robert G. Sutter argues that the CNP changed its attitude
towards opposition forces from suppression to toleration because the ruling
elite could no longer rely on the moral mandate of leadership inherited from
the first-generation leaders." The party leaders then depended on the
expansion of popular election and improvement of governmental performance.
Tien Hung-mao argues that the maturing of socioeconomic conditions and the
commitment of the ruling elite were catalysts of the "democratic transition" in
the ROC. However, Sutter and Tien can only explain the change of the
146
CNP's political policies towards the native Taiwanese and opposition, but not
the drastic pace of political reform in a short period of several years after 1987.
Both Sutter and Tien underestimate one external factor of the ROC — the PRC.
This thesis suggests that the rapid incorporation of the opposition party
in the political structure commenced in the ROC only after the PRC had
successfully arranged in the middle of the 1980s the return of Hong Kong and
Macau under the policy of "one country two systems." Taiwan remains the
last territory which the PRC attempts to incorporate. The increase in political
competition in the ROC was used by the CNP as a diplomatic strategy to
regain the political support of the international community, and to resist the
diplomatic isolation and the proposal of unification by the PRC. The military
crackdown on the student movement by the CCP in the PRC in 1989 resulted
in temporary economic sanctions and the suspension of high-level diplomatic
activities by Western countries. This created an opportunity for the ROC to
show its improvement in political competition in a contrast to the PRC's
suppression of opposition.
Against this background, political reform took place within a short
period, particularly after 1989. Jiang jingguO had announced the lifting of the
martial law in October 1987 and partial incorporation of opposition party in
the state structure up to the legislative level. After the death of Jiang ringgues
in 1988, President a Denghui further increased the chances of political contest
in Taiwan. In June 1990, he declared compulsory retirement of all members
of the three national elective bodies by the end of 1991. These members
included those who were elected on mainland China in 1949 and in Taiwan
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in 1969." He also terminated the "Period of National Mobilization and the
Suppression of Communist Rebellion" in May 1991. Full direct election of
members of the National Assembly took place in December 1991. The result
of this election gave the CNP its first popular mandate since its leadership
began in 1949.'1
 People also participated in direct voting for the members of
the Legislative Yuan in January 1993. The direct election of the next President
of the ROC is scheduled to take place in 1996.
Despite these political reforms, the CNP was still the ruling party and
the opposition party could not obtain majority support in the national
elections.' A survey by Lin Chia-cheng in 1990 indicated that more than
57% (out of 1,500) interviewees still believed that the CNP could maintain
economic prosperity and political stability in the ROC.'
Moreover, political conflicts between mainlanders and native Taiwanese
still continued in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Yung Wei predicted in
the early 1970s that the differences and tensions between them would rapidly
disappear." However, the trend of the domination of mainlanders in the
political structure has not yet been reversed. The percentage of the native
Taiwanese in the upper part of the political structure was increashig, but was
still far below 85% (the percentage of native Taiwanese in the total
population).".
 ' In early 1993, President Li Denghui admitted that most of
the colleagues around him were still mainlanders, not native Taiwanese."
New dimensions of the intra-ethnic conflicts between mainlanders and
native Taiwanese were also developed. The political interests of mainlanders
were threatened by the ascendancy of native Taiwanese in the political
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structure in the early 1990s. The mainlanders accused the Democratic
Progressive Party (which were formed mainly by native Taiwanese) of trying
to get rid of mainlanders from the political structure." In August 1993, 6
CNP legislators whose parents moved from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949
parted with the mainstream of the CNP, and formed a third party, the New
Party in the Legislative Yuan under the leadership of President Li. All these
conflicts between mainlanders and native Taiwanese, though eased, have not
been eradicated in recent political reforms.
Therefore, the secondary social transformation in the ROC, this thesis
has argued, indicates that its ruling elite emphasized political reform so as to
maintain its leadership, and shifted, though not yet completely, its appeals for
political support from a moral to an institutional basis.
To sum up, at the domestic level, the socio-political contexts in which
the higher education system of the PRC have framed have been publicly
monolithic for the last forty-four years, despite the double economic
transformation from the initial acceptance, to the banning, and finally to the
re-acceptance of market forces. In contrast, the socio-political contexts of the
ROC in which its higher education was framed underwent a double political
transformation from Japanese colonial rule to one-party leadership without the
toleration of political competition, and then to tri-party leadership with the
acceptance of opposition forces in the political structure.
The international contexts of the PRC and ROC, which will be examined
in the next section, also framed their higher education systems within the
world system of cultural multiplicity.
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3.4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE PRC AND ROC: THE 
FIRST AND SECONDARY TRANSFORMATIONS 
This section attempts to explore the first and secondary transformations of the
international relations of the PRC and ROC in the last forty-four years. The
section highlights the ideological, international political and international
economic criteria of closure, rejection and adoption used by both Chinese
countries.
The argument of this section is that the tension, between the rejection
of foreign values which were deemed conflicting with the official ones by
political leaders and the development of external relations with other countries
in the PRC and ROC, was framed by their international contexts. These two
countries implemented international closure in different stages. The
international "closure" of a country is defined as its resistance to establish
diplomatic relations with and to participate in activities organized by specified
other countries. "Closure" against some countries may mean, at the same time,
the establishment of relations with others.
The political leaders of the PRC and ROC developed external relations
with foreign countries according to three major criteria: ideological,
international political, and international economic At the initial stage of social
transformation after revolution, the PRC and ROC were most likely to reject
those countries which practised value systems which were antagonistic to
those of the PRC and ROC. However, the development of external relations
of the PRC and ROC was complicated by international political and economic
influences. Any change in the relations of the PRC and ROC with the US and
USSR would affect the relations of these two Chinese countries with others.
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Moreover, the PRC and ROC participated in the international division of
labour and established economic links with countries which allowed their
capital to flow into the Chinese economies.
A discussion of the ideological, international political and international
economic criteria used by the PRC and ROC in dealing with their international
relations will be presented in sequence. Ideological criteria are chosen firstly
because the PRC and ROC have their own state-supported central value
systems which would interact with others in the world system of cultural
multiplicity, and the respective Chinese states would place checks on such
interactions; and secondly because ideological criteria affectothe definition of
the diplomatic world of the PRC and ROC during the first transformation.
International political and economic criteria are stressed because international
political and economic developments, as suggested by Wallerstein and
mentioned in Chapter One, affect the flow of capital between countries in the
world system.
3.4.1 Ideological Criteria of the PRC and ROC during the First
Transformation 
This thesis argues that during the founding period the PRC and ROC
established external relations with foreign countries which supported the
central value systems invoked by the respective Chinese ruling elites.
The PRC's basic criterion for international openness was pro-socialist,
i.e. to develop external relations with countries in the socialist bloc. In June
1949, Mao Zedang decided to 'lean to one side [the former USSR]," and
exalted it as the "best teacher" for China in the communist revolution."
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To the PRC, pro-socialist also meant anti-capitalist at the international
level. The PRC did not turn to the US and its allies before the 1970s. Mao,
despite his recognition of the US as a leading superpower among imperialist
countries," termed American imperialism a "paper tiger" in 1956? The
Beijing government advocated "anti-Western imperialism" and "anti-
capitalism,"" and organized numerous anti-US and anti-imperialist
demonstrations before the 1970s.' The ruling elite of the PRC even identified
communist countries, like Yugoslavia which were associated with the US, as
imperialist.' Therefore, the PRC did not have many diplomatic links with
capitalist countries and their allies in the 1950s and 1960s.
In contrast with the PRC, the ROC upheld an anti-communist approach
in dealing with foreign countries. The anti-communist attitude of the CNP
arose from the party leaders' belief in the final victory of the Three People's
Principles over communism.' Much of the CNP's anti-communist attitude
arose from their antagonism towards the CU', and not just communism in
general. In 1952 in the National Assembly, Jiang Jieshi announced that the
CU' and communism should be opposed persistently. The CNP was
determined to crush Chinese communists, and attempted to contain the PRC
through strengthening its relations with anti-communist nations.' The
association of the ROC with Western countries, particularly the US, was a
matter of military necessity and of belief.'" This in turn blocked the ROC's
relations with other communist countries.
The dualistic criterion of the PRC and ROC for developing external
relations with foreign countries was quite linear. In many international arenas,
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the CCP and CNP, however, adopted more flexible foreign policies before 1949
and particularly after the late 1970s.
3.4.2 The International Political Relations of the PRC and ROC during the
First and Secondary Transformations 
This thesis further argues that the establishment of external relations of the
PRC and ROC depended on their relations with the two superpowers, the US
and the former USSR, in the last four decades; any shift in the mutual relations
and interests among the four countries would affect the relations of the PRC
and ROC with other countries. In short, both the PRC and ROC developed
foreign relations according to their political interests. This was indicated by
the oscillating attitudes of the PRC and ROC in opening up to their ideological
friends and enemies before 1949 and after the 1970s.
3.4.2.1 International Political Criteria of the PRC
Before 1949, the political interests of the CCP were to gain international
support to defeat the CNP in the civil war. Before leaning to the USSR, Mao
UclOng attempted to call for American help in 1944.1'
Between 1949 and the late 1970s, the diplomatic world of the PRC was,
however, divided in accordance with its international political interests into
two parts: supporting and opposing the PRC. The PRC warmly welcomed the
USSR because both countries wanted to stop American imperialism in
Asia.'" In September 1949, Mao announced the principle of alliance with
other countries, "first with the USSR and every new democratic nation:407
After the PRC-USSR split in 1960, the PRC began to distance itself from the
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USSR, and called the USSR the "major enemy" and the US the "minor
enemy.' The cause of the gradual, but drastic, change of attitude,
according to the PRC, was two-fold: Soviet hegenomist behaviour and failure
to back the PRC with military support!'
In the 1970s, the PRC began to redefine its relations with capitalist and
socialist countries. The PRC, after having suffered diplomatic isolation by
Western countries for more than two decades, attempted to re-enter the
international community and to increase the leverage against the USSR's
alleged aggression. Without American objection, the PRC was admitted to the
United Nations as a member in 1972. In the same year, the PRC re-established
its diplomatic relations with the US and Japan!10 In 1979, Deng Xidoping
paid a diplomatic visit to the US and invited it "to unite" with the PRC so as
to "place curbs on the polar bear [the USSR]." 1" In 1983, the PRC ended its
self-imposed isolation from the West, and proposed that "countries with
different social systems can peacefully coexist and equally cooperate." 112 All
these actions of the PRC indicated that it wanted to be independent from the
USSR in the socialist bloc and to expand the PRC's diplomatic world to
indude capitalist countries. After the fall of the USSR in 1991, the PRC still
maintained diplomatic relations with the Commonwealth of Independent
States. By March 1993, the PRC had diplomatic relations with 155 countries
including capitalist and the remaining socialist nations!"
The PRC exhibited a pattern of oscillating diplomatic relations with
foreign countries: from calling for American help to relying on Soviet support
in 1949, to the PRC-USSR split and cooperation with Western countries
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between the 1960s and 1980s, and to the indusion of capitalist and socialist
countries in the PRC's diplomatic world in the early 1990s. Like the PRC, the
ROC, which will be discussed in the next section, has exhibited another pattern
of oscillating diplomatic relations in the last forty-four years.
3.4.2.2 International Political Criteria of the ROC
Like the PRC, the ROC has established its diplomatic relations with other
countries according to its international political interests since 1949. One of the
major international political interests of the ROC has been the survival of
Taiwan as a political entity.
Before 1949, before welcoming US military support in the early 1950s,
Jiang Jieshi asked Russian advisors in 1925 to train his army to fight against
the British,' and his government treasured its recognition by the USSR as
the legitimate government of China until 1950.115
Between 1949 and 1978, the foreign policy of the ROC was to support
international alliances against the PRC with the noncommunist countries so as
to maintain Taiwan as a political entity by military and diplomatic means. The
Taipei authorities relied on American military support to stop the potential
attack by the PRC in the 1950s." The ROC improved its relations with the
US and appealed to non-communist countries in East Asia, e.g. South Korea
and the Philippines. The strategy successfully prevented the PRC from
entering the United Nations until 1971.
However, the ROC was forced to adjust its diplomatic relations with
capitalist countries particularly after its expulsion from the United Nations in
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1971. France (1963), Canada (1970) and Japan (1972) were the first major
capitalist countries which switched their support to the PRC. The US demoted
the US-ROC diplomatic relation from an official to "unorthodox" level."'
The embassies of both countries were dissolved, and new nongovernmental
entities were established to handle the "ambassadorial" affairs of these two
countries.iis
The new international political environment compelled the ROC to
adopt another diplomatic strategy to resist the PRC, i.e. to improve economic
relations instead of political and diplomatic relations with foreign countries.
(More discussion about this strategy will be offered later in this chapter.) This
new strategy allowed the ROC to improve its relations with the communist
bloc."' The ROC permitted Hungary and Poland to establish trading offices
in Taipei in 1989. The Executive Yuan announced in February 1990 that the
ROC could have direct trade with the former USSR and Albania.
In the last forty-four years, the PRC and ROC have had a double
transformation in their diplomatic relations in accordance with their respective
political interests and international political developments. Before 1949, the
founders of the PRC and ROC attempted to gain the international support of
both capitalist and socialist countries. Between 1949 and the early 1970s, the
ruling elites of the PRC and ROC developed a dichotomized diplomatic world
consisting of friends and enemies. After the 1970s, both Chinese countries
assigned the ideological criterion of rejecting enemies to a subordinate level,
and developed external relations with those who earlier had been ideological
enemies. Alongside political interests of the PRC and ROC were economic
156
considerations which will be discussed in the next section.
3.4.3 The International Economic Relations of the PRC and ROC during
the First and Secondary Transformations 
This section argues that the adherence of the PRC and the ROC to the
superpowers did not necessarily allow them or their allies to penetrate the
national economy of the PRC and ROC unless these foreign countries had their
capital — in form of grants, loans, trade or technical assistance — flowing into
the Chinese economies.
3.4.3.1 The International Economic Criteria of the PRC
The PRC, this thesis argues, established economic links with foreign countries
which could help the PRC to pursue capital accumulation in the world
economy, and modified its economic structures twice in the last forty-four
years.
In the founding period, the PRC faced economic isolation from the
Western countries, and received economic and technical support from its
ideological friends, particularly the former USSR. In 1948, the American
government declared that the US would not support any Chinese communist
government, and passed the China Aid Act to grant financial assistance to the
ROC!" The Beijing government, then, turned to the USSR, and accepted its
economic and technological aid before their split in 1960.' 1 In particular, by
the end of 1957, 10,800 Soviet specialists were sent to China and assisted it in
industrial development and in the training of Chinese workers and
technicians!'
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Accompanying economic and technological aid was the importation of
the Soviet's highly centralized economic model into the PRC in the 1950s. Like
the USSR, the PRC, from the capital, devised mandatory national plans for all
units of production,' controlled the basic processes of industrial
accumulation and production, standardized wages, and regulated the
distribution, circulation and exchange of goods.124 All enterprises were
highly centralized despite some slight oscillations between centralization and
decentralization of economic power during the reform periods before 1978."
However, the changes in the international political situation (which was
discussed in the previous section) from the 1970s also altered the sources of
foreign capital and their influences on the PRC economy. In order to have
access to Western capital and technology, the PRC adjusted its mode of
economy to a "socialist commodity economy" in the early 1980s, and officially
to a "socialist market economy" in 1992. The Soviet model had been
denounced by the CCP since 1978.' The reform in the PRC's socialist
economic system continued with the introduction of market mechanisms
similar to Hungary and a "mixed" economy, rather than to the Yugoslav model
of the 1970s.'
Despite the gradual incorporation of market forces into the Chinese
socialist economy from the 1980s, the Beijing authorities still insisted that
market mechanisms were to be operated within the framework of public
ownership. In 1984, Premier Mao Ziyang attempted to differentiate the
"socialist-commodity economy" from a capitalist economy, and from the
previous Chinese socialist economy.' Market forces were frequently
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regarded by the CCP as mechanisms playing only a "supplementary role of
regulation by the market" in the socialist economy,' and were allowed to
operate in different sectors: market mechanisms were dominant in the
agricultural sector, and the planned economy was characteristic of the
industrial sector.' However, the industrial and service sectors, particularly
in the coastal cities, were also opened up to foreign investments from the late
1980s. The percentage of commodities whose price was controlled by the state
was reduced from 50% in 1988 to 20% in 1992." In other words, the PRC
was neither a completely planned nor a total market economy.
However, the PRC's reliance on foreign capital meant accepting some
foreign influence on the economy. In 1992, the PRC utilized foreign capital
amounting to US$ 18.8 billion, i.e. an increase of 62.7% over 1991. The number
of enterprises totally or partially controlled by foreigners was increased by
79% from 47,000 in 1991 to 84,000 in 1992. These foreign-controlled enterprises
accounted for 20.4% of the total value of exports of the PRC.'
Moreover, when the PRC wanted to expand its economic participation
in international arenas, its economy was subject to more foreign influences.
For example, in order to satisfy the preliminary requirements for the entry into
the GATT in 1993, the PRC began to adjust its domestic economic
mechanisms' and policies towards foreign investment.'
Thus, the PRC has had a double transformation in international
economic relations and in domestic economy: the banning of market forces and
the introduction of a highly centralized economic model from the USSR in the
1950s, and the re-incorporation of market mechanisms to tune in with capitalist
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countries in the 1980s.
3.4.3.2 The International Economic Criteria of the ROC
Like the PRC, the ROC, this thesis argues, developed and adjusted its
economic relations with foreign countries in accordance with its pursuit of
capital accumulation in the world economy. Unlike the PRC, the ROC has not
changed its economic model in the last forty-four years.
The Taipei authorities received economic and technological aid from its
ideological friend, the US, between 1951 and 1970"
However, the ROC had no freedom in allocating American aid. The US
insisted that its aid in the ROC should be spent on economic construction,
rather than on military development. The American aid policy in the ROC
was consistent with American President Truman's foreign policy towards the
PRC and ROC: the US protected the ROC from PRC's potential attack, and
prevented the ROC from attacking the PRC." This policy of Truman,
though frustrating the ROC's attempt to recover mainland China, improved
the economic infrastructures of agriculture and industry in Taiwan.137
Unlike the PRC (which adopted completely the Soviet economic model
in the founding period), the economy of the ROC was not totally modelled
upon the US capitalist model. Rather, the state played an active role in
planning the development of national construction, at the same time defending
the material benefits of the majority.' In 1952, the percentages of state-run
enterprises in industrial and manufacturing sectors were respectively 57 and
56.7.139 Between 1953 and 1992, six Four-Year Plans, two Six-Year
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Intermediate Plans, and two Ten-Year Long-Term Plans were launched.'4°
The state also controlled the direction and development of agricultural and
industrial sectors."'
The Taipei authorities, despite the central planning, encouraged the
development of the private sector as in other capitalist countries. Unlike the
PRC (before the late 1980s), the state economic plans of the ROC are
mandatory for public enterprises, but serve only as guidelines for private
enterprises"' The price of products is mainly determined by market
mechanisms. The state determines the physical investment environment (like
the control of the use of land and the provision of cheap electrical power) and
the "psychological" climate, and guides the entry of the ROC enterprises into
the world capitalist system" The economic zones for processing imported
goods in the 1960s and the Hsinchu Science-based Park in 1980 are successful
examples of the transfer of foreign capital and technology into a state-
controlled capitalist economy.
In the new international political situation from the 1980s, the ROC
began to trade with communist countries, particularly the PRC. Indirect trade
between these two countries through Hong Kong, up to July 1992, amounted
to US$ 20 billions. There were 2,552 Taiwan-funded companies, which held
mainland assets worth US$ 820 million, in the PRC."4 One year later, the
number of these companies was drastically increased by more than five-fold
to 17,000.' The reasons for closer economic ties between the ROC and PRC
include the utilization of the cheap labour' and science and technology"'
of the PRC by Taiwanese investors.'
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In conclusion, the PRC and ROC developed external relations with other
countries according to their political and economic interests in the world
system, and have had double transformations in international political and
economic relations in the last four decades. However, during the development
of international relations of the PRC and ROC, contradictions emerged and
complicated the international contexts of these two Chinese countries (which
framed their higher education systems). This will be discussed in the next
section.
3.5 CONTRADICTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
THE PRC AND ROC AFTER SECONDARY TRANSFORMATION 
This thesis argues that since the late 1970s, the PRC and ROC, despite the
secondary re-definitions of their political and economic relations with other
countries, have not settled their relations with other countries, particularly
those which were their arch-enemies before the 1970s: the US for the PRC; the
PRC for the ROC. In other words, both Chinese countries are still defining
their national identities in the international community. The search for
national identity of these two Chinese countries is indicated by the
complexities, particularly the contradictions, of their international relations
after the 1970s.
3.5.1 The Unsettled Relations of the PRC with Capitalist Countries 
Despite the adjustments in foreign policies towards Western countries since the
late 1970s, the PRC, this thesis argues, has hesitated to develop full external
relations with capitalist countries, particularly the US. The unsettled
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international relations of the PRC from the 1970s were demonstrated by three
contradictions in its practice of foreign policy: its reaffirmation of its central
value system; its acceptance of limited economic loss for upholding territorial
claims; and its limited adjustment in domestic political conditions for the
return of the granting of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status by the US.
It should be noted that these three contradictions are not unrelated. Rather,
they involve, for example, the relations between the PRC and US.
The first contradiction in the foreign affairs of the PRC was its re-
affirmation of its state-supported central value system, particularly its anti-
capitalist position, while it was opening up its economy to the West. The
ruling elite of the PRC, this thesis suggests, was afraid of the conversion of the
PRC from a socialist to a Westernized country with a multiple-party political
system. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 1  and "Anti-Spiritual Pollution
Campaign" (1983) were examples which show this fear. The unprecedented
student movement in 1989 was judged by Deng Xiãoping to be a "counter-
revolutionary uprising" which attempted to overthrow the CCP and the
socialist system, to establish a capitalist republic, and to turn the PRC into a
Western vassal.' The 1993 revised constitution explicitly stated that the
CCP and the political system would continue to exist for a long time.' As
a result of the military suppression of the student movement in 1989, the PRC
suffered temporary economic sanctions, and high-level diplomatic isolation by
Western countries. In other words, the ruling elite of the PRC attempted to
preserve the political system and ideals at the risk of breaking relations with
other countries.
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The second contradiction in the international relations of the PRC is that
the PRC would accept limited economic loss for the maintenance of political
claims concerning its territory. For example, the CCP claims that Taiwan is a
province of the PRC. In handling the arms sales of the US" and France'
to the ROC in late 1992, the PRC accused these two Western countries of
interfering in its domestic affairs. The PRC immediately closed the French
consulate in Guangzhou on 23 December 1992, but has made no retaliatory
action against the US so far. The PRC's differential treatment of the US and
France suggests that the PRC will risk economic loss in exchange for
persistence in political claims about the PRC's territory, but the economic loss
must be limited. The PRC had an annual trade surplus of US$ 2 billion with
France, but a larger annual surplus of US$ 15 billion with the US!'
The third contradiction is that the PRC, despite its strong objection in
speeches, would accept some changes in domestic political conditions in
exchange for maintaining international economic relations. An example was
the PRC-US annual controversy of the granting of the Most Favoured Nation
(MEN) status to the PRC by the US. In 1993, the US made use of its great
trade surplus (US$ 18 billion in 1992)' and imposed on the PRC a condition
of its improvement of the human rights situation for the renewal of the MFN
status.' The Foreign Minister of the PRC, Qian richèn, objected to the
conditions imposed on MEN status, and expressed the view that the granting
of the MFN was an economic decision and should not contain any political
conditions!' On the other hand, the PRC government released pictures
showing the "comfortable" jailing conditions of five political dissidents,' and
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released one of the arrested student leaders in the 1989 student demonstration,
Wang Dan, to fulfill the requirements of the US. However, the annual
controversy over the MFN status forced the PRC to reduce its reliance on the
US, and strengthen its ties with other Western countries like Germany and
Canada.'
Thus, the PRC, since broadening its diplomatic networks in the 1970s,
has not settled its relations with other countries, particularly of the West. The
PRC would risk limited economic loss or diplomatic sanction for the
preservation of the political system, some ideals and some territorial claims.
The PRC would also make limited change in domestic political conditions in
exchange for the inflow of capital from other countries. Like the PRC, the
ROC, as discussed in the next section, has not settled its international political
relations.
3.5.2 The ROC's Search for International Political Status 
This thesis suggests that since the expulsion from the United Nations in 1971,
the fundamental contradiction of the ROC in its international relations has
been that the ROC, despite its economic prosperity and being a de facto
political entity, has no official political identity in the international community.
The ROC seeks this identity by exercising its economic influences and
subordinating some of its revolutionary claims against the PRC.
The lack of official political identity of the ROC in the international
community, this thesis argues, was an outcome of its persistent domestic
revolutionary claims. Both the PRC and ROC made claims: that there is only
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one China; and that only their government is the sole legitimate representative
of China in the international community. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
they exduded each other in international arenas, particularly before the early
1980s. Even the US maintained only non-diplomatic relations with the ROC
so as not to cut US-PRC diplomatic ties. In 1993, Premier Li Peng of the PRC
reaffirmed its policy towards the ROC: Taiwan can develop economic, but not
diplomatic relations with those countries which have governmental relations
with the FRC.' Up to now (at the moment of finishing this thesis), no
"dual recognition" of the PRC and ROC as two separate official political
entities has taken place in the international community. The number of
countries which had diplomatic ties with the ROC dropped from 80 in 1971
to 29 in 1992.1"
The ROC adopted two strategies to break the diplomatic isolation
initiated by the PRC. First of all, the ROC utilized its economic influences to
develop a non-diplomatic international network, and therefore to gain
international support and recognition. President Li Denghui admitted in 1988
that the new foreign policy was "to pursue economic development in the
absence of official diplomatic relations" and to use "trade, investment, cultural
and technological channels to promote 'substantive relations' with free and
democratic nations."' In other words, the establishment and expansion of
external trade ties were viewed both internally and externally as evidence of
the economic and political viability of the ROC as an independent system.'
Domestically, the ROC attracted foreign companies to participate in the
construction of the infrastructure in the ROC; e.g. the US$ 300 billion public
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projects outlined in the Six-Year National Development Plan, 1991-1996.1"
Internationally, the ROC diversified its economic networks. Up to early
1993, the ROC has maintained substantive economic and trade relations with
160 countries.'" The ROC also maintained diplomatic relations with less
than 30 countries (up to 1992) by granting subsidies or technical assistance to
their economies, although most of these countries were small developing
countries of Latin America and Africa.
Secondly, the ROC subordinated its political claims to economic
interests and international participation from the 1980s. The ROC has changed
its policy from the mutual exclusion of the PRC and ROC in international
arenas to the acceptance of their coexistence. This is indicated in the ROC's
acceptance of its country's name as "Chinese-Taipei" in the 1984 Olympics; and
as "Taipei, China" in the Asian Development Bank in the 1980s and the early
1990s.
Moreover, the ROC, despite the insistence in the policy of "Three Nos"
(no direct contact, no negotiation, and no compromise with the Chinese
communists), developed limited political relations with the PRC from the
1980s. The first high-level official ROC-PRC interaction in the Chinese
communist territory (since their split in 1949) took place when President Li
IMnghui sent the Minister of Finance, Shirley Kuo, to participate under the
country name, Taipei China, in the conference of the Asian Development Bank
held in l3éijing in 1989. In April 1993, the Taipei authorities also endorsed a
semi-official organization to hold a "Wang-Koo Conference" with the PRC in
a third country, Singapore. The major agenda of this conference was the
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institutionalization of non-diplomatic activities between the ROC and PRC.1"
In the early 1990s, the ROC, while developing economic relations with
the PRC, attempted to develop formal ties with international organizations,
particularly the United Nations. Despite the acknowledgement of the potential
opposition of the PRC,1' the Foreign ministry of the ROC announced in May
and June 1993 the application for "participation" in, rather than "rejoining" of,
the United Nations' under the strategy of "one China two seats."'
However, the ROC's application was rejected by the United Nations in late
1993.
These two strategies (the exchange of economic influences for
international support; and the subordination of political claims to the
enhancement of diplomatic network) of the ROC, it has been argued in this
section, indicate the ROC's search for an official political identity in the
international community, although the ROC was a de facto political entity and
was recognized as a newly industrialized country by many countries.
To sum up, since 1949, the contemporary international contexts of the
PRC and ROC have been undergone two major transformations. However,
both countries have not settled relations with their former ideological enemies
of the 1950s. The PRC still resists the interference of the US in the PRC's
domestic political affairs. The ROC still searches for its official political
identity in the international community.
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter has described the contemporary domestic and international
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contexts of the PRC and ROC (in which their higher education systems were
institutionalized) between 1949 and 1993 through the discussion of the social
construction of their state-supported central value systems, and through the
examination of the contradictions emerged during the process of construction.
This chapter has argued that the contemporary domestic and
international contexts of the PRC and ROC have undergone two major
transformations. These transformations brought forth corresponding changes
in domestic social structures in the PRC and ROC: for example, the
incorporation of market forces in the PRC; and the introduction of Western
form of democracy in the ROC. Both Chinese higher education systems were
also affected by these two transformations. For instance, in the PRC, the
private higher education sector was banned in the early 1950s and allowed to
re-emerge in the early 1990s. In the ROC, university academics can form a
public, though not an independent, voice against the state after the emergence
of political pluralism in the late 1980s.
However, both countries, this chapter has argued, have not settled their
domestic and international relations. Common to the anxieties of both
countries in the last forty-four years was the search for cultural and political
identity under pressures from within and without: for the PRC, the
preservation of the CCP-controlled socio-political status quo; and for the ROC,
the strive for the CNP-dominated socio-political structure and official
international political identity.
Against this understanding of historical and contemporary contexts of
the PRC and ROC, Chapter Four will examine how these two higher education
169
systems were used as part of national mobilization in resisting the formation
of a "homogenous world" and in the creation of "homogenous national
cultures." Chapters Five and Six will analyze the complexity of the
international academic relations of the PRC and ROC, particularly in the
importation of foreign science and technology for the purposes of economic
modernization.
170
Endnotes For Chapter Three
1. This thesis adopts Terry Eagleton's definition of legitimation. He
defines legitimation as a "process by which a ruling power comes to
secure from its subjects an at least tacit consent to its authority." See
Terry Eagleton, Ideology (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p.54.
2. The "Common Programme" was adopted in 1949, and served as a
temporary constitution in the PRC until 1954. In 1954, a formal
constitution was promulgated. Later, it was revised in 1978, 1982 and
1993. The "Common Programme" and the 1954 version of the
constitution of the PRC are in Zhiinghua Renmfn GOnghigu6 GOngtOng
Gangling If Xrnjill Xidnfa (The People's Republic of China: a Collection
of the Common Programme, and New and Old Constitutions) (Hong
Kong: 136ifartg, 1970).
3. These principles were offered by San in the 1910s as a prescription to
save China from its economic backwardness and potential foreign
military aggressions, and frequently invoked by Jiang Jieshi and his
successors (Jiang Jinggu6 and Li Dênghui) after the CNP settled in
Taiwan in 1949. See Ybdan San, Sanmfn Zhayi (The Three People's
Principles) (Taipei: Cheng Chung, Revised ed., 1978), p.1.
4. Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the ROC describes the Principle of
Nationalism, particularly the sovereignty of the ROC and equality
among the various racial groups in the ROC. Chapters 2-12 spell out
the Principle of Democracy, i.e. the rights of the people in the ROC;
Chapter 13 deals with the Principle of Livelihood, and spells out
fundamental national policies like national defence, economy, and
education. See ZhOnghudmIngu6 Xidnfd (Constitution of the Republic of
China) (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, 3rd
ed., 1989); for the English translation, see Constitution of the Republic of
China (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, 3rd ed.,
1988).
5. Taiwan was a colony ruled by the Dutch between 1650 and 1680, and
by Japan between 1895 and 1945. Before 1949, there were about 6
million Taiwanese whose ancestors migrated into Taiwan from
mainland China in the 17th century and particularly from its Fujian
Province in the 19th century. At the founding period of the PRC and
ROC in the early 1950s, a large influx of military personnel and people
from mainland China into Taiwan took place. Between 1949 and 1950,
about 1.2 million mainlanders (including about 400,000 soldiers) moved
with the CNP from mainland China and settled in Taiwan. The
population was increased by 29.2% from 6.09 millions in 1946 to 7.89
millions in 1951. See Shao Sheng Chên, Taiwan Yitnjiii C6ng Kan: Taiwan
171
De RinkOu Mangan Yu Shaul Bit) nqian (Studies On Taiwan: Change of
Population and Society in Taiwan) (Taipei: Lian ring, 1985), p.380;
Huaisi Peng, Taiwan Zhengzhi Bianqitin Sishf Nian (Political Changes of
the Republic of China in the Past 40 Years) (Taipei: Z111 Mak), 1987),
p.70; and Rural Economics Division, Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction, Taiwan Agricultural Statistics, 1901-1965 (Taipei: Chinese-
American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1966), p.7. See
also GuOx1ng Zhang, Z111 De Taiwan (Self-Independent Taiwan) (Taipei:
Dacodang Press, 1990), pp.24-25.
6. In 1950, Jiang Jieshf was proud of maintaining the ROC as a member
state of the United Nations, and attempted to convince his subjects to
construct Taiwan as a model province of China and the base of
recovering the territories lost to the CCP. See Jieshi Jiang, "Statement
on the Resumption of Presidency, March 1, 1950," "Broadcast on
November 13, 1953," and "The Evacuation of Hainan and Chusan" in
Selected Speeches and Messages of President Chiang Kai-Shek, 1949-52
(Taipei: Office of the Government Spokesman, 1952).
7. Article 1 in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages, 1987), p.11.
8. See Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution, and the Preamble of the 1982
Constitution. Part of the 1978 Constitution is quoted in Mark Selden
(ed.), The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of
Revolutionary Change (New York and London: Monthly Review, 1979),
pp.689-695. See also 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1987), p.5.
9. The National People's Congress is constituted by people through
"democratic elections." Their members are elected indirectly from
conference representatives at different levels of the party hierarchy. The
elected members claim to exercise the right, on behalf of the people, to
legislate and to elect top state executives including the President and
Premier. This kind of socialist democracy and legality was judged by
the ruling elite of the PRC to be superior to the Western rule of law and
capitalist democracy. See David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng
Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform (Basingstoke, Hampshire:
MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1988), p.50.
10. Ian Derbyshire, Politics in China: From Mao to the Post-Deng Era
(Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1991), pp.8-9.
11. Franz Schurmann has argued that the CCP is an organized expression
of the will of the proletariat and peasants, and represents the interests
of the people, and hence dialectically exercises the control of society
over the state. See Franz Schurmarm, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2nd and enlarged edition, 1968), pp.110-111.
172
12. Articles 3 and 4. See Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1987), pp.11-12
13. This Principle refers firstly to liberty, equity, and love; and secondly to
the operation of the government by the people. See Ylxian San, Sanmfn
Zhiyi (Three People's Principles) (Taipei: Cheng Chung, Revised ed.,
1978), pp.79, 97.
14. The separation of governmental powers was a modification of the
Western tripartite division of powers (legislative, executive, and
judicial) with the addition of two powers drawn from the Chinese
tradition: the examination power and the "control" or supervising
power. The examination Yuan would examine all aspirants for public
office. The Control Yuan would supervise the conduct of officials and
would have the power to impeach. Ybdan Sun, Gusifil Qudnjf (The
Complete Works of San Ylxian) (Taipei: Party History Committee of the
Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Rev. ed., 1973), Vol.2,
pp.154, 179, 184.
15. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1988), p.56.
16. In the cases of the PRC and ROC, this thesis accepted two assertions of
elite theory summarized by Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone. They
suggest that regardless of the dominant political ideology and state
organization, every country consists of a small number of people who
rule and a majority of people who are the ruled. Moreover, the
character of a country and its direction of national policy can be
understood in terms of "the composition, structure, and conflicts of the
ruling groups." See Kenneth Prewitt, and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites:
Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row,
1973), p.5.
17. Articles 28-31 of the "Common Programme" in ZhOnghud Renmfn
Geinghigu6 GeingtOng Gangling If Xfnjill Xianfd (The People's Republic of
China: a Collection of the Common Programme, and New and Old
Constitutions) (Hong Kong: Beifang, 1970).
18. Renmfn Mao Hdiwaiban (People's Daily, overseas edition), 30 March,
1993.
19. Harmon Zeigler, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political
Association and Conflict Regulation in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p.139.
20. Articles 144-145. ZhönghudmInguO Xidnfa (Constitution of the Republic
of China) (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, 3rd
ed., 1989), p.55; for the English translation, see Constitution of the
Republic of China (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive
173
Yuan, 3rd ed., 1988), pp.44-45.
21. Kwoh-ting Li, Economic Transformation of Taiwan, ROC (London:
Shepeard-Walwyn, 1988), p.79.
22. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1988), p.56.
23. Articles 85 and 86. See Zhãnghudmingu6 Xidnfd (Constitution of the
Republic of China) (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive
Yuan, 3rd ed., 1989), pp.30-31; Constitution of the Republic of China
(Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, 3rd ed., 1988),
pp.24-25.
24. Peng also suggested two reasons for the emergence of technocrats in the
ROC. First, technocrats were needed in the period of US aid in the
1950s. Second, after successful economic development in the 1960s,
their role became more important, and hence more professionals with
higher degrees were recruited into the state government. See Hudisi
Peng, Tdiwan Zhengzhi Bidnqidn ash( Nidn (Political Changes of the
Republic of China in the Past 40 Years) (Taipei: Z111 Wanbao, 1987),
p.44.
25. National mobilization is defined as a process or means of directing
people and material resources to achieve certain national goals
delineated by political leaders on a purposive and large-scale basis.
26. Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political Ideologies and the Democratic
Ideal (New York: HarperCollins [sic.] Publishers Inc., 1991), p.9.
27. Ylxian Stn, Siinmin Zhilyi (The Three People's Principles) (Taipei: Cheng
Chung, Revised ed., 1978), pp.1-2.
28. Ybdan Sfm, GuOfd Qudnjf (A Complete Collection of Works of Sfm
Yixian) (Taipei: Central Cultural Service, Rev. ed., 1981), Vol.2, pp.2231.
29. "All under heaven" is a traditional Chinese phrase referring to a country
in which sincere and competent officials are elected; social relations are
harmonious; people are responsible and contribute to the construction
of the national economy; people are not selfish; and the society is so
safe that there is no need to dose the door of any house at night. See
Jiang Jieshi, Xan angtOng Xing Gang Sixidng Ydliln Ziingji (A Complete
Collection of Thoughts and Speeches of the Late President Jiáng Jieslu')
(Taipei: Central Party Committee, Chinese Nationalist Party, n.d.), Vol.3,
p.15.
30. G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar
(Documented and Analysed), The Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: China
Quarterly, 1961); and Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Sino-American
174
Reconciliation (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press,
1978).
31. Cheng Chen, "Ten Years in Retrospect: A Report to the Third Session
of the National Assembly, March 14, 1960," in Free China Review, Vol. 10,
No. 4 (April 1960), p.55.
32. President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages 1988 (Taipei:
Government Information Office, 1989), p.20.
33. This phase was used by Htl Yaobäng in his speech at the Twelfth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 1 September
1982. See HU YaobAng, "Quanmian Michuang Shehul Zhdyi
Xiandaihua Jianshe De )an jtimian" (To Create a New Phase for the
Construction of Modernization of Socialism), in Research Centre of the
Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
Shfyrjie Sdnzhöng Qudnhul Yildi ZhOngyao Winjitin Xutindil (Selected
Readings of Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of
the Eleventh National People's Congress) (Beijing: People's Publishing
House, 1987), pp.469-524, particularly p.493.
34. In March 1979, Deng XiAoping proposed that socialist modernization
could only be achieved by keeping to the Four Cardinal Principles:
adhering to the Socialist road, upholding people's democratic
dictatorship, the leadership of Communist Party, and Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism. See XiAoping Deng, Deng Xidoping Wenxudn, 1975 -
1982 (Selected Works of Deng XiAoping, 1975 - 1982) (Beijing: People's
Publishing House, 1983), pp.150-151. For the English translation, see
Selected Works of Deng Xil oping (1975 - 1982) (Beijing: Foreign
Languages, 1984), p.172.
35. For the sections of the Constitution revised in 1993, see Renmin Mao
Hdiwdibdn (People's Daily, overseas edition), 30 March, 1993.
36. Flti YaobAng restated the importance of the Four Cardinal Principles at
the 60th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on 1 July 1980;
Zhao Ziyang emphasized the role of the Four Cardinal Principles in the
growth of productive forces at the Thirteenth National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party on 25 October, 1987; and Jiang Zemin
regarded these principles as the foundation of the construction of China
in the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the People's Republic of
China on 29 September 1989. See Renmln Ribelo (People's Daily), 1 July
1980, p.2; Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China (1987) (Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1987), p.73; and State
Commission for Restructuring the Economy, ZhOngguif Jingji Tizhi Giz'ige
1990 Nidnjidn (China Economic Systems Reform Yearbook, 1990)
(Beijing: GEO Publishing House, 1990), p.9.
175
37. It was Sun Ybdan's message to the Chinese and quoted by Jack Gray,
Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990), p.233.
38. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1988), p.56.
39. Adam Westoby, "Conceptions of Communist States," in David Held et
al. (eds.), States & Societies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and the Open
University Press, 1985), pp.228-229.
40. Article 1 is: "The socialist system is the basic system of the People's
Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by any
organization or individual is prohibited." Article 35 is: "Citizens of the
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." Artide
36 is: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of
religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may
compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may
they discriminate against citizens who believe in or do not believe in,
any religion." See Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages, 1987), pp.11, 27-28.
41. Lowell Dittmer, "Tiananmen Reconsidered," Pacific Affairs, Vol.64, No.4
(Winter, 1991-92), p.529.
42. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay,"
edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr., Political Modernization: A Reader in
Comparative Political Change (California: Wadsworth, 1967), pp.207-246.
43. Jieshl Jiáng, "New Year Message, 1951," in his book, Selected Speeches and
Messages of President Chiang Kai-Shek, 1949-52 (Taipei: Office of the
Government Spokesman, 1952).
44. YdzhOu ZhOukrin (Asian Week), 17-24 February, 1991, p.23.
45. Brian Davies, Social Control and Education (London: Methuen, 1976), p.27.
46. John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry quoted Michael Mann's argument
for the existence of "despotic" and "infrastructural" powers of a state.
The "despotic" power of a state is its ability to act arbitrarily and free
from constitutional constraint, while the "infrastructural power" is the
ability to penetrate society and coordinate social relations within the
territory of the state. See Hall and Ikenberry, The State (Stony Strafford,
Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), p.13.
47. Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 1986), p.60; James D. Seymour, 'Taiwan in 1987: A Year of
Political Bombshells," Asian Survey, January 1988, p.74; Robert G. Sutter,
176
Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University Press of America,
1988), p.55; and Simon Long, Taiwan to 1993: Politics versus Prosperity
(London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989), p.7.
48. Jieshi Jiang, Jiang angtOng If (A Collection of works of President Jiang
Jieshf) (Yang Ming Shan: ZIOnghua Dadian, 1974), Vol.2, p.1898.
49. Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook, 1989, p.231.
50. Simon Long, Taiwan: China's Last Frontier (Basingstoke, Hampshire:
MacMillan, 1991), p.65.
51. Franz Schurmann argued that except during the period of the Great
Leap Movement (1958-60), Marxism-Leninism has been a pure ideology
for the PRC since 1949. See his book, Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2nd and enlarged edition, 1968), p.104.
52. Mao also emphasized the use of plain Chinese language to explain
Marxism, and encouraged those who attempted to solve Chinese
problems from the perspective of Marxism to relate Marxism to Chinese
history and present conditions. See Stuart R. Schram, The Political
Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1963), pp.57-58; 112-115.
53. Ian Derbyshire, Politics in China: From Mao to the Post-Deng Era
(Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1991), pp.16-17.
54. June Teufel Dreyer makes the same point. See her book, China's
Political System: Modernization and Tradition (Basingstoke, Hampshire:
MacMillan, 1993), p.7.
55. Examples of such an equation can be found in Zhcinghud Renmln
Geonghigu6 GuOmIn Irngji He Shehul Fazhrin Diqrge Wanidn Awl (1986 -
1990) (The Seventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social
Development of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: People's
Publishing House, 1986), pp.17, 179; Zhönggu6 Zhdngyang Guanyd
Zhiding GuOmIn AO He Shaul Fazhdn Shinidn Guihua He Illuni Wuth De
Iidnyi (The Ten-year Plan of the National Economy and Social
Development and the Proposal On the Eighth Five-year Plan By the
Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991),
pp.14-24; the speech of the newly elected chairman of the Politburo in
May 1993, summarized in Rennin Ribâo Hdiwilibtin (People's Daily,
overseas edition), 22 May, 1993, p.1; and the summary of the interview
of the Secretary-General, Jiang Zemin, by the CNN in May 1993, in
Renmin Mao Iiiiiwagn (People's Daily, overseas edition), 24 May, 1993,
p.1.
177
56. The Revision of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(ThOnghui Renmfn GOnghêgu6 Xianfa XiiTuhengan) was passed in the
Eighth National People's Congress on 29 March, 1993. The Revision is
in Renmfn Ribdo Hifiwdibdn (People's Daily, overseas edition), 30 March,
1993.
57. June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan, 1993), p.7.
58. Muqiao Xue, and Hong MA (eds.), Zhônggutf yngji Nidnjidn, 1990
(Almanac of China's Economy, 1990) (Beijing: Economics Management
Press, 1990), Section III, p.261.
59. Renmfn Ribdo (People's Daily), 20 December, 1992.
60. Renmfn Ribdo Hiliwdiblin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 13 and 14
October, 1992.
61. RenmIn Ribdo Hiliwaibin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 16 March,
1993.
62. June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan, 1993), p.150.
63. John Kohut, "One step forward ... one step back," in South China
Morning Post, 13 March, 1993.
64. Carl Riskin, China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development since
1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.41.
65. For details about the list of party cadres and their posts, see Renmfn
Ribdo Htliwdibeln (People's Daily, overseas edition), 29 March, 1993.
66. The other reason suggested by Kohut is that Deng attempted to enhance
Jiang's role in foreign relations at the ideological level because of the
global collapse of communism. See John Kohut, "One step forward ...
one step back," in South China Morning Post, 13 March, 1993.
67. Xiãoping Deng: "YOng ZhOnggu6 De Ushi JiaoyÜ angnian" (To
Educate Youths with Chinese History), Deng Xiaopfng TOng-zhi Lib! Jidoyil
(Educational Thoughts of Deng Xiäoping) (Beijing: People's Publishing
House, 1990), p.168.
68. Kevin J. O'Brien, Reform without Liberalization: China's National People's
Congress and the Policies of Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp.4-7.
69. It should be noted that the emphasis on political reform in the ROC
from the late 1980s did not mean it overlooked economic development
On the contrary, the ROC directed its economy from labour
178
intensiveness to capital and technology intensiveness. Despite different
economic strategies in different stages, the basic economic structure —
a planned capitalist economy — of the 1950s continued in the early
1990s.
70. See the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of
Communist Rebellion" in Zhönglnufmingu6 Xidnfi (Constitution of the
Republic of China) (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive
Yuan, 3rd ed., 1989), pp.67-72. The English version is in Constitution of
the Republic of China (Taipei: Government Information Office, Executive
Yuan, 3rd ed., 1988), pp.55-57.
71. When the CNP moved its seat to Taipei in 1949, 1,576 members of the
National Assembly came to and resumed their duties in Taiwan. The
members of the National Assembly had not been re-elected for more
than four decades, but they, instead of the people, had the right to elect
the president. Up to 1990, only 920 members at the age of over 80
remained in the National Assembly. New members were likely to be
recruited, but not elected, into the National Assembly only when the
old members died. See SOngran WEng, "Taiwan Zhêngzhl Tixi Fenxr
(An Analysis of the Political System of Taiwan) in Minzhil Ddxue
TOngmln (The Bulletin of the Democracy University), No. 6 (5 August
1990), pp.3-4.
72. In the early 1970s, the entire population of the ROC consisted of 2%
aborigines of Malay origin, 74% Minnanese, 12% Kejia people, and 12%
mainlanders. The Minnanese and Kejia people were those whose
ancestors emigrated from mainland China to Taiwan in the 19th
century. See Leo Moser, "Taiwan, China and the World," in Yung-
Hwan Jo (ed.), Taiwan's Future (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State
University, 1974), p.98.
73. Yung Wei observed that before the early 1970s, mainlanders spoke
Mandarin which was adopted by the CNP as the official language of
the ROC, resided mainly in urban areas, and were employed mainly in
governmental, educational, military, and professional sectors. In
contrast, native Taiwanese spoke their dialects (Minnan or Kejia),
predominated in small towns and villages, and were employed in
commercial, agricultural and fishery sectors. See Yung Wei, "Political
Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan: Analyses and
Projections," in Yung-Hwan Jo (ed.), Taiwan's Future (Tempe, Arizona:
Arizona State University, 1974), p.26.
74. Harmon Zeigler, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political
Association and Conflict Regulation in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p.158.
179
75. John Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants (Berkeley,
California: Institute of East Asian Institute, University of California,
1981), p.5.
76. Harmon Zeigler, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political
Association and Conflict Regulation in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p.140.
77. Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook, 1977, p.305.
78. Gudocing Zhang, Zill De Tawan (Self-Independent Taiwan) (Taipei:
Damciang Press, 1990), p.28.
79. Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook, 1977, p.305
80. "The Per-Capita Wealth of the Taiwanese is HK$ 440,000," in Ming Bdo
(Ming Pao Daily), 8 April, 1993, p.22.
81. Shing-Yuan Sheng, and Tin-Yu Ting, "The Party Competition Between
the Kuomintang and the Opposition: The Case of the 1983 and 1986
Elections in Taiwan," in Journal of National Chengchi University, Vol.59
(1989), pp.34-35.
82. Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook, 1977, p.305.
83. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1988), p.58.
84. Robert G. Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1988), p.60.
85. Hung-mao lien, "Taiwan's Evolution Toward Democracy: A Historical
Perspective," in Denis Fred Simon, and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.),
Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992),
PP.3-23.
86. Hungdah Chiu, "Constitutional Development and Reform in the
Republic of China on Taiwan," in Issues and Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1
(January 1993), p.22.
87. Julian Baum, "Local Leverage," in Far Eastern Economic Review, 9
January, 1992, p.28.
88. In the 1991 election of the National Assembly, the CNP won 254 out of
325 seats. In the 1992 election of Legislative Yuan, the CNP won 102
out of 161 seats; whereas the opposition party, Democratic Progressive
Party, got 50. In other words, the CNP won 78.2% of the seats in the
National Assembly in 1991, and 63.3% in Legislative Yuan in 1992. For
the 1991 election, see Central Monthly, January 1992, p.6. For the 1992
election, see Hua Shl, "Tdiwan Minzhd JianggOu Chengxing" (The
180
Formation of Democratic Structure in Taiwan), in Push( Nidnddi (The
Nineties), January 1993, p.58.
89. The survey was to compare people's political attitudes towards the
CNP and the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
in Taiwan. The survey indicated that the CNP had more support from
the people than the DPP did. On the party's capacity to maintain
economic prosperity, 57.0% of the respondents supported the CNP and
23.5% had faith in the DPP. 58.7% respondents believed that the CNP
can maintain the political stability of Taiwan; and only 15.2% trusted in
the DPP. On the party's ability to bring forth political reform, the CNP
had 47.7% support; while the DPP got 33.9%. See Chia-cheng Lin, "A
General Survey of Political Attitudes in Taiwan," in Soochow Journal of
Sociology, No. 1 (March 1992), pp.53-93.
90. Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan,"
in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and
Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp.28-73.
91. In 1987, the percentages of Taiwan-born Chinese in the Cabinet and
Central Committee of the CNP were respectively 40 and 48. See Hudisi
Peng, Tdiwan Zhengzhi Biangian ash( Nidn (Political Changes of the
Republic of China in the Past 40 Years) (Taipei: Z111 Wanbao, 1987),
p.106.
92. Local-born Taiwanese occupied only 17% (220 out of 1300) seats in the
National Assembly; and 14% (21 out of 150) in the higher government
posts. Only 8 (25%) of the presidents of 28 higher education institutes
were native Taiwanese. See GuOxing Zliang, Zi11 De Tdiugin (Self-
Independent Taiwan) (Taipei: Daoxiang Press, 1990), P.25.
93. Zhangyang Mb (Central Daily News, international edition), 6 February,
1993.
94. Zluingyang Ribdo (Central Daily News, international edition), 20 March,
1993.
95. The phrase "lean to one side" was used by Mao in his speech, "On the
People's Democratic Dictatorship," in commemoration of the 28th
anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in China on June 30, 1949.
The "one side" was the USSR as indicated by the context of the speech.
See Ma:mg Mao, Mdo Ze.dOng Xudnjl Disijudn (Selected Works of Mao
Zedang) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2nd ed., 1991), Vol.4,
pp.1469, 1473, 1481.
96. ZedOng Mao, Mao Mang Xudnji Disijudn (Selected Works of Mao
Zedang) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2nd ed., 1991), Vol.4,
p.1471.
181
97. ZedOng Mao, Mdo Wang Xudnji Diwiljudn (Selected Works of Mao
Zed-Ong) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1977), Vol.5, pp.289-292.
98. See Yu San Wang, 'Foundation of the Republic of China's Foreign
Policy," Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox
Approach (New York: Praeger, 1990), p.10.
99. The "Resist America and Aid Korea" campaigns in 1951 and 1960, and
protests against US intervention in Vietnam in 1960s were some
examples of the PRC's demonstrations against the US and imperialism,
which were permitted by the PRC government. For a detailed list of
the PRC's antiforeign movements and the number of people involved
in the 1960s and 1970s, see Kuangsheng Liao, Antiforeignism and
Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990),
pp.271-324.
100. In 1963, Yugoslavia was labelled by the authorities of the PRC as a
polluted Communist country, and its reform was called Yugoslav
revisionism and equated with the product of the US imperialist policy.
According to the Beijrng government, Yugoslavia allowed the existence
of private enterprises and private possession of capital during the
reform. More important was that Yugoslavia was accused of being a
vassal of the US because Yugoslavia received US$ 54.6 billion American
aid and signed a treaty with the US. See the Editorials of the Renmfn
Ribdo (People's Daily), 1 and 14 June, 1958.
101. In 1967, Jiang Jieshi repeated his insistence that those who wanted to
demolish the Three People's Principles would be devastated by them.
In 1986, Jiang Jinggue• claimed that the Three People's Principles as
national policy were better than communism. Jiang jinggu6 believed
that the Three People's Principles were good national policies for the
people, and that communism was repressive and suppressive.
According to him, the problems of China could be solved only when
the Three People's Principles are realized in China. See A-Ping WU
(ed.), DdzhOng Zhlzheng Gluing Ziingtang Jiinggöng Bdinidn Danchen finidn
ZhuInja Gluing ZOngang Hew Jidoyil Sailing (The Late President Jiang's
Thought on Education) (Taipei: Cheng Chung, 1986), p.113. See also
Jinggue• Jiang, Jiang ZeingtOng linggucl XidnsICeng 75th Nian YdnhInjf (The
Speeches of President Jiang jrnggu6, 1986) (Taipei: Government
Information Office, Executive Yuan, 1987), pp.6-7, 10, 123.
102. Chi-ytm Chang, The Rebirth of the Kuomingtang: The Seventh National
Congress (Taipei: China Cultural Service, n.d.), pp.63-64.
103. The anti-Communist Kuomingtang Platform was adopted by the CNP
on 18 October, 1952. There were thirty-six articles which were grouped
under seven headings: political affairs, foreign policy, military
programme, economic programme, education, social service, and
overseas Chinese affairs. All these sections reflected the rival attitude
182
of the CNP towards the CCP and Communism. See Articles 1,8 and
34. The English translation of the Platform is in Chi-yun Chang, The
Rebirth of the Kuomingtang: The Seventh National Congress (Taipei: China
Cultural Service, n.d.), pp.95-101.
104. Szu-yin Ho, "The Republic of China's Policy Towards the United States,
1979-1989," in Yu San Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the Republic of China
on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach (New York: Praeger, 1990), p.35.
105. Mao's words, "we [the Chinese] must cooperate and we must have
American help," were quoted in Michael Schaller, The United States and
China in the Twentieth Century (New York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979), p.100.
106. At the level of the Soviet government, China was one of the major
targets for communist revolution. On November 24, 1918, Stalin wrote
an article, 'Don't Forget the East," and argued that the mission of the
Soviet Communist Party was to wake up the oppressed peoples of the
East and to summon them to a struggle with imperialism. In the
second Congress in Moscow in July 1920, China was mentioned as one
of the main target countries. The Comintern held its Second Congress
in Moscow from July 17 to August 7, 1920. A number of theses were
adopted and collected in The Comintern, Theses and Statutes of the HI
Communist International (Moscow: Publishing Office of the Communist
International, 1920), pp.68-70. The part concerning China was quoted
by Henry Wei in his book, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, New
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp.46-47.
107. Mao announced the PRC's alliance with the USSR in the first Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949. See Zhiinggu6
RenmIn Zhangzhl Xiesluinghulyi Diyijie Qudnti Hulyi ZhOng* Wenjidn
(The Main Documents of the Plenary Session of the First Term of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) (GuangzhOu:
)anhua, 1950), p.4.
108. The PRC also labelled Soviet "socialist imperialism" as the "number one
enemy" of peace. See Michael Schaller, The United States and China in
the Twentieth Century (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979), p.163.
109. Krushchev was accused by the Renmfn RUA) (People's Daily) on
September 6, 1963 of putting forward the thesis of "peace transition" to
achieve international security by making friends with the United States
in the USSR's Twentieth Congress in 1956. The Soviet government was
also accused of making no distinction between enemies and friends and
leading the Soviet people astray. The whole accusation was summed
up in the seventh point of the twenty-five points of a letter to the Soviet
government. The letter was approved by the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party on June 14, 1963, and delivered to Moscow
183
on the following day, and simultaneously published in the Renmin
Ribdo. Moreover, the USSR did not support the PRC militarily. The
PRC charged the USSR with its failure to use "politicomilitary pressure"
of its missiles to guard against American imperialism and to help the
PRC liberate Taiwan and resolve the Sino-Indian border crises in 1959
and 1962. The PRC also objected to the Soviet hegenomist aggression
against Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and the initiation of military
conflicts with the PRC over Chenbao Island in Ussuri in March 1969.
The English translation of the Reninfn Rilido of September 1963 can be
found in Alan Lawrance, China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.70-73; the twenty-five points were
summarized in Peter Jones and Sian Kevill (compilers), China and the
Soviet Union, 1949-84 (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1985), pp.31-38. See
also Harold C. Hinton, Government & Politics in Revolutionary China:
Selected Documents, 1949 - 1979 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1982), p.103. For the border crises, see the Editorial 'The
Truth about how the Leaders of the CPSU have Allied themselves with
India against China" of Renmin Mao (People's Daily) November 2, 1963.
See also A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the
Post-Mao Era (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p.261.
110. Premier ZhOu Enlai acknowledged major differences in ideology, the
PRC-ROC issue, and some foreign policies, and perceived anti-
hegemony as the common ground of the "Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence." However, he signed with US President Richard Nixon the
Shanghai Communiqué on February 21, 1972. On September 25, ZhOu
also signed another treaty with Japan to establish diplomatic, economic
and cultural relations. See ZhOu Enlai, "The Gate to Friendly Contacts
Between China and the United States has Finally been Opened" and
"The Chinese and Japanese Peoples should live in Friendship From
Generation to Generation" in Selected Works of ZhOu Enkfi (Beijing:
Foreign Languages, 1981), Vol.2, pp.499-503.
111. Time (February 5, 1979), pp.14-15.
112. ZhCmghud Renmin Genghegu6 Dilitljia QudnquOrenmin Dlyqie
QudnguOrenmIn Ddibitiodahui Hulyiwenjidn (First Session of the Sixth
National People's Congress, June 1983) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing
Co., 1983), p.56.
113. "A Summary of the Government Report by Premier 11 Peng," in Renmin
Ribclo ildiwaibtin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 17 March, 1993.
114. In his letter, dated June 26, 1925, Jiang Jieshi asked General Bliukher to
send Russian advisors to help train 100,000 Chinese people so that they
could form a competent army within three to six months. The letter is
in Wilbur C. Martin and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution:
Soviet Advisors and Nationalist China, 1920 - 1927 (Cambridge,
184
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 502-505.
115. The "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and Related
Agreements," signed on 14 August 1945, signified the USSR's
recognition of the Nationalist government led by JiAng Jieshf as the only
government of China, and guaranteed Soviet economic assistance to the
nationalist government in its national re-construction. Article 6 of the
Treaty stated that the High Contracting Parties agreed to render each
other every possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a
view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and
to contributing to the cause of world prosperity. However, the Soviet
government signed another treaty, the "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China," with the PRC on 14 February, 1950. The Treaty
recognized the Chinese communist government as the only government
of China and redirected Soviet economic help to the PRC. The wording
of the USSR's treaty with the PRC was similar to that with the ROC: "to
develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet
Union and China, to render each other every possible economic
assistance, and to carry out the necessary economic co-operation." The
first treaty is printed in Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton,
New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 334-335; the
second one is in Harold C. Hinton, Government & Politics in
Revolutionary China: Selected Documents, 1949 - 1979 (Wilmington,
Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982), pp.8-9.
116. In this decade, the PRC-USSR alliance and the Korean War forced the
US President, Harry S. Truman, to reconsider the military strategic
position of Taiwan which was described by General Douglas
MacArthur as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in East Asia. Truman
ordered his Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Straits and to curb any
potential military attack by the PRC on Taiwan. See Immanuel C. Y.
Hsii (ed.), Readings in Modern Chinese History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p.762.
117. According to Szu-yin Ho, the ROC's American policy was constrained
by America's indifference to the ROC as a legitimate player in its
dealings with the PRC, by the US's increasing preference for the PRC,
and by the ROC's longtime economic dependence on the US, especially
on international trade with the US. The US President Jimmy Carter,
regarding the ROC as an incompetent partner in Asia, terminated the
Mutual Security Treaty, and immediately signed another Taiwan
Relations Act. In Carter's understanding, the Act enabled "the
American people and the people on Taiwan to maintain commercial,
cultural, and other relations without official Government representation
and without diplomatic relations." See Yu San Wang, "Foundation of
the Republic of China's Foreign Policy," and Szu-yin Ho, "The Republic
of China's Policy Toward the United States," in Yu San Wang (ed.),
185
Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach
(New York: Praeger, 1990), respectively in p.9 and pp.34-35. See also
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1979
(January 1 to June 22, 1979) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), Book 1, pp.640-641.
118. According to the "Taiwan Relations Act," the American Institute in
Taiwan was authorized to administer to or take from any person an
oath, affirmation, affidavit or deposition, to act as provisional
conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens,
and to assist and protect the interests of American people. The
Coordination Council for North American Affairs for the ROC was
established in Washington. The Council also handled the two nations'
ambassadorial duties in an unofficial way. See Section 7 of the "Taiwan
Relations Acts," in U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol.93 (1979), pp.14-21; and
Gene T. Hsiao and Michael Witunsld (eds.), Sino-American Normalization
and its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp.468-475.
119. In October 1987, the Ministry of Foreign Relations announced that ROC
citizens were allowed to go to the USSR, Cuba, East Europe to attend
international academic conference and sports competitions (though not
to the PRC and to those regions controlled by it). People from non-
antagonistic communist countries were also allowed to come to the
ROC. See Wdijidobil ShëngmIng Yu Gangbdo (Declaration and
Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, July 1987 - June
1988), p.44; and Zhangyang Ribdo (Central Daily News), 30 October,
1987.
120. In the US, the first session of the 81st Congress passed the "Bill to
Provide Economic, Financial and Other Aid to China" on 19 February,
1949, and amended it on 28 March 1949. The amendment to the Act
explicitly re-asserted the American position: "It should be made
perfectly clear that there is no intention of using this provision to assist
any government in China which is dominated by the Chinese
Communists." The Bill and the Report are in Richard D. Challener,
Economic Assistance to China and Korea, 1949 - 1950 (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1979), pp. 232-239 and 249-250.
121. In February 1949, the Soviet government promised to grant the PRC
credits amounting to US$ 300,000,000 at a very favorable interest rate
of 1% per annum according to an agreement along with the Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the
USSR. Article 1 of the Agreement recorded the Soviet government's
promise of granting the PRC credits. The credits (equivalent to 8.57
million ounces of fine gold at that time) were granted in the course of
five years from January 1, 1950, and in the form of equipment and
materials including electric power stations, metallurgical and
engineering plants. The credits were to be repaid in the form of
186
deliveries of raw materials, tea, and US dollars. In 1954, the USSR gave
the PRC a second loan in term of credits worth 520 million rubles and
promised to help build 15 extra industrial plants on top of the
previously agreed 141 plants. Two years later, the USSR granted
another loan valued at 2,500 million rubles to the PRC and helped build
another 55 industrial enterprises. For the agreement, see Harold C.
Hinton, Government & Politics in Revolutionary China: Selected Documents,
1949 - 1979 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1982), pp.
10-11; and Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (Princeton, New Jersey:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 346-347; about the loans, see
Jan-Ingvar Lastedes quotation from the People's China (February, 1957)
in his Chinese Educational Policy: Changes and Contradictions 1949-79
(Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1980), pp.79-80;
85.
122. By the end of 1957, 211 Chinese major industrial enterprises were
reported to have been helped with Soviet technical aid and supplied
with complete sets of equipment. See "Sino-Soviet Cooperation" Beijing
Review, No.29 (29 April, 1958), p.20; and Kuangsheng Liao,
Antiforeignism and Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 1990), p.123.
123. Eight Five-Year Plans for constructing the economy were launched after
1953. Along with the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), a Ten-Year
Plan (1991-2000) was passed by the National People's Congress in April
1991. For the Ten-Year Plan, see Zhönggu6 Zhöngyang Guanyzi Zhiding
Guetmin Jfngji He Shehul Frizhiin ShInian Gu gual He Bauni Ala De Jidnyi
(The Ten-year Plan of the National Economy and Social Development
and the Proposal On the Eighth Five-year Plan By the Chinese
Communist Party) (Beijing: People's Press, 1991).
124. The central departments managed enterprises and unified the
distribution of materials, although two attempts to devolve authority on
local governments, not on production units, were made in 1958-59, and
1970. The more centralized the state hierarchy, the more enterprises
and the more kinds of materials were placed under the control of
central departments. In the period of Sovietized First Five-Year Plan
(1953-1957), the number of industrial enterprises was increased from
2,800 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1957; while that of kinds of materials was
increased from 227 in 1953 to 532 in 1957. In the retrenchment period
of the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1%0), the numbers were
respectively reduced to 1,200 and 285. However, during the Cultural
Revolution, the numbers were correspondingly increased to an
unprecedented level: 11,000 and 579 respectively. Later, the numbers
were greatly reduced in 1970. The number of kinds of materials under
unified distribution was lowered to 200. See the report by the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economy in ZhOnggu6 Jingji Tizhi
Gdige Shfnidn (Ten Years for Economic System Reform of China)
187
(Beijing: jrngjl Gull& Publishing House and Gaigê Publishing House,
1988), p.486.
125. Guangyuan Yu (ed.), China's Socialist Modernization (Beijing: Foreign
Languages, 1984), p.83.
126. Many defects of the existing economic structure were mentioned in the
National People's Congress in 1978. Owing to the practice of over-
centralization, enterprises had not enough economic power to decide
and manage according to their production conditions. Mandatory
national plans also neglected the individual relations between
production units and dynamic national needs. Moreover, vitality and
competition were lacking in the national economy because the
centralized system depended heavily on the administrative hierarchy
and neglected value-regulation and market mechanisms. Another
defect was the inertia of people. As a result, the national economic
growth was slowed. The phenomenon of claguaan (sharing food from
the same big pot) was common. Enterprises were assured of
investment and purchase of their goods by the state, but bore no
responsibility for production output; labourers got the same wage, and
did not fear dismissal nor expect to gain extra material rewards. See
Section W and V of Zhao Ziyäng's Report delivered at the Thirteenth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 25 October
1987. The report is in the Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China (1987) (Beijing: Foreign Languages,
1987), pp.30-60.
127. According to Gordon White, the Yugoslav model was a market
socialism in which state intervention was less and individual state
enterprises had full decision-making and management power; the
Hungarian model was one with "a relatively weak parametric state and
higher enterprise autonomy." In 1984, Shigeru Lshikawa argued that the
economic models adopted by the PRC were unclear. In 1985, Chen Yu-
Chen suggested that the PRC adopted a "mixed model" which was
based on seven principles: insistence on socialist principles; throwing
out the Soviet economic structure; imitation of the Hungarian economic
model; absorption of the management model of American enterprises;
learning from Japanese development experience; learning from
Taiwanese economic success; and integration of indigenous practical
characteristics. Cul Dianchao in 1991 suggested that the Chinese model
was similar to the Hungarian one. However, Zhao Ziying had already
denied that the reformed economy was similar to any other socialist
counties in 1987. See Shigeni Ishikawa, "China's Economic System
Reform: Underlying Factors and Prospects, and Gordon White,
"Changing Relations Between State and Enterprise in Contemporary
China: Expanding Enterprise Autonomy," in Neville Maxwell and Bruce
McFarlane (eds.) China's Changed Road to Development (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1984), pp.9-20, 43-60; Yu-Chen Chen, "An Assessment of
188
Economic Reform in Mainland China Since 1979" Chung-Hua Institute
for Economic Research, Modern Economic Study Series, No.8, Taipei,
Taiwan, January 1985, esp. Chapter 5, pp.133-63, p.138; DianchAo Cu!,
"ChOngsÜ ZhOnggus5 ringjl" (Reconstruction of China's Economics) in
DiAnqIng XII, Dins-ming Lei, and rill Mang (eds.), ZhOnggucf Jrngji
Gdige: Fenxi, Fdnxing, Qidnzhdn (China's Economic Reform: Analysis,
Reflections and Prospects) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991),
p.65; and Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China (1987) (Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1987), p.12.
128. Zhao Ziyang insisted that the reformed economy of the PRC was still
a planned economy, not capitalist, and that only minor commodities,
agricultural supplement products and services were freely regulated by
the market. On the other hand, he suggested that within the planned
economy there were two types of plans: mandatory and guiding. The
number of mandatory plans governing the general direction of the
national economy should be reduced, while that of the guiding plans
concerning economic effectiveness and daily operation of production
units should be increased. Further, the guiding plans were regulated
by economic means, and the mandatory plans must also take economic
rules, especially value mechanism, into consideration. See Zhao's
speech, "GuAnyti Jingjl Tall GAige Thong SAnge Wend De Yljian"
(Opinion on Three Questions Concerning the Reform of Economic
System) which was delivered in his meeting with Deng XiAoping, HU
Yaobang and two other senior party leaders on 9 September, 1984. The
Opinion is in the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy,
ZhOnggu6 Jingji Tizhi MO Shinidn (Ten Years for Economic System
Reform of China) (Beijing: jingji GuAnli Publishing House and Gaige
Publishing House, 1988), pp.40-42.
129. Article of the 1982 Constitution spells out that "The state practises
planned economy on the basis of socialist public ownership. It ensures
the proportionate and coordinated growth of the national economy
through overall balancing planning and the supplementary role of
regulation by the market." This stance was re-emphasized in the
"Central Committee's Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure"
which was adopted in October, 1984. Later, the stance was reaggerted
by Party Secretary-General, Zhao Ziyang, in the Thirteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China on 25 October 1987; by
Jiang Zemin, in the 40th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party
on 29 September 1989; and by Premier Li Peng in his report which was
passed by the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress
on 9 April 1991. See Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages, 1987), p.17; Documents of the Thirteenth National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (1987) (Beijing: Foreign
Languages, 1987), pp.31-32;_.
 State Commission for Restructuring the
Economy, Zhdnggu6 Pe Tizhl Gdige ShInidn (Ten Years for Economic
System Reform of China) (Beijing: ringjl GuAnli Publishing House and
189
Gaigê Publishing House, 1988), p.47; State Commission for
Restructuring the Economy, Zhönggu6 AO Tizhl Gdige 1990 Nidnjidn
(China Economic Systems Reform Yearbook, 1990) (Beijing: Gaige
Publishing House, 1990), p.9; and Zhönggud Zh&gyring Glanyil Zhiding
GuOmin Jingji He Shehul FuTzhin Shin idn Guiltul He Bawii JihuA De Jidnyi
(The Ten-year Plan of the National Economy and Social Development
and the Proposal On the Eighth Five-year Plan By the Chinese
Communist Party) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1991), p.15.
130. Jan S. Prybylia, "Economic Development in the People's Republic of
China, 1985-86," quoted by David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng
Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform (Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1988), p.265.
131. Pêng Li, "Zhengfil Gangzut• Baogao" (Government Administration
Report to the First Meeting of the Eighth National People's Congress on
15 March, 1993) in Rinmin Rthdo Hdiwaibdn (People's Daily, overseas
edition), 2 April, 1993.
132. "A Statistical Report of Economic and Social Development of the
People's Republic of China by the State Statistics Bureau," in RenmIn
Ribdo Hdiwaibiin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 20 February, 1993.
133. In February 1993, the PRC failed its application for the entry into the
GATT because of the PRC's restrictions on foreign investment. One
month later, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Economic Relation and
Trade made some proposals for domestic economic changes to satisfy
the working commission of GATT. The proposals involved agricultural
and pricing policies, distribution of foreign exchange, implementation
of a unified trade system, foreign trade management, and inspection
product quality. See "GATT to Ensure Stable Growth, Official Says," in
Ming Pao Daily, 17 March, 1993.
134. In April, the PRC authorities also decided that the foreign exchange
policy would be adjusted to satisfy the requirements of the GATT. The
adjustments would include the reduction of state control over the
foreign exchange market and the reduction of the gap between the
official and market exchange rates. See "Re-entry into the GATT and
Foreign Exchange," in Renmin RUA() Hdiwdibin (People's Daily, overseas
edition), 8 April, 1993.
135. American aid to the ROC amounted to US$ 1.48 billion between 1951
and 1970. This amount was equal to 50% of American aid to Korea
between 1953 and 1965. American aid to Korea amounted to US$ 2.94
billions between 1953-1965. See Taiwan Statistical Data Books, 1991
(Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1991), p.247;
and Dching Zhao, Meiyudn De Yanyang (The Use of American Aid)
(Taipei: Lian Ting, 1985), p.258.
190
136. F. A. Lumley, The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-Shek: Taiwan Today
(London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1976), p.61.
137. According to Zhao JichAng, industry, mining and electrical plants were
the major targets of US aid to the ROC. According to Neil H. Jacoby,
two-thirds of US capital assistance went to infrastructure and
agriculture. The public sector shared four-fifths of the assistance.
American aid, Anthony Y. C. Koo, was to help stabilize soaring prices
by financing the government budget deficit, by contributing to
infrastructure construction, and by covering the import surplus. See
Dchang Zhao, Mèiyudn De YilnyOng (The Use of American Aid) (Taipei:
Lian Ting, 1985), p.35; Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of
Foreign Aid, Self-help and Development (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp.174-
175; and Anthony Y. C. Koo, "Economic Development of Taiwan," in
Paul K. T. Sih (ed.), Taiwan in Modern Times (New York: St. John's
University Press, 1973), p.406.
138. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, "The State and Economic
Transformation: Towards an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying
Effective Intervention," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and
Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), pp.44-77.
139. Hudisi Pêng, Tdiwan Zhangzhl Bidnqian Sishf Nidn (Political Changes of
the Republic of China in the Past 40 Years) (Taipei: 71l1 Wanbão, 1987),
p.81.
140. The national economic plans of the ROC were the Four-Year Plans for
the periods: 1953-1956, 1957-1960, 1961-1964, 1965-1968, 1969-1972, 1973-
1976, and 1982-1985; the Six-Year Plans for the periods: 1976-1981, and
1991-1996; and the Ten-Year Plans: 1971-1980, and 1980-1989.
141. In order to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector, the
government of the ROC actively initiated a series of nationwide
measures: land reform; improvement of irrigation systems, chemical
fertilizer and seed; and the promotion of the mechanization of
agriculture in 1950s and 1960s. To develop the industrial sector, the
government envisaged a shift from rural industry, to light industry, to
heavy industry and then to high technology over the forty years.
142. Zhen Stn, "MInsheng Zhily1 Yinjife (The Study of the Principle of
Livelihood) in Sdnmin Duly! Ydnjia (The Study of the Three People's
Principles), edited by the Center of Education of Public Administration
and Business Management, National Chengchi University (Taipei:
National Chengchi University, 1982), pp.770-775.
143. Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 1986), p.122.
191
144. Renmfn RN° 1-11iwiiibiln (People's Daily, overseas edition), 20 July, 1992;
and Philip Liu, "No Turning Back," Free China Review, Vol.44, No.7 (July
1992), pp.54-56.
145. China Daily, 14 July, 1993, p.2.
146. It was estimated that mainland workers earned as little as US$40 to
US$60 a month, one-tenth of their Taiwan counterparts. See Renmfn
Ribrlo Hdiwelibdn (People's Daily, overseas edition), 20 July, 1992; and
Philip Liu, "No Turning Back," Free China Review, Vol.44, No.7 (July
1992), pp.54-56.
147. Economic cooperation between the PRC and ROC was basically
conducted in the following form: the ROC invested capital in the PRC;
whereas the PRC offered science and technology to Taiwanese
investors. There were two ways of cooperation between the PRC and
ROC. First, Taiwanese merchants and PRC universities established
enterprises in the PRC. Second, Taiwanese technological companies
proposed research themes and provided funds; whereas the Department
of Technology in the PRC coordinated its research institutes to conduct
such researches. See "jiaolid Kejl, Mad LiAngan" (The Exchange of
Science and Technology would Benefit Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits),
in Renmln RI1x10 Hiliwdibdn (People's Daily, overseas edition), 20 April,
1992, p.5.
148. Other reasons include special privileges including tax exemption and
reduction offered to Taiwanese investors by the PRC; sharing of
common language (Mandarin) between people in the PRC and ROC;
and the advantage of geographic proximity. See Tzung-ta Yen, "Taiwan
Investment in Mainland China and Its Impact on Taiwan's Industries,"
in Issues & Studies, Vol. 27, No. 5 (May 1991), p.10.
149. The Cultural Revolution was intended to eradicate all systems of
exploitation so as to eliminate the differences between intellectuals and
workers and peasants, between town and country, and between mental
and manual labourers. See the Editorial of the Gutingmfng RIbtlo
(Guangming Daily), 1 June, 1966.
150. The term, "uprising," first appeared in the Editorial of the Mind?: Milo
(People's Daily), 26 April, 1989. Deng XiAoping expressed this view on
9 June 1989, five days after the suppression of the 1989 student
movement in Tiananmen Square. Part of the speech is in the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economy, Zhönggu6 lingji Tizhi Gine
1990 NidnjitIn (China Economic Systems Reform Yearbook, 1990)
(Beijing: Gate Publishing House, 1990), pp.3-5.
151. Renmfn Ribilo Hdiwelibtin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 30 March,
1993.
192
152. American President George Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16A/B air
fighters (worth US$ 4 billions) to the ROC during his re-election
campaign on 2 September 1992. Bush's announcement was condemned
as American hegemony and interference in the peaceful unification of
the PRC and ROC by the Central Committee of the National People's
Congress two days later. Renmfn RI&lo HiliwIlibtln (People's Daily,
overseas edition), 5 September 1992.
153. Two months later, France agreed to sell to the ROC 60 Mirage-2000E
fighting warplanes and 1,500 missiles. See Ming No (Ming Pao Daily),
19 November, 1992.
154. "History spells trouble in French connection," in South China Morning
Post, 24 December, 1992, p.12.
155. "The PRC Cannot Avoid Economic Pressure," the Editorial of the Ned
Magazine, No. 163 (23 April, 1993), p.1.
156. In February 1993, the spokesman of President Bill Clinton re-asserted
that the renewal of the MFN status to the PRC would depend on its
adherence to the past agreements on human rights, trade, and weapon
sales. See Mfng Belo (Ming Pao Daily), 24 February, 1993.
157. Ming Bdo (Ming Pao Daily), 24 March, 1993.
158. The pictures are in Zijing (Bauhinia Magazine), No. 30 (March 1993),
pp.58-60.
159. In May 1993, the PRC's Vice-Premier, Qian Qichen, visited Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden to strengthen economic cooperation;
whereas Executive Vice-Premier Thu Rongji held a series of talks with
the senior officials of Canada. See Chris Yeung, "MFN move unlikely
to affect relations," in South China Morning Post, 29 May, 1993.
160. "Answers of Premier Li Pêng and Vice-Premiers to Journalists'
Questions Concerning the Domestic and Foreign Policy of China," in
Renmfn Ribdo Hcliwaibrin (People's Daily, overseas edition), 1 April, 1993.
161. The figures were displayed in the Memorial Exhibition Hall of San
Ybdan in Taipei in October, 1993.
162. According to President 11, 25 countries have established 30 offices in
the ROC to facilitate mutual contact and communication. President Lee
Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages 1988 (Taipei: Government
Information Office, 1989), pp32, 43.
163. Yuan-Li Wu and Kung-Chia Yeh, "Taiwan's External Economic
Relations," Growth, Distribution, and Social Change Essays on the Economy
of the Republic of China (Baltimore: School of Law, University of
193
Maryland, 1978), pp.173-216.
164. QuOjia liansha Lit) Nidn Jiltud (1991 - 1996) Di Yr Ca: angti Rngji Fazhdn
Milbido (Six-Year National Development Plan, (1991 - 1996), Vol. 1:
Development Objectives of the Whole Economy) (Taipei: The Executive
Yuan, 1991).
165. "President Lee: Asia-Pacific needs collective security system to resolve
disputes peacefully," in Free China Journal, 2 April, 1993, p.7.
166. See the "Illustration of the Background of Wang-Koo Conference"
released by the Executive Yuan of the ROC. The "Illustration" is in
ZhOngyang Rlbdo (Central Daily News, international edition), 20 March,
1993.
167. President Li Denghui had already expressed in 1989 the idea that "the
ROC, as a sovereign country, must have full rights to participate in
international organizations and to enhance its friendly relations with
foreign countries." In his report concerning the ROC's reentry into the
United Nations to the Legislative Yuan in March 1993, the Foreign
Minister of the ROC, Qian Fa, suggested that the ROC can apply to the
United Nations for becoming a full member, a representative or an
observer. However, Qian noted the opposition of the PRC in the
United Nations, and advised the Taipei authorities to wait for one or
two years more. The phrases of President Li is quoted by Michael
Yung-mao Kau, 'The ROC's New Foreign Policy Strategy," in Denis
Fred Simon, and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic
Miracle (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p.245. See also "Taiwan Re-
enters the United Nations," in Ming Bdo (Ming Pao Daily), 1 April, 1993.
168. Foreign Ministry of the ROC, Zhönghudmingut5 Canya Lidnhequ6 (The
Participation of the Republic of China in the United Nations) (Taipei:
Foreign Ministry, 1993).
169. The Taipei authorities acknowledged that if the ROC applies for
membership in the United Nations, the application needs to be
discussed in the Security Council and the PRC as one of the five council
nations would veto the application. The ROC would apply for
"participation" in the activities of the United Nations. This application
would be reviewed by the Steering Committee of the United Nations,
not its Security Council. See "Return to the United Nations, Set 'One
Nation Two Seats' as Goal," Zhöngyang Rlbdo (Central Daily News,
international edition), 12 June, 1993, p.1.
194
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CULTURAL TASK OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE PRC AND ROC
4.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the relations between higher
education, the state and the central value system in the PRC and ROC between
1949 and 1993. The chapter will firstly highlight the educational policy
relating to cultural transmission in the PRC and ROC, the revolutionary ideals
and moral virtues to be transmitted, and the institutionalization of the central
value system in their higher education systems between 1949 and the late
1980s. This chapter will secondly examine educational changes in cultural
transmission in these two Chinese higher education systems between the late
1980s and 1993.
This chapter argues that despite the supplementary revision of domestic
and international relations from the late 1970s (which was discussed in
Chapter Three) the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC were more
"dosed" in the dissemination of state-supported central values than their
changing societies between 1949 and 1993. In other words, as compared with
the societal changes (economic reform in the PRC and political reform in the
ROC), both Chinese higher education systems have made relatively less change
in the curriculum and transmission structure for the dissemination of central
values to students in the last forty-four years.
This chapter further argues that the resistance to change in political and
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ideological education in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC
was a result of cultural and revolutionary legacies. Like Imperial China, the
ruling elites of the PRC and ROC accepted the domination of a single value
system over the education system; emphasized moral education as a way to
create socio-political cohesion amongst people; and linked higher education
tightly with the state and the central value system. Moreover, the current
ruling elites of these two Chinese countries still rely on the moral claims used
by the first-generation leaders to justify their political leadership: the basic
revolutionary ideals and moral values prescribed by the first-generation
leaders were propagated in the respective Chinese higher education systems
through the transmission structures created by these leaders.
The description of cultural transmission in these two Chinese higher
education systems is divided into two periods: between 1949 and the late
1980s, and between the late 1980s and 1993. The late 1970s (during which
partial revisions in the domestic and international relations of the PRC and
ROC took place) are not selected as a dividing line because, as suggested in
the argument of this chapter, there were no significant differences before and
after the 1970s. The late 1980s are chosen firstly because significant student
movements took place in the PRC and ROC; and secondly because the period
saw the beginning of the global downfall of communism. The decline of
communism in the world has implications to the PRC and ROC in the early
1990s. The PRC needs to struggle for the preservation of Chinese socialism
against this trend; whereas the ROC can no longer use anti-communism as an
easily available stance, but must rely mainly on the preservation of Chinese
196
traditional culture to define its international political identity. This chapter
will first examine cultural transmission in these two Chinese higher education
between 1949 and the late 1980s.
4.2 CULTURAL TRANSMISSION IN HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE 
PRC AND ROC BETWEEN 1949 AND THE LATE 1980S 
This section argues that the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC utilized the
transmission of the central value system in higher education as a means to
maintain socio-political cohesion and hence their political leadership between
1949 and the 1980s.
The detailed categories presented in sequence in this section are cultural
mission statements of the PRC and ROC; their lists of revolutionary ideals and
moral values; and their institutionalization of the central value system.
Cultural mission statements for education in the PRC and ROC are selected
because they spell out the general cultural task of education. The lists of
revolutionary ideals and central moral values in both Chinese countries are
chosen because these lists reflected the contents of cultural transmission
through education. Institutional measures indicated how the PRC and ROC
ensured the transmission of official values, and the defence against the
infiltration of foreign values which were deemed challenging to political
leadership. The cultural mission statements for education in the PRC and
ROC will be discussed first.
4.2.1 Central Value Systems and Cultural Mission Statements for
Education in the PRC and ROC 
This thesis argues that the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, like the emperors
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in Imperial China who used royal decrees to legitimize the domination of
Confucianism in classical higher education, incorporated the transmission of
the central value system as a cultural task of education into their constitutions.
Some articles of the constitutions of the PRC and ROC became the cultural
mission statements for education; and formed a legal basis for the justification
of the relations between education, the central value system and the state.
In the PRC, the ruling elite legitimized education as a state channel to
transmit the official socialist worldviews prescribed in the constitution. The
1982 constitution indicated that education should be set within the framework
of socialist systems which were led by the CU', and was guided by "Marxism-
Leninism and Mao ZedOng Thought.' The constitution also stated that
education was a socialist means to build up a socialist society in modern
China? The philosophy of education in the PRC had been expressed
concisely in the 1957 Mao adãng's cultural mission statement for education.
The aim of socialist education was
to enable those who receive education to develop morally,
intellectually, and physically, and to become labourers with both
socialist consciousness and culture?
This formula was incorporated into the constitution," and has become a
general policy of education.'
After 1957, the cultural mission statement of Mao was used by the
ruling elite of the PRC in different contexts, but with a common emphasis —
the preservation of social ideals. During the Cultural Revolution (the period
in which politics took command), the formula was upheld,' but led to the
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destruction of the entire education system. During the secondary
transformation (marked by the opening up of the PRC to the West and the
introduction of market forces) from the late 1970s, the Mao formula was also
cited on important occasions and in state reports. In particular, the 1985
educational reform plan stressed the ideological functions of schools as "sturdy
bulwarks against the corrosive influences of capitalist and other decadent ideas
and firm bases for the building of a socialist civilization of a high cultural
level."' The 1992 educational reform plan emphasized the training of
"successors" to carry on the tasks of constructing a socialist society.'
As in the PRC, the ruling elite of the ROC, after moving to Taiwan in
1949, legitimized the transmission of their official values through education in
Taiwan. Jiang Jieshf assumed that national survival depended on education
which was the prime mover of national strength? He argued that in order to
facilitate the use of education as a national instrument, a common belief
system — the Three People's Principles — was necessary to invoke a common
emotion and discipline among the people." Jiang also suggested that the
cancellation of the courses on the Three People's Principles in 1947 was a cause
for the loss of mainland China to the CCP in 1949.11
Against this background, the CNP under the leadership of Jiang used
the constitution as a legal basis for the transmission of the party's worldview
through education. Since 1946, the realization of the Three People's Principles
has been spelt out as the objective of educational and cultural development in
Article 158 of the constitution of the ROC:
Education and culture shall aim at the development among the
citizens of the national spirit, the spirit of self-government,
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national morality, good physique, scientific knowledge and the
ability to earn a living.'
The Ministry of Education of the ROC, despite the institutionalization of
opposition in the political structure and despite the establishment of relations
with socialist countries in the late 1980s, admitted that the Three People's
Principles were guidelines in the formulation of education policy in the
ROC.'
Thus, in the PRC and ROC in the last forty years, the cultural mission
statements were not changed significantly and education, as in Imperial China,
was linked by the government with the central value systems. Also like
Imperial China, both contemporary Chinese countries, as discussed in the next
section, stressed moral education.
4.2.2 Education for National Morality in the PRC and ROC 
This section argues that the PRC and ROC, like Imperial China, had their own
list of central values, including revolutionary ideals and moral virtues, to be
transmitted in their higher education (and other levels), but both lists served
the same function — to help students to conform to the socio-political status
quo.
The ruling elite of the PRC singled out a set of revolutionary ideals and
moral values for socialist moral education which was supposed to help train
people with socialist consciousness and to mould the society with socialist
spiritual civilization. Socialist moral education, according to the PRC
authorities, means education of "morality of thought" and "political
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education.' The young people were identified by the state as a target for
the inculcation of socialist values and norms."
Under Mao's rule, a set of socialist values to be upheld was listed in the
agenda of moral education in the PRC. Highly advocated in civic education
for the training of "new socialist citizens' to fight against feudal and
capitalist ideas were, for example, the socialist constitutional ideals of the "five-
loves" (the love of the motherland, of the people, of labour, of science, and of
socialism),' "five-isms" (patriotism, collectivism, internationalism,
communism, and dialectic and historical materialism), and Mao's thoughts.
After Mao's death, the CCP under the leadership of Deng XiAoping also
accepted the "five-loves" and "five-isms" as part of national ideals.' After
1985, the CCP emphasized "three-isms" (patriotism, collectivism, and socialism)
instead of "five-isms." To deal with the potential Western socio-political
influences on the society of the PRC after its opening up to the West in the late
1970s, Deng highlighted a particular list of "communist virtues": the love of the
motherland, of the people, of science, and of public properties; and to fight
wisely and courageously with enemies and bad social members." Regarding
the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng also
encouraged people to possess "four-haves" (to have morality, communist or
socialist ideals, culture and discipline)," and "three goods" (good in ideology,
study, and health)."
This thesis further argues that the higher education system of the PRC,
despite oscillations between the priorities of professional training and political
transmission, was consistently perceived as a means to produce politically
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reliable personnel in the PRC. Students were supposed to be trained to be
"red" and "expert" under the leadership of Mâo and Deng. "Red" refers to
political reliability; "expert," to vocational competence. To be "expert" was to
master the basic theory and training provided in higher education. The
minimum standard of "redness" for a student was to love the socialist
motherland, to support the leadership of the CU', and to serve the people. A
higher standard of "redness" was to build up a communist worldview, to
adopt the theory of practice as the sole truth, to support the socialist
democratic system, to integrate the intelligentsia with the proletariat, to
integrate theory with practice, and to grow collectively.'
Stress was put on both political reliability and vocational competence
in the higher education of the PRC in the founding period and after the
introduction of market forces in the late 1980s. Between these two periods, the
balance was tipped to "expertness" during the First Five-year Plan (1952-1957),
in the early 1960s,24
 and during the opening up to the West and the
emergence of market forces in the early 1980s. Emphasis was put on political
training during the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1960). 25 The
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) pushed "redness" to its extreme. After major
student movements, for example in the "Capitalist Liberation" in 1986-198726
and the Tiananmen massacre in 1989,27
 ideological education was
strengthened.
As in the PRC, the ruling elite of the ROC designated a particular set
of socio-political values, but under the Principles of Nationalism and
Democracy, so as to help students to support the leadership of the CNP. Jiang
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Jieshf, following the revolutionary ideals of Sun YbdAn, argued that, to save
China from extinction it was necessary to restore its national self-confidence
which was rooted in the cultural heritage of the past.' The most
fundamental function of education was, according to Jiang, to cultivate
students' personality, to change their moral qualities, and to correct their
behaviours so that the moral and political qualities of the society may be
changed and the nation may be saved." Therefore, education through the
Principle of Nationalism, according to the Ministry of Education, has the
central task of ensuring the continued existence of the Chinese people and its
cultural heritage.'
Unlike the PRC, the list of moral virtues of the ROC was drawn widely
from the Confucian tradition. The relation of education to the Principles of
Nationalism and Democracy was Confucian in essence: personal and social
ethics interacted in a disciplined society. This was reflected in the national
and school motto in the education system. Before moving to Taiwan in 1949,
Jidng set eight Confucian virtues (loyalty, filialty, benevolence, love,
trustworthiness, faithfulness, and peace) as the parameters of the national
spirit of Republican China. He designated another set of four Confucian
values (propriety, righteousness, integrity, and honour) as a common motto of
all schools and as a common moral standard for the cultivation of all students.
In contrast to the PRC which was marked by oscillations between
"redness" and "expertness," the ruling elite of the ROC stressed both
ideological and political education and professional training in higher
education. The transmission of these twelve Confucian values to students in
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Taiwan was perceived by Jiang in the 1950s and 1960s as a "spiritual weapon"
to resist the Chinese and Russian communists. Article 32 of the
"Kuomintang Platform" in the 1952 National Assembly permitted the state to
guide the thought of youths and to help them establish patriotic organizations
so as to ensure victory in their fight against communism and Soviet
imperialism.' hi 1960, the Ministry of Education indicated that higher
education was to be used to train specialized personnel in various fields for
national construction and to prepare them for the recovery and reconstruction
of mainland China.' In the late 1960s, the CNP organized a national
campaign, 'Revival of Chinese Culture," to highlight the destruction of Chinese
culture in the Cultural Revolution in the PRC In 1993, integrity was singled
out by the Ministry of Education as a virtue to be promoted in secondary
education. This was supposed to help rectify the social atmosphere in a newly
industrialized society.
Although the PRC and ROC had different lists of revolutionary ideals
and moral values drawn from different sources, both lists encouraged both sets
of students to accept the values, attitudes and worldviews of the first-
generation leaders, and to exhibit behaviours which were acceptable within the
socio-political norms defined by the respective ruling elites. hi the PRC, both
Mao and Deng advocated the primacy of the leadership of the CCP. hi 1956,
Mao argued that the domination of the CCP over other parties in the political
arenas was to suppress potential anti-revolutionary activities, to resist
imperialism, and to construct socialism in the PRC." In the early 1980s, Deng
suggested that the ultimate criterion of discipline was to support faithfully and
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implement resolutely the policy of the party and the state." The criterion
was a socialist version of the Confucian promotion of loyalty to the emperor.
In the ROC, education through the Principle of Democracy was to help
create social cohesion amongst people. Jiang promoted the idea of organized
democracy and disciplined freedom. He also argued that in order to be
liberated, people had to obey the laws and be responsible so that the nation
could achieve independence and self-strengthening. The knowledge and
technology of higher learning could be achieved only in a law-abiding
society.' This is a nationalist version of Confucian social ethics. This version
was daimed by the Ministry of Education to be promoted in the education
system of the ROC in the 1970s and 1980s.37
Therefore, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, like the emperors in
Imperial China, adopted their revolutionary ideals and selected moral values
as a guiding principle in the formulation of education policy, and transmitted
these socio-political values through education to students. These values were
believed by the authorities of these two Chinese countries to help students
conform to the social order, and support the existing political leadership. How
the PRC and ROC utilized higher education to help students conform to the
socio-political status quo will be discussed in the next section.
4.2.3 Institutional Transmission of Central Values in Higher Education of
the PRC and ROC 
This section argues that between 1949 and the late 1980s, the states of the PRC
and ROC established in their higher education systems institutional measures
to guard against the infiltration of conflicting values (which were regarded as
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challenging the existing political leadership) from abroad, and to ensure the
transmission of the respective Chinese central value system to students. The
measures included the creation of an environment in which official beliefs
were propagated; the establishment of a party-controlled administrative
structure; and the imposition of ideological courses as academic requirements.
The environment in which students were to study is selected because
it indicated the external relations of individual higher education institutions
with other social institutions at home and abroad. The administrative
structure is chosen because it was the political arena in which the struggles
between the university administration and party authorities took place.
Ideological courses are selected because they represented the curricular and
extracurricular activities relating to cultural transmission.
4.2.3.1 Creation of an Environment for Cultural Transmission
The first institutional measure for cultural transmission in the higher education
systems of the PRC and ROC between 1949 and the late 1980s was the creation
of an environment which was marked by the domination of the central value
system over rival ones.
During the founding period, the ruling elite of the PRC created a
socialist environment in which Chinese socialism was transmitted and
particularly capitalist influences were minimized. In 1947, nearly 44% of 125
tertiary institutions were private, and many of them were run by American
churches. The private sector of higher education was abolished, and
educational and political sovereignty from foreign and local private ownership
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was resumed in the 'Three-Antis Movement" between 1949 and 1951. As in
the former USSR, higher education institutions were nationalized, i.e. their
ownership was transferred to the state or collectivity.
In particular, the takeover of foreign-related institutions in the PRC was
intended to eliminate capitalist influence from other institutions abroad on
socialist higher education in the PRC. The Deputy-Minister of Education, Qi.in
JÜnrul, explicitly admitted that the takeover of American-subsidized schools
was "not a simple administrative job, nor a matter of funds, but a most
important political undertaking."' The taldng-back of higher education from
foreigners involved education of teachers and students about "American
cultural aggression" in discussion meetings; the replacement of foreign
administrative and teaching staff with the Chinese; and the removal of the
religious curriculum from normal teaching.' By the end of 1951, 21
universities linked with foreign churches were nationalized.' All higher
education institutions were owned, run, and thereby controlled, by the state.
This lasted up to the late 1980s after which the Beijing authorities allowed local
Chinese, and encouraged foreigners, to run private higher education
institutions.
As in the PRC, the ruling elite of the ROC created a nationalist
environment for the transmission of the Three People's Principles in the higher
education system of the ROC during the founding period. In this period, the
CNP and those emigrants from mainland China had to deal with three cultural
problems: the cultural legacy left by the Japanese; the existing two major
dialect groups (Minnanese and Kejia people) who could not speak Mandarin;
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and the infiltration of communist ideas, particularly from the PRC.
To deal with the Japanese cultural legacy, the ROC's government in
Taiwan regained educational and political control from the Japanese over
Taiwanese higher education (and other levels) between 1945 and 1949. All
institutions were taken over by the Ministry of Education of the ROC in 1945.
The name of the Taihoku Imperial University was changed to the National
Taiwan University. The Japanese staff was gradually replaced by those who
came to Taiwan from mainland China with the CNP in 1949. The Japanese
language as a medium of instruction was banned at all levels of education.
To deal with the local Taiwanese culture, the CNP as an external
political force (which moved its seat to Taiwan in 1949) adopted a "colonial"
language policy: the local people who were the majority of the population had
to use the language of an external political power as the official language.
After 1945, the CNP adopted Mandarin, rather than one of the major dialects,
as the official language of instruction. Local dialects were banned in all levels
of schools. (In 1993, the learning of dialects was allowed to be incorporated
as an elective subject in primary and secondary schools.") The CNP
explained its language policy as a means to fight against the Japanese cultural
legacy and to provide a common language for different dialect groups in
Taiwan." However, between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the local-
born Taiwanese did not speak Mandarin, and could not follow the lectures
given by professors from mainland China. New students, rather than
mainland professors, were required to learn Mandarin and Chinese literature
several hours per week.'
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To deal with the infiltration of communist ideas, the ROC banned the
transmission of communism in all social institutions (including higher
education) in 1949. Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, books by
communists were cleared from the shelves in libraries and bookshops. Clubs
for the study of the books written by Marx were banned, and students who
organized the clubs were arrested.*
Therefore, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC created an environment
for higher education within the respective publicly monolithic socio-political
contexts (discussed in Chapter Three) to minimize further influences on
students from rival forces at home and from abroad. The ruling elites of the
two Chinese countries also established political forces within individual higher
education institutions to monitor their observance of the policies of the
respective parties.
4.2.3.2 Establishment of a Party-controlled Administrative Structure
The second institutional measure to ensure the transmission of central values
in the higher education systems of the PRC and the ROC was the
establishment of a party-controlled administration hierarchy.
In the manner of the Soviet model, the CCP indirectly controlled
higher education institutions through the creation of a vertical administration
network. The educational hierarchy included, from the top, the CCP, the State
Council, the Ministry of Education (State Education Commission after 1985)
together with other ministries, local authorities of education or other
ministries, and tertiary institutions under the Ministry of Education or under
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other ministries. The top-down vertical administrative relations were required
in the parts constitution to be strictly observed." As indicated in the four
directives issued between 1950 and 1953, personnel management and the
planning of teaching had to be done in accordance with the detailed
instructions of the Ministry of Education (See Appendix 4.1)."
The CCP also regulated higher education institutions directly through
the creation of a vertical hierarchy within them. This hierarchy was
intertwined in the power relations of university administration and party
forces within individual institutions. In other words, there were two
contending power centres — university administration and party organs —
within the hierarchy. The purposes of the establishment of these complicated
relations were to ensure that Party policies were implemented by the
university authorities and daily university administration was conducted
within the socio-political norms prescribed by the CCP. As a result, party
forces dominated the university administration authorities.
The university administration authorities formed a major core of power,
and comprised, from the top, the presidents and their deputies, directors of
colleges, and department heads. However, their appointments were controlled
mainly by the CCP. For example, the presidents of higher education
institutions were appointed by the CCP, and could be removed from their
office of presidency at anytime by the CCP. The removal of the president of
the Beijing University for political reasons immediately after the Tiananmen
Square Incident in 1989 was one of many examples in the higher education
system of the PRC. Moreover, deputy presidents were usually party
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secretaries of local university party committees, and were directly accountable
to the CCP. They were also heads of another power contending group in
individual higher education institutions.
The establishment of party organs as another core of authority in
individual higher education institutions was also a mark of the integration of
university administration and party powers. These organs included university
party committees, local Communist Youth Leagues, and the student unions
under the leadership of the university party committees. In the arenas relating
to the ideological and political affairs in higher education, these organs and the
presidents of higher education institutions were jointly supervised by the
Ministry of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the
Ministry of Education of the State Council which directed these affairs.'
Among these party organs, university party committees were the most
powerful. In 1%1, these committees were designated as the highest internal
administrative organs in higher education institutions. The functions of these
committees were to implement properly the Party's general line, and policies;
to accomplish the tasks delegated by higher Party or state organs; to
consolidate ideological and political work; and to administer the personnel of
individual institutions.' The Central Committee of the CCP admitted in the
1985 education reform that the power of these university party committees
was so great that they practised "monopolizing the management of everything"
in higher education institutions.'
Between 1985 and 1989, the "president-responsibility system" was
allowed to emerge, and presidents were given more, but still limited,
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managerial powers.' At the same time, the local party secretaries were given
the duties to "strongly support the principals or presidents in the execution of
their functions and powers, and to guarantee and supervise the
implementation of the Party's various principles and policies and the
fulfillment of the state's education plans." Only a small number (e.g. about
10% in 1985) of higher education institutions, as noted by Du Ruiquing, were
chosen to test the president-responsibility system, and only some powers were
transferred from the university party committees to presidents.' However,
since the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, the pilot scheme of the
separation of powers between the university administration and party
committees in individual institutions, as noted by Cheng Kai-ming, has been
suspended. Therefore between 1949 and the late 1980s, the higher
education system of the PRC was mainly dominated by party forces outside
and on campuses.
As in the PRC, the CM' dominated the administrative affairs of higher
education institutions in the ROC through the Ministry of Education.' The
Ministry of Education appointed the presidents of public and private
universities, assessed the qualifications of their teachers, and controlled their
admission quota and tuition fees. Moreover, university presidents were
usually the executive heads of the institutions, and at the same time the
chairpersons of party committees on campus. The control of the Ministry of
Education over higher education in the ROC can be reflected in a common
saying, "there is only one university — the University of the Ministry of
Education.'
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At the administrative level within the campus, the president of a tertiary
institution in the ROC had full rights to appoint professors as Deans of
Studies, Deans of Discipline, and Deans of General Affairs. The president
could also appoint the director of a college in the university structure, and
recruit teaching staff including professors, associate professors, lecturers and
associate lecturers.
In other words, the administrative structure in higher education of the
ROC comprised a single power core: the Ministry of Education and the
presidents. This was different from the PRC which had two power cores: the
administration and party forces. However, both structures served the same
function: the insurance of the implementation of the educational policies of the
ruling party.
The CNP-controlled administration hierarchy in higher education
institutions of the ROC lasted for nearly 40 years. This practice was
challenged by the academics' refusal of the selection and appointment of their
presidents by the Ministry of Education in the early 1990s. This issue will be
discussed later in this chapter. This thesis continues to examine how the CCP
and CNP controlled the direct transmission of respective central values to
students through the formal and informal curricula of higher education.
4.2.3.3 Imposition of Ideological Requirements on Students
The third institutional measure to disseminate official central values in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC, this thesis suggests, was the
imposition of ideological courses as compulsory academic requirements for
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admissions and graduation.
Admissions mechanisms, this thesis argues, served as the first screening
filter of the higher education systems in the PRC and ROC to accept those
students who had passed the ideological and political entrance requirements
set by respective ruling parties.
In the PRC, since 1952, unified entrance examinations for
undergraduates have served as a major admissions mechanism for recruiting
students. In order to be qualified for admission, students of the PRC were
required to pass papers on Chinese socialism, and to give examiners the
answers expected by the CCP.' In the period of the Second Five-Year Plan
(1958-1962), priority was given to "political quality" over "academic quality" in
the selection of candidates." Between 1971 and 1976, the examination system
was criticized as a "testing method of the bourgeoisie" and was canceled.
Instead of passing ideological papers, students' political "conditions" (e.g.
children of workers and peasants) and local party's recommendations became
important admission criteria." After 1976, the passing of examinations
relating to Chinese socialism was resumed as an admission criterion.
Therefore, despite the change in form and despite the variation in importance,
political and ideological criteria were used in the selection of students for
higher education studies in the PRC in the past four decades.
Unlike the PRC, the ROC consistently used entrance examinations to
test students' knowledge of official beliefs. Since 1954, joint university
entrance examinations have been an essential mechanism to select students.
The paper on the subject, "Three People's Principles," was compulsory for all
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candidates.' In other words, the passing of this subject became a necessary,
though not the most important, admission criterion for students to pursue
higher education studies in the ROC. Those who had not mastered the
required level of knowledge about the central value system were denied the
opportunity to study in higher education of the ROC.
After admission, students were required to fulfill a series of formal and
informal curricular requirements to qualify for graduation in the PRC and
ROC. In particular, intensive transmission of the central value system took
place in compulsory courses: theoretical and practical.
In the PRC, the contents of the theoretical courses comprised two basic
ingredients. First of all, students had to learn political thought. Mao's
thought, in addition to Marxism and Leninism, was formally incorporated as
a core part of the ideological and political curriculum in 1961. After 1978,
Deng's speeches concerning the building up of socialism with Chinese
characteristics were also incorporated as reading materials for students.
Moreover, the policies of the CCP, and development of the PRC and the world
were included. From 1980, the courses in the "History of the Chinese
Communist Party," 'Political Economy," and "Marxist Philosophy" were
compulsory for all undergraduates.
For these theoretical ideological studies, the PRC also ordered the
university authorities to allocate a considerable portion of learning time for
ideological and political education. In 1978, the Ministry of Education
stipulated that the portion of learning varied with the field of study: about
10% of the total class time for students in science and engineering fields, and
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about 20% for students in the field of humanities.° Postgraduate students
were also required to spend 100 - 140 hours a year on Marxist theories.°
In the ROC, compulsory theoretical studies induded courses on the
"Thoughts of San Ybdan" (which was formerly called the "Three People's
Principles"), 'The Constitution of the ROC," and the CNP's version of
"Chinese Modern History."' Among them, the 'Thoughts of San Ybdan" was
most controversial amongst academics.
The course on the "Thoughts of Sun Ylxian", this thesis argues, served
two basic purposes: the transmission of &Tin Ybdan's ideals; and the
propagation of Jiang Jieshf's message of anti-communism and recovering
mainland China. This course carried four units: 2 units a term and 2 hours a
week.° The classes were perceived by the CNP as part of a cultural and
ideological war between the Three People's Principles and Communism, and
as psychomilitary preparation for the recovery of mainland China.° The
teaching curriculum of this course was prescribed by the Ministry of Education
in 1980." Textbooks were written, for example by Wii fl-Ping, 71
 according
to the promulgated guidelines, and were therefore loaded with the Three
People's Principles and anti-communist ideas.
In addition to these theoretical courses, military training was required
as a compulsory practical course in ideological and political education in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC.
In the 1980s, military training was required in part of the higher
education system of the PRC. For example, in 1987, 105 higher education
institutions were selected by the central authorities as pilot schools, and
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110,000 students were involved. Students of 51 higher education institutions
(about 60,000) received training in military bases; whereas students of other 54
institutions were trained on campuses. In 1988, the number of selected
institutions for military training was increased to 142. 2
 The period of
training was about 8 weeks: 5 for intensive courses; and 3 for non-intensive.
As compared with the PRC, student military training in the ROC was
more demanding in time and compulsory for all tertiary students from 1953."
There are two kinds of military training: on campus and at military training
centres. Campus military training carries no units, but is compulsory for all
students in the first and second years.' The total number of hours is 128, i.e.
2 hours for 16 weeks a term." Another type of military training for male
students has been taking place in military training centres outside campus
since the summer of 1959. The period of training was 14 weeks at initial
stages. After several modifications, it was reduced to 6 weeks from 1972
onwards.
However, this thesis argues that student military training on or outside
campus in the PRC and ROC was based on the needs for the transmission of
central values to students, rather than for the purposes of actual military
defence.
In the PRC, the stated purposes of military training were political in
nature. This kind of training was, according to the Beijing authorities,
supposed to help students acquire the spirit of hard work and striving for
success through struggle; to master the concept of collectivism; and to become
people of "four-haves" (to have socialist ideals, culture, morality, and
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discipline)." Moreover, the time spent on the transmission of Chinese
socialism to students was not negligible. In military training, the ratio of time
spent on practical training and ideological education was stipulated as 1 : 1.77
The political nature of military training in the PRC was also reaffirmed
by the sudden prolongation of the training period from 8 weeks on campus
to 1 year outside campus for new students of BZiji-ng University and Ftclan
University after the student movement in 1989. Female students of the PRC,
unlike those in the ROC, received the same training as males did. In addition
to physical exercises, political courses were also set up as part of military
training. This training was supposed to give students correct ideological
consciousness and all-round development." For example, in 1991-1992, 700
new students of the Fdan University were required to study the recent
speeches of Deng Xiaopfng and Jiang &min. Through this training, 43
students were recruited as members of the CCP."
Student military training in the ROC was as political as in the PRC.
Though this course includes spiritual, military, physical and practical training,
the objectives were to impart the spirit of the Three People's Principles and an
anticommunist consciousness to students, and to prepare them to conduct
military defence.' Jiang ringgu6 reportedly admitted in 1954 that practical
military training made up a small part of the whole course.' A considerable
time was spent on the propagation of official values. In the military training
on campus, both female and male students were required to study the
thoughts of Sun Ybdan, instructions to the youth by Jiang Jieshi, and, from
1984, the speeches by Jiang JingguO. The ratio of time spent on the study of
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the works of the three presidents was suggested to be 1 : 3 : 3. 82 Besides,
female students studied midwifery and nursery; while male students learned
military knowledge. A standardized set of textbooks for male students was
written by the Military Department of the Ministry of Education, providing its
own version of ROC-PRC relations in the last four decades.'
This thesis further argues that the CCP and CNP also utilized the
informal curriculum to help students to conform to the socio-political norms
prescribed by the respective ruling elites.
In the higher education system of the PRC, teachers were given the duty
to monitor the activities of students. Every student was assigned a class tutor
who was supposed to give advice and guidance to the student for the whole
course of study in higher education. In general, one class tutor "looked after"
about 10 students." Political counsellors, selected from party members and
lecturers in political theory and directly appointed by the university party
committee, were arranged for the students of the first and second years. The
political counsellors conducted ideological and communist moral education
amongst students, to inform them about current affairs, party line and policies,
and to recruit students as party-members.'
Extracurricular activities, both vacational and regular, were another
channel for the state to transmit the central value system to students in the
PRC. Students' social services in vacations were organized by the university
authorities to help students experience the life of the masses, and to link
theory with practice. Regular extracurricular training was taken up and
supplemented by the local Communist Youth League" and the student union
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under the university party committee in each higher education institution.
After activities like participation in productive labour and self-criticism,
examinations and appraisals to evaluate their performance were given to
students.'
As in the PRC, the CNP also employed non-academic activities to help
students exhibit behaviours acceptable within the norms prescribed by the
ruling elite of the ROC. In the Taiwanese higher education system, there were
two major types of special personnel responsible for student discipline:
military, and discipline officers. Military officers were assigned by the state
to both public and private universities and colleges according to their student
enrollment." These two types of officers overlapped in the administrative
structure and had the same basic duty: to help students to exhibit
behaviours acceptable to the school and political authorities. In particular,
military officers, together with academic tutors, gave grades for conduct for
each student each term. This grade would be recorded permanently in the
overall student report sheet."
Other extracurricular activities in the higher education system of the
ROC were also used to transmit the revolutionary ideals and moral values
prescribed by the ruling elite. Students were required to attend national flag
raising ceremonies. Local Anti-communist Youth Leagues were permitted to
recruit student-members, and coordinate seminars and activities to promote
anti-communist ideas on campus.
After passing a series of formal and informal curricular requirements
in ideological and political education, students of the PRC and ROC would be
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awarded degrees. The PRC even indicated in the 'Degree Regulation"
(promulgated in 1980) that its graduates were supposed to possess minimum
"redness" (i.e. to support the CCP and the socialist system) and "expertness."'
However, the political performance of PRC students before graduation
would affect their future careers more than ROC students. After graduation,
ROC students had to find jobs for themselves; whereas PRC students were
assigned jobs by the government according to their academic and political
achievements.' The policy of job assignment by the government in the PRC
further limited students' behaviours during their studies.
To sum up, the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC were
marked by an emphasis on the preservation of the national identity between
1949 and the late 1980s. The governments of the two countries deliberately
linked their higher education systems with the respective monolithic, state-
supported, official central value systems, and established institutional controls
to minimize domestic and foreign influences on the transmission of
revolutionary ideals. As a result, students in the PRC and ROC had little
chance to exercise their constitutional rights of freedom and to choose publicly
value systems which were challenging to the existing political leadership of the
ruling elites.
Nevertheless, despite the institutional controls over the transmission of
values in higher education of the PRC and ROC for nearly four decades, the
respective Chinese ruling elites faced political challenges by large-scale student
demonstrations respectively in 1989 and 1990. Students of both countries
demanded reforms in the political structure. This indicated that the students
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of the PRC and ROC were dissatisfied, to some extent, with the performance
of the respective ruling parties.'
However, the differential treatments of the student demonstrations by
the respective states of the PRC and ROC indicated their differences in the
domestic socio-political development in these two countries in the last decade.
In the PRC, the CCP emphasized economic, rather than political, reforms. The
political powers were still controlled by leaders of the first generation, and the
domestic political structure was publicly monolithic. Within such a domestic
socio-political context, student demonstrations were condemned as political
struggles against the CCP and socialism by the Politburo on 24 May, 1989.94
The students were militarily suppressed on 4 June. The student leaders and
intellectuals who supported the movement were arrested, or became fugitives
and dissidents in other countries.
In contrast, the ROC stressed political reforms before the occurrence of
student demonstrations in March 1990. Martial law was lifted and the
opposition party, though as a minority, was officially incorporated into the
political structure. During the demonstration, the student leaders, unlike those
in the PRC, had an opportunity to express their requests directly before
President LI DEnghui. The movement finally ended in a peaceful way.
The next section will examine the development of cultural transmission
in higher education of the PRC and ROC after these student demonstrations.
4.3 CULTURAL TRANSMISSION IN HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE 
PRC AND ROC IN THE EARLY 1990S 
This thesis argues that owing to different domestic socio-political contexts from
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the late 1980s, the higher education systems of the FRC and ROC differed in
their relations with the ruling party, but were still used as a way to preserve
national identity. In the arenas of political and ideological affairs in the early
1990s, no conspicuous depoliticization — the process of removing political
forces or influences — occurred in higher education of the PRC, but partial
depoliticiz,ation occurred in higher education of the ROC.
However, the nature of the cultural task in these two Chinese higher
education systems was basically the same, i.e. they were used by the respective
ruling parties to prolong their political leadership through the preservation of
national identity within new contexts: for the CCP, to maintain the PRC as a
Chinese socialist tradition in an era of the global downfall of communism; and
for the CNP, to strive for the international recognition of the ROC as a Chinese
cultural tradition against the increasing diplomatic containment by the PRC in
the international community.
The discussion on cultural transmission in higher education of the PRC
in the early 1990s will be followed by that of the ROC in this section.
4.3.1 Strengthening of the Cultural Task in Higher Education of the PRC
This thesis argues that despite the introduction of market values as part of the
central value system from the late 1980s, the ruling elite of the PRC basically
maintained the primary revolutionary ideals and socialist values, and
disseminated these values (including market ones) to students through the
basic transmission structure used in higher education before the student
movement in 1989. This was a result of the Chinese communist leaders'
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perceptions about the potential international and domestic threats to their
leadership. These threats did not weaken, but strengthened, cultural
transmission in the higher education system of the PRC.
4.3.1.1 CCP's Perceptions of Potential Threats in the Early 1990s
In the early 1990s, the ruling elite of the PRC, this thesis argues, perceived that
the transmission of their worldviews to the next generation, and hence their
political leadership, was endangered by potential socio-political threats from
three major sources: new international political factors, domestic economic
reforms, and the political performance of higher education in the PRC.
The rust threat to the political leadership of the ruling elite in the PRC
from the international community was the global decline of communism in the
early 1990s. The downfall of communism was recognized by the ruling elite
as a potential challenge to the viability of Chinese socialism on which they
justified their leadership. The PRC authorities perceived that Western
countries would subvert the PRC and change its monolithic political system
into a multi-party one. In 1991, the Minister of the State Education
Commission, LI Tièying, reiterated the idea of his senior party members: the
international political challenge to the PRC came from the "international
subversion-movement for peaceful evolution."" One and a half year later, LI
admitted that the downfall of communism had constituted a domestic threat
to the political leadership of the CCP.'
Another threat to the political leadership of the ruling elite in the PRC,
this thesis argues, was the socio-political influences of domestic economic
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reforms through the introduction of market mechanisms in the socialist
economy. Despite some advantages, market forces, as summarized by Cul
YÜnxi (the Head of Education Department of the Propaganda Ministry under
the Central Committee of the CCP) in 1993, have "bad" socio-political effects
on the leadership of the CCP." These "bad" effects include "individualism",
"extreme individualism", extravagance of newly rich people, and the exchange
of political power and money. In particular, corruption within the CCP and
the state structure which was a cause for the emergence of the student
demonstration in 1989 continued to exist in the early 1990s?
Finally, the ruling elite of the PRC perceived higher education as
potential sources of social disturbances particularly after the Tiananmen
Square Incident in 1989. Two surveys about the political situation of higher
education in the PRC were done by the State Education Commission
respectively in 1991 and 1992." In the 1991 survey, the CCP attempted to
identify the possible sources of future disturbances in higher education. The
CCP observed that out of 860 full-time higher education institutions, students
of 10 universities were "highly possible" to generate social uprisings at
anytime; and 62 universities would likely generate or participate in social
uprisings" This survey indicated that the PRC was cautious about the
recurrence of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident.
In the 1992 survey, the State Education Commission chose 50 key-point
higher education institutions to study the political tendencies of their students.
The results showed that nearly 50% of the responding students were not
interested in ideological and political education, and only 9% of the
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respondents would like to master their professional studies and to serve the
socialist cause. The balance between "redness" and "expertness" in higher
education of the PRC had been upset and had shifted away from both sides.
In order to perpetuate Chinese socialist worldviews, and particularly to
keep the party line (the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics)
"unshakable" for 100 years,' the ruling elite of the PRC came to two
conclusions in the early 1990s. The first conclusion was: "the quicker the
[economic] reform and openness [to the outside world], the more consolidation
and improvement [are needed] in the work of constructing the Party, and in
ideological and political education." 1
 The second condusion was to
consolidate the CCP leadership in the PRC. In March 1993, the CCP revised
the constitution to incorporate into the Preamble for the first time the sentence,
"multi-party cooperation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
and the political consultation system will [continue to] exist and develop for
a long time." 	 The CU' attempted to "legalize" the publidy monolithic
political structure and the supreme leadership of the CU' over other "parties."
In other words, the current ruling elite of the PRC acknowledged that
the moral claims of its leadership over the people were no longer effective, and
that the termination of the era of charismatic leaders has begun. Despite this
acknowledgement, Jiang amin reasserted in June 1993 that without the
leadership of the CU', the PRC would have no economic reform and socialist
modernization.' This suggests that the ruling elite of the PRC still insists
on the preservation of socialist ideals and the primacy of the CU'. How to
achieve these two goals by improving ideological and political education in the
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higher education system of the PRC in the early 1990s will be discussed in the
next section.
4.3.1.2 Cultural Task of Higher Education of the PRC in the Early 1990s:
Recruitment of Successors
This thesis argues that despite the incorporation of market values as part of
central values, the PRC authorities tightened, not lessened, the political and
ideological work in higher education after the Tiananmen Square Incident in
1989. The tightening was indicated on six dimensions: the reassertion of the
importance of cultural transmission, the control of campuses, the readjustment
of administrative personnel, the training of teachers for ideological and
political education, the maintenance of compulsory courses, and the
introduction of overall assessment mechanisms in higher education.
4.3.1.2.1 Reassertion of the Cultural Task of Higher Education
In the early 1990s, the political leaders of the PRC emphasized the recruitment
of their successors as an important cultural task of higher education in the
early 1990s. Higher education was still perceived, in Deng's words, as a
"strong ideological weapon" against "decadent" capitalist influences although
market mechanisms were introduced into the socialist economy and higher
education.' In March 1991, Li Tièying reasserted that ideological and
political education was a means to ensure domestic political and stability, and
the persistence of the socialist system in the PRC.
In particular, higher education was to transmit the Chinese socialist
worldview through the fostering of "reliable successors."' The quality of
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these successors, as expected by the Chinese communist leaders, was the
students' ability to "resist capitalist liberalization and all decadent thoughts of
exploitation."' In the 1993 education reform plan, the Central Committee
of the CCP also stressed the training of "successors with moral, intellectual,
and physical development" and the improvement of the political qualities of
teachers.' These successors were supposed to possess "four-haves"
(morality, socialist ideals, culture and discipline) and supported "three-isms"
(patriotism, collectivism, and socialism).'' The reassertion of the importance
of cultural transmission in higher education suggests that it was still an
important means to perpetuate the worldviews of the revolutionary elite.
4.3.1.2.2 Maintenance of CCP-controlled Campuses
Despite the permission for the existence of the private sector in higher
education, the ruling elite of the PRC created CCP-controlled campuses in
which official values were transmitted to students. University campuses, as
noted by A. C. Grayling and the Hong Kong press, were patrolled by large
numbers of police, particularly on anniversaries of "political significance," for
instance, 4 May and 4 June.'" In July 1992, the educational authorities gave
an instruction to higher education institutions that ideas of "capitalist
liberalization" should not be allowed to be transmitted on campuses, and that
no "earthquakes" (i.e. movements leading to social uprisings) would be
allowed to take place. The university authorities were given the duty to
suppress these activities at their emergence.'
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4.3.1.2.3 President-Responsibility System Led by the Party
Besides controlling campuses, the CCP reclaimed its administrative control
from the presidents of higher education institutions after the Tiananmen
Square Incident in 1989. Between 1990 and 1992, 90% of top university
executives were reappointed. More than half of these university executives
had attended ideological and political training courses. Party members were
"cleansed" through re-registration and reassessment (cling 11 ging cha).112
In particular, the Central Committee of the CCP officially changed the
"president-responsibility system" to "president-responsibility system led by the
Party" in the 1993 education reform plan. The new system explicitly spelt out
that the local university party committee would be the highest decision-
making organ in each higher education institution. Each local university party
committee was supposed to be organized by the CCP as a "strong leadership
core and fighting fortress" on campus.' The State Education Commission
sent an order to 36 higher education institutions directly under its
administration and indicated that from 1992-1993 onwards, important issues
in these institutions have to be discussed and decided by both presidents and
university party secretaries. Although these presidents are given the power
to organize executive committees to implement university policies, university
party secretaries can control the direction of university reform and the
ideological and political work on campus.114
Higher education institutions under other ministries and provincial
authorities in the PRC were also requested to change from a president-
responsibility system to one led by the party. Many universities reportedly
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changed the administration system to the party-led system. In Bêijing, most
of the city universities adopted the party-led president-responsibility
system."' University party secretaries were given the power to decide
important issues after discussion with university administrators. Only a few
higher education institutions were allowed to keep testing the president-
responsibility system. In these "exceptional" campuses, university party
committees were, however, instructed by the central authorities to function as
a "political core.'" Therefore, the administration of the higher education
system was still under the control of the CCP in the early 1990s.
4.3.1.2.4 Teacher Team of Ideological and Political Education
The CCP also attempted to re-establish a teacher team for ideological and
political education through the organization of activities for and raising the
qualification of these teachers in the early 1990s. All teachers, according to the
1993 education reform plan, were required to raise their "ideological and
political qualities";117
 and to teach in accordance with the policy of the
ccp.118 Between 1990-1992, young teachers were organized to attend
theoretical courses on ideological and political education and participate in
training relating to rural socialist education." 9
 Some of the young teachers
were also selected to participate in student military training. In particular,
6,000 teachers received moral education training offered by the Research
Committee of Moral Education in Higher Education of Bèijing between 1982-
1992.1"
In 1993, the PRC authorities attempted to increase the quality of
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teachers in ideological and political education. This special team was very
large; for example, there were 20,800 such teachers (5.2% of the total teacher
population) in higher education in 1990. 121
 It was suggested that the
majority of these teachers would be holders of bachelor or master degrees with
a major in ideological and political education; and the rest would be recruited
from lecturers in other professions.' The teachers in ideological and
political education were advised by the State Education Commission to use
creative methods and modern educational technology to help teaching
compulsory ideological courses. This means that students were supposed to
have better (than normal) educational resources in compulsory ideological
courses.
4.3.1.2.5 Maintenance of Compulsory Ideological Courses
In the early 1990s, the PRC still used the passing of compulsory ideological
courses (both practical and theoretical) as it did before 1989. Two incidents
seemed to indicate that the PRC was lessening the task of the transmission of
official values in higher education. The first one was the reduction of the
military training period from 1 year back to 8 weeks for new students of the
Beijing University and Fadan University from 1993-1994.' The second
incident was that the Chinese People's University in Beijing was reported by
an official newspaper of the PRC to have replaced 14 Marxist courses with 17
new courses on management and administration.'
However, in an interview by Newsweek in March 1993, the Minister of
State Education Commission, a Tieying, ruled out the possibility that military
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training would be cancelled. He reiterated the PRC's cultural imperative that
military training was to "recruit morally, intellectually and physically
developed socialist builders and successors." In the same interview, LI
also denied that the Chinese People's University has suspended 14 marxist
courses. He admitted that only one course, the "theory of price," was
cancelled, but the other courses still existed.' In the same month, the
President of the Beijing University also announced that courses on Marxism
would remain in his university.' All these suggest that the PRC still
maintained the formal curriculum as a means to transmit the revolutionary
ideals and values prescribed by the ruling elite.
4.3.1.2.6 Political Functions of University Assessment Mechanisms
In order to check how university presidents and teachers implemented the
CCP's policy, the ruling elite of the PRC used assessment mechanisms to
provide a quantitative evaluation on the political performance of individual
higher education institutions.
In the late 1980s, assessment mechanisms were introduced to evaluate
the overall performance of individual higher education institutions. These
mechanisms were believed by the PRC authorities to "strengthen and improve
the macro-guidance and management" when institutional autonomy was
increased.13 In December 1990, the State Education Commission spelt out
that the assessment process comprised two stages: assessment by higher
education institutions themselves; and by the state (central or provincial
authorities). The key items of assessment included ideological and political
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education, professional education, and curriculum.'" In November 1992, the
National Assessment Committee was established and was headed by the party
secretary of the State Education Commission, He DOngchäng.
This thesis observes that political performance in most levels of higher
education institutions, directly under the State Education Commission or other
ministries, was a major assessment item. The State Education Commission
designed an assessment scheme for its 36 universities in 1992.' 3° Forty-six
major areas of assessment were listed. In addition to the assessment of the
administration of higher education and the professional standards of teachers
and students, the assessment of the ideological and political condition of
administrators and party cadres, and teachers and students (undergraduates
and postgraduates) was emphasized. In particular, the political performance
of universities as "fighting fortresses" at all levels would be assessed in terms
of the "respect" for party organizations by students and staff; the results of
students in ideological and political education; the number of student party
members; and the students' acceptance of job assignments by the state.
Moreover, some provincial authorities on the instruction of the State
Education Commission designed their own assessment scheme. However,
political performance of higher education at various levels was one of the
primary assessment items.131
 In other words, the PRC began to use
quantitative methods to measure the political quality of higher education.
These assessment mechanisms can be regarded as weapons of the CCP to
control ideological and political affairs in higher education.
To sum up, the PRC tightened control over the transmission of the
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central value system to students after the student movement in 1989. The
perceptions of the ruling elite about the potential international and domestic
threats to its political leadership compelled its higher education system to
maintain the transmission of the revolutionary ideals and values through the
pre-1989 basic transmission structure. As compared with the PRC, there were
some signs of the diminution of political influences on higher education in the
ROC in the early 1990s. This will be examined in the next section.
4.3.2 Partial Depoliticization in the Cultural Task in Higher Education of
the ROC 
This thesis argues that despite partial depoliticization in the administrative
structure of higher education in the ROC, its ruling elite did not de-emphasize
the cultural task of higher education in the transmission of the central value
system to students.
4.3.2.1 Depoliticization within Limits in Higher Education of the ROC
Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, the higher education system of the
ROC has been marked by depoliticization within limits. This was
demonstrated on four dimensions: the formation of university teacher
associations; the election of the presidents of public higher education
institutions; the establishment of religious courses in higher education; and the
establishment of the Institute of Taiwan History. In these four areas, the CNP
had the opportunity to participate in making the final decision.
4.3.2.1.1 University Teacher Associations as Public Forces
The university teacher associations of the ROC were allowed to function as
public forces, and as political arenas between academics with membership of
the ruling party and those without. The participation of CNP academics as a
contending group in these associations, then, can limit their policy direction
and formulation.
The lifting of martial law in the ROC in 1987 created an opportunity for
university academics to form their associations and express their views
publicly. There were two types of teacher associations: trans-university; and
university-based.
A trans-university teacher association, the University Reform Promotion
Association, was established in 1989. This association, after gaining the
support of 961 teachers from 16 public and 8 private higher education
institutions, wrote a letter to the Legislative Yuan: 132 In this letter, these
teachers expressed their request for a change in the relations between higher
education and state: from higher education as a state-agent to an independent
legal entity accountable to the law, but not to the state or to the CNP.
Before the formation of this trans-university association, many
university teacher associations had been organized by academics in their
universities in 1987.' 33
 These associations made public claims to demand the
withdrawal of political forces (including military officers) from universities;
university autonomy in administration and curriculum; and freedom of
publication"'
However, the development of some university teacher associations was
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limited by the diffusion of CNP academics. These associations became
political arenas for the struggles between teachers with CNP membership and
those without. The CNP first banned, and then encouraged its member
teachers to participate in such associations. These CNP teachers became
mainstream forces in the standing committees of these associations. In the
case of the university teacher association of the National Taiwan University,
the association founders withdrew their membership and gave up their
opportunities in the second election of the standing committee in 1989.1'
Therefore, since 1987, the formation of university-based and trans-
university teacher associations have created platforms for teachers to express
publicly their protests against the control of higher education by the CNP.
However, the demand of teachers (and students) for the depoliticization of
higher education would not be satisfied unless the CNP and state devolved
powers on higher education. The next section will discuss the issue
concerning the devolution of powers from the Ministry of Education to
individual higher education institutions in the early 1990s.
4.3.2.1.2 Election of the Presidents of State Universities
Before 1992, the nomination and appointment of the presidents of all state
universities in the ROC were completely controlled by the Ministry of
Education. In December 1992, the Ministry of Education, after testing,'
promulgated the "Principles of Selection of the Presidents and Directors of
State Universities," and attempted to use these principles to select presidents
of the National Taiwan University, National Taiwan Normal University and
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Provincial Taipei Teachers College in 1993. According to the "Principles of
Selection," the president of a state higher education institution would be
appointed by the Ministry of Education after a nomination procedure
conducted by a selection committee controlled by the Ministry of
Education.'
However, this thesis suggests that university academics attempted to
minimize party control over their future presidents in the nomination and
selection processes. This was indicated on three dimensions: the formation of
a university-based selection committee; the diversification of the sources of
nominees for presidency; and the requirement of the successful candidate not
to hold concurrently party and presidential offices.
In early 1993, the academics of the National Taiwan University and
National Taiwan Normal University objected to the formation of selection
committees by the Ministry of Education. These academics insisted that the
selection committees must be university-based, i.e. the committee members
must be administrative and teaching staff of the universities concerned, and
no representatives from the Ministry of Education would be accepted as
members. In March 1993, the Minister of Education, Cue, Wenn, accepted the
persistence of these two universities and suspended the formation of state-led
selection committees for them.' Finally, these two universities established
their own selection committees and devised their own criteria for selecting
their presidents.'
These two selection committees further minimized party control over
their future presidents by diversifying the sources of applicants before the final
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nomination to the Ministry of Education for appointment. Applicants for a
presidency must have support from either groups of academics or
organizations including professional associations, student unions, alumni
associations, or the Ministry of Education!' In the case of the National
Taiwan Normal University, the Minister of Education declared that he would
not nominate candidates to participate in the competition for the presidential
post141
Moreover, these two selection committees required the applicants for
presidency to submit a written letter to declare that if they are chosen and
appointed by the Ministry of Education as president, they must not
concurrently take up party duties during their terms of office. This would
mean discontinuing the tradition that the president of a national university (as
discussed earlier in this chapter) usually took up party duties on campus or
in the public political structure. The current President of Soochow University
echoed this new practice and resigned from the Central Committee of the
National Assembly (the highest political body in the ROC) in April, 1993.1'
The devolution of power on public higher education institutions to
select their presidents was a political struggle between university academics
and the state. University academics have successfully striven for an
opportunity to provide a wider choice of candidates for the Ministry of
Education to consider, and at the same time to limit its choice.
However, the Ministry of Education still holds the final power over the
appointment of their future presidents. Although there were ROC scholars
based in the US who competed for the presidential posts of the National
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Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University, the final
successful candidates selected by university academics were former top
executives of these two universities: Chen Mizhao, the former Director of the
Medical College of the National Taiwan University; and Lii rirn, the former
Dean of Studies of the National Taiwan Normal University. These two
presidents were finally appointed by the Ministry of Education without
objection respectively in June and July 1993. From another viewpoint, this
thesis suggests that the appointment of these two new presidents by the
Ministry of Education was an internal promotion, but via a more complicated
and more "transparent" procedure, by the Ministry.
The next section will discuss the ROC's toleration of other non-
communist value systems to be institutionalized in its higher education system
in the early 1990s.
4.3.2.1.3 Establishment of Religious Courses
This thesis argues that after the lifting of martial law in 1987, the state of the
ROC began to tolerate religious pluralism (the official transmission of more
than one religious value system) with political limits in its higher education.
Before 1987, no religious courses were allowed to be established in any
higher education institution of the ROC, although there were some private
universities, like Fujen Catholic University and Chtmgyuan Christian
University, run by churches. The first institute of religion (for postgraduate
students) was established in the Fujen Catholic University in 1987. However,
this religious institute was subject to the condition that the contents of the
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course should be comparative, and no single religion should be propagated
alone.'
However, the institutionalization of religion in higher education of the
ROC, this thesis argues, would not change the domination of the transmission
of the central value system. Up to 1993, only one university provided
religious education for postgraduate students; but many national and private
universities trained specialists on the studies of the Three People's Principles.
The number of postgraduate students of religion was much smaller than that
in the Institutes of the Three People's Principles. For example, in 1990-91,
there were only 19 postgraduate students of religion, but 169 master students
and 96 doctoral students were enrolled in the Institutes of the Three People's
Principles.'
The previous three examples (the formation of university teacher
associations, the selection of the presidents of state universities, and the
institutionalization of religious courses) have demonstrated the political limits
prescribed by the ROC state. The next example will show that some political
limits were prescribed by academics themselves.
4.3.2.1.4 Establishment of the Institute of Taiwan History
This thesis further argues that part of the academic community in the ROC
still practised self-censorship in the early 1990s. Self-censorship is defined as
an act to avoid discussing issues in public which are deemed politically
sensitive and challenging to the existing political leadership.
In March 1993, the Academia Sinica decided to establish an Institute of
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Taiwan History to research the social, economic and political development of
Taiwan. The founding goal of this institute is to "upgrade the Taiwan's
standing in international academic circles by establishing strong theories and
effective approaches to the study of Taiwan history."'
However, the development of the Institute of Taiwan History would be
limited by the constraints imposed by the government and the academic
community. The proposal of research areas needs to be approved by the
Office of the President of the ROC. Some research fellows of the Academia
Sinica admitted that in order to avoid current politically sensitive issues, the
Institute will not carry out research on the problems of the independence of
Taiwan and its unification with the PRC. The period of Taiwanese history to
be studied will also be limited up to 1960. 146
 This indicated that some
academics still took political factors into account when thinldng about studies
related to the political leadership in the ROC.
This thesis has demonstrated that from the late 1980s, the political
control of higher education by the CNP was relatively diminished. However,
the contents of the central value system and its transmission structure in the
higher education system of the ROC in the early 1990s remained the same as
those before. This will be discussed in the next section.
4.3.2.2 Persistence in the Transmission of Central Value System
This thesis argues that despite some changes in compulsory courses for
undergraduate students in the early 1990s, the higher education system of the
ROC was still a state agent to propagate the official belief system to students.
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The official beliefs are those revolutionary ideals and values prescribed by the
ruling elite members of the first generation, and are disseminated through the
transmission structure created by them.
Despite the objection of teachers of non-ideological courses, the Ministry
of Education made relatively less change in the transmission of the central
value system through the formal curriculum in the early 1990s. In October
1992, the Ministry of Education under the pressure of university academics
revised the list of compulsory subjects common to all higher education
institutions.' From 1993-1994, two ideological courses, 'Thoughts of San
Ylxiart" and the "Constitution of the ROC," would be cancelled despite the
objection of the lecturers of these courses!" The course on the 'Thoughts
of Sun Yixian" was strongly opposed by academics. A new compulsory
course, 'The Constitution and Founding Spirit of the ROC," would be
introduced in the same year. Higher education institutions with difficulties in
introducing this new course would be allowed to delay to 19941995.16
However, this thesis observes that the major purpose of this new course
is the same as the old one: the transmission of the central value system to
students. The new course is simply an incorporation of the course "Thoughts
of San Ybdän" into the "Constitution of the ROC." This is indicated by the
goals of the new course stated by the Ministry of Education. The new course
is expected to help students on three dimensions: to develop the concept of
democracy; to understand the founding spirit and ideals of the ROC; and to
learn the thoughts of Stm Ybdan, the constitution of the ROC, and their
integration with other contemporary trends!' The founding spirit and
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ideals of the ROC, as discussed in Chapter Three, are claimed by the CNP to
be based on the Three People's Principles. In other words, the revolutionary
ideals are to be disseminated in the formal curriculum of the higher education
system in the ROC in the early 1990s. Evidence of this can be found in a
textbook written by Hong Quamdang for this "new"uco rse.im
Moreover, other compulsory ideological courses are maintained in the
formal curriculum of the higher education system in the ROC. Students are
still compelled to take the CNP's version of Chinese history. Military training
remains compulsory for all students of the first and second years.' This
course must be passed by students who want to graduate.'
Finally, the structural relations between military officers and discipline
committees in higher education institutions of the ROC remained intricate until
the end of 1993. The new University Act (passed in December 1993) attempts
to separate the functions between military offices and discipline committees
in supervising students.' According to the Act, discipline committees will
be changed into student affairs committees responsible for counselling and
extracurricular affairs, but military offices are kept as one of highest organs
and are responsible for military training and nursery. In other words, despite
the objection of university academics and despite the pressures from the
opposition party since the lifting of martial law in 1987, military officers are
legally permitted to continue to exist on campus. Moreover, how the
separation in functions between military offices and disciplines will affect the
transmission of the central value system on campus remains unknown.
To sum up, despite some changes relating to cultural transmission in
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the higher education system of the ROC in the early 1990s, these adjustments
were made within the political limits prescribed by the state. These limits
included the state as the final decision-maker; the Three People's Principles as
the core of the central value system; and the avoidance of public discussion
about politically sensitive issues in the academic community.
In particular, the propagation of the Three People's Principles in the
higher education system of the ROC, this thesis suggests, is now used by the
ruling elite to resist potential incorporation by the PRC. The global decline of
socialism and the increasing PRC-ROC non-diplomatic ties undermine the
cultural task of transmitting anti-communist ideas to students in the Taiwanese
higher education system. However, the ruling elite of the ROC continues to
refuse communist values, and insists on the future unification between the two
countries under the principle of "one country one system." The system is
expected by the Taipei authorities to be one which is a "democratic and
pluralistic society that has a free economy and a culture in harmony with daily
life."' The potential unified China, as expected in the 1991 "Guidelines for
National Unification" of the ROC, would be a "democratic, free and equitably
prosperous China."' The teaching of the constitution and the "founding
spirit" of the ROC is, then, an important way to preserve its own cultural and
political identity in spite of the lack of official international recognition in the
early 1990s.
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter has described the relations between higher education, the state,
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and the central value systems of the PRC and ROC between 1949 and 1993.
This chapter has been argued that despite the changes in domestic
relations (between the ruling party, state, people and economy) and
international relations with other countries for the last forty-four years, the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC have been transmitting the
revolutionary ideals and values prescribed by the ruling elites of the first
generation.
The preservation of cultural identity in the higher education systems of
the PRC and ROC was a continuity of classical Chinese higher education.
These three higher education systems differed in the traditions they preserved:
the classical, Confucianism; the PRC, Chinese socialism; and the ROC, the
Chinese modified cultural tradition represented in the Three People's
Principles. However, for the last forty-four years, the higher education
systems of the PRC and ROC inherited three cultural legacies from classical
Chinese higher education: the domination of a monolithic, state-supported
central value system; the emphasis on moral education; and the deliberate
links between higher education, the state, and official beliefs.
Moreover, these two Chinese higher education systems in the early
1990s we still marked by revolutionary and cold-war legacies. The
revolutionary ideals and moral values prescribed by the respective national
founders during the periods of revolution and the cold war were still
propagated through the basic transmission structure created by them. The
dissemination of central values in higher education of the PRC and ROC was
as important in the early 1990s as in the founding period. The current ruling
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elite of the PRC insisted on the preservation of Chinese socialism in an era of
global decline of communism; whereas the current ruling elite of the ROC
persisted in using the preservation of Chinese culture represented in the Three
People's Principles as a contrast to the PRC in the Taiwanese struggles for
international political identity.
In the next two chapters, two fields of study — science and technology -
- in both higher education systems will be selected to discuss how the PRC
and ROC handled the tension between the preservation of national identity
and economic modernization with the introduction of foreign science and
technology.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPORTATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
INTO THE PRC AND ROC
5.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
This chapter sets out to trace the importation of science and technology into
the PRC and ROC between 1949 and 1993. The chapter will first provide an
overview of the relations of science and technology with economy, culture and
society; and second, highlight these relations in the PRC and ROC.
This chapter argues that in the past forty-four years the importation of
foreign science and technology had implications for the economic and socio-
political contexts of the PRC and ROC: they have accommodated foreign
science and technology for pragmatic purposes, while injecting them with
domestic socio-political values.
The line of argument of this chapter is as follows. First of all, because
science and technology are economic and cultural goods, the transfer of science
and technology is both an economic transaction and intercultural activity
between countries in the world system. As economic goods, science and
technology are used for the improvement and sustenance of national
economies respectively in both developing and developed countries. As
cultural goods, science and technology have their own evaluation system, and
are associated with certain set(s) of socio-economic and cultural patterns of
relations and values of the society in which activities of science and technology
are conducted. Therefore, the importation of foreign science and technology
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by developing countries from developed countries means, at least the partial,
the incorporation of these relations and values from developed countries, and
interactions between aspects of foreign and domestic sodo-political cultures
in developing countries.
Moreover, foreign science and technology were imported by the PRC
and ROC for economic purposes, and this was justified, as a social
construction, for socio-political purposes. The PRC and ROC incorporated
foreign science and technology for the same economic purposes — the dosing
of the economic, scientific and technological gap between their respective
countries and developed countries. However, the PRC and ROC adopted
different strategies. The PRC changed supply-source from the USSR to
Western countries in the 1970s, and consistently emphasized heavy industries.
The ROC relied mainly on Western counties for their science and technology,
and changed their emphasis gradually from agricultural to heavy and
technology-intensive industries.
However, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC re-interpreted the
functions of foreign science and technology and incorporated the re-
interpretations into their respective central value systems. The PRC stressed
socialist modernization, and offered justification on ideological grounds for
accessing Western science and technology. The ROC entrusted imported
science and technology with an ideological mission to recover mainland China
and to transform traditional Chinese culture.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion about the relations of science
and technology with the economy, culture and society so as to provide a
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context of understanding concerning the importation of science and technology
into the PRC and ROC.
5.2 RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WITH ECONOMY,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE WORLD SYSTEM 
This section argues that the importation of science and technology from
developed countries by developing countries is an international economic and
intercultural activity.
Before discussing the economic and socio-political nature of the
importation of science and technology from developed countries into
developing countries, it is necessary to define science and technology, and to
understand the relationship between them.
5.2.1 Science and Technology: Their Definitions and Relations 
The thesis accepts the view of a general distinction between science and
technology. Whilst science represents the pursuit of knowledge about the
nature, technology is the application of science to exercise control over
people's physical environment, including nature.'
However, the thesis rejects the linear relation between science and
technology: the precedence of science over technology, or science-based
technology! Science and technology are rather seen as inter-related and
interdependent human activities planned and conducted in given (economic,
socio-political and cultural) contexts which involve continuous generation and
utilization of knowledge about the physical world for human development'
The transfer of science and technology is defined as a process of acquisition
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of these innovative activities by secondary users.' Hardware (such as a
physical system for production) or software (such as knowledge for the
smooth running of this system) may be involved in the process of transfer.
The next two sections will discus the relations of science and technology with
their contexts — economic, and sociopolitical.
5.2.2 Transfer of Science and Technology as Economic Goods in the World
Economy
This section argues that science and technology are economic goods created
and purchased by countries for the purposes of accumulating capital in the
world economy. The importation of science and technology from developed
countries by developing countries is part of the international division of
labour. The states of receptor countries are actors in controlling the types of
science and technology transferred across their territorial boundaries, and the
utilization of science and technology for domestic economic purposes.
5.2.2.1 Science and Technology and Economic Growth
Science and technology have been seen as a key to the accumulation of capital
in both developed and developing countries. Ralph Landau and Nathan
Rosenberg argue that technology determines the economic growth and
therefore the future of a country.' In the 1960s, the United Nations suggested
that the utilization of science and technology in advanced countries can widen
their economic gap with poor countries; however, if used appropriately in less
developed countries (LDCs), science and technology can narrow the gap
between them and the better-off countries.' This also means that with the
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help of science and technology, developed countries can maintain their
economies; whereas developing countries can improve their economies. Jolla
Price has suggested an empirical relationship between the GNP of a country
and its investment on science and technology: the higher the investment in
science and technology, the larger the output of science and technology
research results, and the greater is the GNP of a country.' In 1988, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggested
that technological change can increase the growth of labour productivity, and
industrial output.' Therefore, science and technology become economic goods
which are created or purchased by countries for the pursuit of capital in the
world economy.
5.2.2.2 Sources of Import
The transfer of science and technology, this thesis argues, is governed by
international economic forces and dominated by core countries over semi-
peripheral and peripheral countries in the world system. The domination of
core countries is a result of the unequal distribution of material and human
resources. These countries control most of the world research and
development (R&D) expenditure, and world researchers in the field of science
and technology. In 1973, six developed countries (the US, USSR, Japan, West
Germany, France, and United Kingdom) possessed 72% of the world's
researchers, and spent 83% of all R&D funds. In contrast, developing
countries controlled less than 3% of the world's R&D funds and had about
12% of the world's scientists and engineers.' The disparity in distribution
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continued to exist in the 1980s," and is probably continuing in the 1990s.
Science and technology, as observed by some scholars," are transferred
within industrially advanced countries; from developed countries in the north
to newly industrialized countries in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, and
Argentina) and in Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan);
and from developed countries and these newly industrialized countries to
other developing countries.'
Developing countries can access foreign science and technology mainly
through commercial transactions with multinational corporations
predominantly based in industrially advanced countries and in newly
industrialized countries. The ways of importation include foreign direct
investment, multiple or exclusive licensing, joint venture with or without
licensing, and coproduction with foreign counterparts."
5.2.2.3 Types of Imported Science and Technology
This thesis argues that despite the domination of developed countries over the
transfer of science and technology, the states of developing countries, if they
wish, can determine the types of imported science and technology. In the
1960s, many developing countries adopted a capital-intensive approach in their
importation of foreign science and technology. The United Nations suggested
that the importation of modern Western science and technology into LDCs
could facilitate the process of modernization by saving time and effort spent
on generating science and technology which had been tested in advanced
countries." Complete sets of equipment and plants were transferred from
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Western countries to the Third World so that the buyers could immediately
embark on production.
Yet, the "whole plant" approach was challenged in the 1970s by the fact
that the economic conditions of Third World countries had not improved
because Third World countries lacked both capital to purchase new plants and
personnel with adequate knowledge and skills to maintain existing plants.
The large labour force in these countries was also under-utilized. Francisco R.
Sagasti argued from a Latin American perspective in 1979 that the capital-
intensive approach, instead of improving the technological level of Third
World countries, had caused them to become more technologically reliant on
supplying countries.'
Scholars and the United Nations in the 1970s and 1980s proposed
alternative strategies to the capital-intensive approach, and encouraged the
states of developing countries to make decisions over the importation of types
of foreign science and technology according to their domestic conditions. In
terms of objective, these strategies can be broadly classified as a "basic needs"
approach." This approach emphasized the fulfillment of the minimum
requirements of the local people "for private consumption, adequate food,
shelter, clothing, ... sanitation, public transport and health and educational
facilities."' The harmony between the progress of science and technology
and the order and manner of domestic priorities of is emphasized in the
basic needs approach.
Ernst F. Schumacher proposed that "intermediate technology" should be
encouraged in LDCs as it represents industrial processes requiring capital
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investment affordable by LDCs. The raw materials for production are
supplied mainly from the LDCs, and the industrial output is also essentially
for local use in LDCs." Similarly, Marja-Liisa Swantz suggested the use of
appropriate technologies, utilizing mainly labour-intensive and low capital
investment programmes." Sosthenes Buatsi demonstrates that proper
planing in the choice of imported science and technology was a factor leading
to the success of some cities in Asia." Other studies also show that national
policies formulated by the state were another successful factor in some Asian
countries?' In other words, the states of developing countries can be an actor
in making decision over the types and sources of imported science and
technology for the improvement of their national economies.
However, the importation of foreign science and technology by
developing countries was not merely an economic transaction or simply
technical in nature, but also involved socio-political and cultural dimensions.
This will be discussed in the next section.
5.2.3 Transfer of Science and Technology as Cultural Goods in the 
Interstate System 
This section describes the evaluation system of science and technology adopted
by the scientific community, the relations of science and technology with
external values, and the interactions of foreign and domestic socio-political and
cultural forces when science and technology are imported by developing
countries from developed countries.
This section argues that the importation of science and technology as
cultural goods from developed countries to developing countries is an
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intercultural activity. Science and technology as academic disciplines have
their internal evaluation system. Science and technology expressed in the form
of knowledge and skills are not free from socio-political or cultural values. In
other words, science and technology are associated with the socio-economic
and cultural relations and values of society in which activities of science and
technology are conducted. Therefore, the importation of science and
technology from developed countries into developing countries means the
incorporation of the internal value system of science and technology and their
associated relations and values in developed countries into developing
countries.
However, these imported relations and values can be modified
according to domestic cultural and socio-political preferences by the states of
receptor countries.
The section will first discuss the internal evaluation system of science
and technology.
5.2.3.1 Internal Value System of Science and Technology
Science and technology as academic disciplines, it is argued in this thesis, have
their own value system(s) to justify the validity of existing scientific
knowledge, to incorporate new theories to replace the old ones, and to reject
ill-found theories.
Scientists and technologists need certain criteria from within or outside
the scientific community to evaluate the validity of the results of observation
or descriptive accounts of discovery about the natural world. Karl Popper and
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Thomas S. Kuhn, despite different approaches, advocated that science and
technology have their own criteria to evaluate existing and potential scientific
knowledge. Popper regarded all science as tentative, and argued that theories
are classified into two groups: those which have been conjectured and falsified;
and those which are conjectural and await possible falsification. Kuhn
suggested that science has five principles to evaluate the adequacy of a theory:
demonstrability; internal and external consistency; generalization; simplicity
and coherence; and fruitfulness.'
In other words, science and technology as academic disciplines per se
are not value free, and are ultimately interpreted and determined by a person
or a group of people in accordance with certain set(s) of criteria. Therefore,
the importation of science and technology as academic disciplines by
developing countries implies the incorporation of the internal evaluation
system of science and technology adopted by the scientific community in the
world. Moreover, the introduction of foreign science and technology, as
examined in the next section, in developing countries may incorporate foreign
patterns of relations and values together with imported science and
technology.
5.2.3.2 Science and Technology and Their Links with External Value
Systems
This thesis further argues that science and technology are not neutral, but are
linked with external value systems. Science and technology shape and are
shaped by society and culture.
In contrast to those who attempted to separate science and technology
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from the domain of values, this thesis argues that science and technology
are value-laden, and replete with personal interests and incorporate social
values.'
In other words, the importation of foreign science and technology by
developing countries also means the incorporation of the perceptions and
interpretations of the natural world by scientists and technologists in supplier
countries.
At the social level, the evolution of new science and technology, it is
further argued in this thesis, creates alternative patterns of socio-economic
relations and values to ones already existing in society. The development of
science and technology is influenced by political and cultural preferences and
constraints in a given society.26
Science and technology, it has been argued by many scholars, introduce
new patterns of socio-economic relations and values in society. Jacques Ellul
and George McRobie argue that technological factors are the decisive factor in
generating socio-economic progress or changes? Mitra Das and Shirley
Kolack also argue that new technology has its "own ethos" and demands new
forms of work relations and orientation to the means of production. New
technology also results in "discontinuity" in the identity, values, and social
roles of a society.' The introduction of science and technology improves
material and technical conditions. However, material improvement initiates
a corresponding change in people's attitudes, thoughts, values, beliefs, and
behaviours?
In particular, the science and technology revolution brought forth
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specialization as a new pattern of working relations amongst people.
Specialization is a kind of division of labour, and give rise to many
professional associations and codes of practice in society. However,
specialization brought by the science and technology revolution, as argued by
Stanley A. Hetzler, disengages individuals from the work area, deprives
people of their satisfaction of whole authorship during the production process,
dehumanizes all classes of people under the steady pressure of competition,
and encourages the promotion of the concept of using science and technology
to remedy social maladies.' Moreover, the science and technology revolution
brought about further division of labour; and therefore more technological, but
less social interdependence."
On the other hand, science and technology are shaped by socio-political
and cultural forces in a given society. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcrnan
argue that production technology, domestic technology and military
technology represent their direct or indirect shaping by a social relation or a
set of social relations. Direct social shaping of technology generally occurs
when the creation or maintenance of a desired social relation enters into the
choice of technologies; whereas indirect social shaping takes place when
economic calculations and implications are considered.34 ' The allocation
of funding for science and technology also indicates the economic interests of
the commercial and industrial sectors, the political concern of government, and
the social preferences of the public.
Therefore, science and technology influence existing socio-economic and
cultural relations and values which in turn determine the priorities and
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development of science and technology. These relations are specific to the
society in which science and technology are conducted. If science and
technology are transferred from developed to developing countries, these
relations may also be reproduced in developing countries.
However, these relations in developing countries, as discussed in the
next section, may not be a simple replication of those in developed countries.
5.2.3.3 Science and Technology Transfer as Intercultural Activities
This thesis notes that the importation of science and technology by developing
countries involves domestic political considerations (in addition to economic
ones) when this kind of transfer is dominated by developed countries. Some
scholars argue that the international transfer of science and technology would
enhance global economic integration, and would be mutually profitable to
transferrers and transferees?' However, as noted by Sagasti, it is not true for
many Third World countries which were further exploited by developed
countries because of the latter's technological domination.'' 3' M. R.
Bhagavan argues that science and technology are the "third great force" (after
political and economic forces) of Western countries to enable them to penetrate
other countries of the world.'
The domination of Western countries over developing countries has
been seen along two dimensions: the economic, and military. Economically,
for developing countries to gain access to and the use of Western science and
technology, they need to pay, on a continuing basis, fees or loyalty to, or even
share their economic profits with Western countries. Militarily, the diffusion
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of high technologies to developing countries is restricted by developed
countries so as to create disproportionate disparity in military capacities
between these two types of countries. Therefore, economic control,
technological diffusion and leadership become important topics of political
concern to the governments, particularly of developing countries, in the
formulation of science and technology policy. Ward Morehouse proposed
that in order to minimize the control by developed countries, the states of
developing countries should develop their capacity for directing technological
change towards meeting domestic economic and social problems.'
Moreover, the transplantation of foreign science and technology to
developing countries involves cultural dimensions: it may introduce new
socio-economic and cultural patterns of relations and values to developing
countries as the scientific and technological revolution did in developed
countries. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman observed that the same
technology can have dissimilar effects in different societies.' David Jeremy
believes that domestic cultural forces can shape the form of the imported
technology; and, together with domestic economic forces, even modify or
transform it'
The importation of science and technology also created problems for
working relations in developing countries. Michael Campbell notes that social
tensions existed in emerging bureaucracies in the developing countries of
Southeast Asia and South Pacific.42
 These tensions were between "generalist
managers" and technocrats. According to Campbell, "generalist managers"
were those personnel of middle and senior management levels who operated
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within political and environmental constraints, and were sensitive to domestic
cultural values. In contrast, technocrats were those who were trained in
industrialized countries. These technocrats insisted on professional values and
were not sensitive to "political and environment parameters." The tensions,
according to Campbell, indude discrepancies in viewpoints and sets of values,
and miscommunication between "generalist managers" and technocrats.
To sum up, the importation of science and technology from developed
countries by developing countries may involve their mutual, though not
necessarily equal, pursuit of capital; the incorporation of the internal
evaluation system(s) of science and technology; and the introduction of foreign
socio-economic and cultural relations and values associated with imported
science and technology. Moreover, science and technology transfer is
complicated by domestic socio-political and cultural forces.
In the rest of this chapter, the thesis will illustrate the complicated
nature of the relationship between imported science and technology and the
domestic economy, culture and society in both the PRC and ROC. This thesis
discusses separately the relations of science and technology with the economy,
and with society and culture. It should be noted that despite discussions in
two separate sections, the importation of science and technology into the PRC
and ROC involved an interplay of economic, socio-political and cultural forces.
5.3 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ECONOMY IN THE PRC
AND ROC 
This section describes the relations of science and technology with the
economy in the PRC and ROC, and their respective strategies for using science
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and technology for economic purposes.
This section argues that the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, like San
Ylxian, identified science and technology as economic forces with potential to
reduce economic gaps (expressed in terms of GNP) with Western countries,
but adopted different strategies in the utilization of science and technology
and in the importation of foreign science and technology. Both the PRC and
ROC lacked sufficient manpower and the necessary infrastructure of science
and technology for economic modernization. To improve the infrastructure,
these two Chinese countries established a special state agency and formulated
national plans to direct the domestic development of science and technology,
and the importation of foreign science and technology. However, the PRC and
ROC differed from each other in emphases on the development of science and
technology.
Moreover, the PRC and ROC differed from each other in their strategies
for importing foreign science and technology. In terms of supplying countries,
the PRC first turned to the former USSR, and then mainly to Western
countries; whereas the ROC relied on Western countries throughout. In terms
of the types of imported science and technology, the PRC started with capital-
intensive heavy industry, and then fluctuated between appropriate technology
and technology-intensive industries; whereas the ROC emphasized
"appropriate technology" in the 1950s and 1960s, and gradually moved
towards capital- and technology-intensive industry in the 1980s.
The development of the argument of this section begins with the
description of the strategy used by Sfin Ybdan to improve the economy of
early Republican China.
5.3.1 The Path of San Yixan 
In the early 1910s, i.e. much earlier than the United Nations, San Ybdan
addressed the problems of basic needs in mainland China and advocated the
use of science and technology to reduce the economic disparities between
China and Western countries. Siin spelt out that the basic goal of economic
modernization of China was to meet the Chinese people's basic needs: food,
clothing, shelter, and transportation.'
San identified science and technology as means to improve the
productivity of the national economy. In the agricultural sector, he proposed
seven ways for the adaptation of science and technology techniques to increase
agricultural production." In the industrial sector, he suggested employing
advanced science and technology to establish the basic industrial infrastructure
of China; to exploit natural resources including mineral ores; and to develop
selected industries. These industries were supposed to increase the supply of
food, to improve the quality of clothing and home facilities, and to raise the
standards of transport and printing.' Siin also believed that science and
technology could improve the military arsenal of China for purposes of self-
defence.' Despite his realization that Chinese science lagged behind the
standards of Western European countries by two hundred years, Sun was too
optimistic in thinking that China could catch up with Western countries in
"several years" through learning from them.' SUn's dream could not be
realized within the life-time of Sian, and needed to be carried further by his
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successors, Mao Zedang and Jiang Jieshf, respectively in mainland China and
Taiwan.
5.3.2 Goals and Indicators of Economic Modernization of the PRC and 
ROC
The ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, it is argued in this section, set economic
improvement as a national goal for their respective Chinese peoples. In
particular, leaders of both Chinese countries used the reduction of the
difference in their GNPs with developed countries as an indicator for reaching
the economic level of developed countries.
The ruling elite of the PRC has made many claims about the reduction
of the economic gap with developed, particularly Western, countries in the
past forty-four years. According to the estimation of a Chinese engineer, Gue•
KE, the agricultural and industrial levels of the PRC in the early 1950s were,
respectively, equivalent to the corresponding levels of Europe in the 19th
century, and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With such a weak
infrastructure, Mao Z.6dOng stated in 1957 the goal of overtaldng the US
economically in 50 or 60 years.' In 1958, the Politburo even issued a call to
supersede Britain in steel production in fifteen years.' The ruling elite also
decided to construct a "comprehensive industry system" with particular
emphasis on heavy industry, and expected that many important branches of
science and technology would approach the "advanced levels" of the world by
1970.51
The plan of catching-up with Western countries in the PRC became less
vigorous after the middle of the 1970s. In 1975, ThOu Enlai postponed the
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target deadline of the establishment of an industrial system to 1980. The
catching-up process was also modified into two stages: to build an
independent and relatively comprehensive economic system by 1980; and to
accomplish the "Four Modernizations" (modernization of agriculture, industry,
national defence, and science and technology) by the year 2000? The goals
of modernization were further adjusted by Deng )(Moping in 1980: the per
capita GNP of the PRC would be US$ 1,000 by 2000, 5' and from 1985 it was
expected that the PRC would take 30-50 years to reach the economic level of
developed countries." The Politburo proposed to quadruple the GNP of 1980
by 2000, but revised, in 1993, the target date to 1997, i.e. 3 years earlier?
However, in 1990 Lin Zixin questioned, in terms of the availability and quality
of productive resources, the feasibility of the PRC catching up in such a short
period. He speculated that the PRC indeed lagged by more than one century
behind the US, instead of the official speculation of 10 to 30 years." Despite
Lin's criticism, the deputy director of the state Planning Commission, Can
Ziyu, in March 1993, expected that the annual economic growth of the 1990s
would be higher than 11.5% — the average annual growth rate in the 1980s.'
The ruling elite of the ROC, like that of the PRC, held the idea of
catching up with the economic level of Western developed countries. Jiang
Jieshi argued that the success of economic modernization in the ROC
depended on whether it could be modelled upon Britain's spirit of
organization and utilization of scientific methods? In order to rid his people
of a sense of technological inferiority, JiAng urged them to learn from Western
countries and try to supersede them in science and technology? In 1976,
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Premier Jiang jinggue• exhorted his colleagues to utilize the natural resources
of the ROC and expand its trade so that the ROC could "catch up with other
countries economically" and attain the status of a "developed state."' In the
same Legislative Yuan, Premier Sun Yun-suan predicated in 1980 that the ROC
would enter the stage of advanced development and its industry would
ultimately attain international standards in ten years' time." In 1988,
President Li Dênghul predicated that by 2000, the GNP of the ROC would be
US$ 300 billion, and a per capita GNP of US$ 13,400. 62 In October 1992, LI
attempted to convince his people that the ROC has "entered the ranks of the
developed nations." Li used two important projected figures: the ROC would
have a GNP of US$ 200 billion and a per capita GNP of more than US$ 10,000
by the end of 1992.'
Therefore, in the last forty-four years, the ruling elites of both the PRC
and ROC recognized the urgent need to dose the economic gap with Western
countries and to reach their targeted GNPs. These ruling elites of both
Chinese countries identified science and technology as the economic means to
increase productivity in the economic sector, thereby reducing the economic
gap with Western countries. This will be examined in the next section.
5.3.3 Science and Technology as a Means to Improve the Economy in the
PRC and ROC
This section describes the social location of the use of science and technology
in the PRC and ROC. This section argues that both Chinese countries
identified science and technology as a means to increase the productivity of
287
their national economies, and re-interpreted the role of science and technology
over a specified time period.
In the early days of the PRC, Chinese communist leaders recognized the
importance of science and technology to the process of modernizing China.
Since the promulgation of the "Common Programme" in 1949, the apparent
authority of science has been widely upheld as one of the virtues identified in
the constitution, and natural sciences were seen as servants of the construction
of industry, agriculture and national defence."
In 1956, Zhau tnlai, recognizing the tremendous progress of science and
technology in other parts of the world, indicated that the state should view
science and technology as decisive factors in modernizing national defence,
economy and culture." The emergence of the Sino-Soviet split in the late
1950s compelled Mao Zkdông to become independent of the USSR in science
and technology. During the Great Leap Forward Movement in the late 1950s,
the CCP issued a call to "march toward the sciences" and promoted a slogan
of a "big leap forward in science" for the purposes of improving the national
economy."
From 1978, the ruling elite of the PRC reinterpreted science and
technology as important productive forces in socialist modernization.
According to the Minister of the State Scientific and Technological
Commission, Fang YI, the modernization of science and technology referred
to a comprehensive and fundamental technical transformation of all fields of
material production.' In 1981, Premier Zhao Zlyang further suggested that
science and technology were "powerful" productive forces of and great
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"stimuli" to economic development. Zhao believed that science and technology
can serve people in "all aspects of human life."8 In 1985, the Chinese
communist leaders viewed science and technology personnel as "pioneers" in
developing new productive forces, rather than targets for class struggle.'
Science and technology were also perceived as "the profound source of the
vitality" for the rejuvenation of China's economy, and as the base for
production, construction, circulation and all other economic undertakings."
In 1988, Deng Xiaoping supplemented Marx's idea by ranking science and
technology as the "first" production forces in socialist modernization.'
In the early 1990s, the modernization of Chinese science and technology
was emphasized as one of two priorities of economic construction.' The
Ten-Year Plan (1991-2000) and the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) spelt out
the dialectic relationship between science and technology and the economy:
science and technology must be geared to economic construction; and
economic construction must orient towards science and technology.' In 1993,
science and technology were still perceived by Premier Li Peng as the first
productive forces, and as an important key to both material and "spiritual"
construction.'
However, the Chinese communist elite used the pre-1949 Republican
slogan, "science and technology to rescue the nation," and extended it to the
local level in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Towards the end of 1991, 20
provinces of the PRC had reportedly adopted the scheme of employing
"science and technology to make a province prosperous," and more than 200
cities had exploited "science and technology to make a city prosperous.'
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Like the CCP in the PRC, the CNP of the ROC socially reconstructed the
role of science and technology in the economic modernization of Taiwan.
Since 1949, the CNP has raised the importance of science and technology to the
constitutional level. The promotion of scientific knowledge amongst citizens
was established as one of the tasks of education and culture in the ROC
constitution.' The ruling elite of the ROC frequently stressed the
construction of a modern society which was marked by growth with equity.
To achieve this goal, they identified two measures: reasonable distribution of
land and the restriction of excessive accumulation of capital. However, the
success of these two methods depended on the exploitation of the scientific
spirit and methods."
However, the development of science and technology in the ROC before
the middle of the 1960s, as perceived by the ruling elite, was not well oriented
towards economic construction. In 1956, Jiang Jieshf reproached his people.
He argued that if they did not embrace a scientific spirit of research and
development, the whole nation would lag behind in science and technology,
and also be ousted gradually from the scientific world which was highly
competitive.'
In the 1970s, the improvement of science and technology in the ROC
was frequently mentioned together with national development. In 1975, Jiang
Jinggu6, despite his recognition of the "essence of science" as "the pursuit of
perfection and realism," suggested that the development of science should be
geared towards national construction and popular benefits, particularly to
national defence, communications, industry, agriculture, medicine and
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education."
In the 1980s, the economic functions of science and technology were
more emphasized by the ruling elite of the ROC. The objectives of national
science development were to include improving "national strength," the
accumulation of greater wealth for the nation, and the elevation of the living
standards of all citizens in the ROC.' In the middle of the 1980s, the
establishment of a self-reliant defence system was stressed as another
important objective of science development. In 1988, President Li Dènghui
admitted that the government had deliberately used science and technology
to upgrade the ROC into the ranks of developed countries.'
Therefore, in the last forty-four years, the ruling elites of the PRC and
ROC regarded economic modernization as an important national goal in
economic construction, and identified science and technology as a means to
achieve it. However, as will be discussed in the next three sections, the PRC
and ROC had a weak science and technology infrastructure inherited from
their predecessor, and both countries needed to import foreign science and
technology in order to develop their own.
5.3.4 Domestic Levels of Science and Technology in the PRC and ROC
In their founding periods, the PRC and ROC both inherited a weak
infrastructure of science and technology from their predecessors. The common
predecessor of the PRC and ROC, Imperial China, did not advocate practical
education (as discussed in Chapter Two). Moreover, a series of wars (e.g. the
Japanese invasion in the 1930s and civil wars in the 1940s) in mainland China
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further damaged the weak infrastructure before the founding of the PRC. It
was estimated that in 1949 the PRC had about 50,000 people (including clerical
workers) engaged in work related to science and technology, but not more
than 500 researchers. There were only about 30 research institutes.'
Taiwan, though having no legacy of civil war, also had a weak science
and technology infrastructure. This was because Japan, as the overlord of
Taiwan, had adopted the policy of "industrializing Japan and agriculturizing
Taiwan" during the colonial period (1895-1945). Although colonial education
in Taiwan advocated science and technology education, about 80% of college
students were Japanese (see Appendix 5•1)•" In 1944 (the year before Taiwan
was returned to China), there were 2,174 students enrolled in Taihoko Imperial
University and four special colleges in Taiwan. Of this total, 1,703 students
took science and technology as their majors, but only 328 (19.3%) students
were Taiwanese. Of these Taiwanese students, 202 took medicine as their
majors, and 109 received technical education. Therefore, the PRC and ROC
were weak in the infrastructure of science and technology in the founding
period.
In the past four decades, the infrastructure of science and technology
in the PRC and ROC, despite gradual improvement, was still below the
standards of developed countries. The percentage of GNP allocated for science
and technology research and development in the PRC was 0.1 in 1952, 0.5 in
1978, 1.2 in 1985, and 0.78 in 1992; 88 and in the ROC, 0.95 in 1984,86 and 1.70
in 19915 Moreover, the number of science and technology personnel per ten
thousand population in the PRC was 2.9 in 1986 and 3.1 in 1988; 88 and in the
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ROC 12.8 in 1985,9 and 22.5 in 1991." In 1992, the Beijing authonties
estimated that there were 500,000 scientists and engineers in the PRC. 91
 In
July 1993, the PRC admitted that the investment in science and technology was
even lower than some developing countries.' In the early 1990s, the Taipei
authorities expected to increase the investment in science and technology to
more than 2% of GNP by 1995. 93 In developed countries, the percentage of
GNP and number of personnel per ten thousand population employed in
science and technology research and development were higher; they were
respectively 2.6 (1984) and 65 (1988) in the US; 2.5 (1985) and 30 (1988) in (the
former) West Germany; and 2.6 (1984) and 65 (1988) in Japan."
Therefore, the PRC and ROC were faced with a dilemma: an urgent
need for science and technology to improve productivity in the economic
sector and insufficient domestic manpower trained in science and technology.
The next section will centre on how these two countries solved this problem
between 1949 and 1993.
5.3.5 Strategies for the Development of Science and Technology in the 
Economic Sectors of the PRC and ROC 
This thesis argues that the states of PRC and ROC exercised their control over
the development of science and technology for economic modernization
through a specialized state agency and through national plans. Both Chinese
countries also imported foreign science and technology. However, the PRC
and ROC differed from each other in their emphases on the development of
science and technology, and strategies for the importation of foreign science
and technology.
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5.3.5.1 Establishment of a Special State Agency for Science and Technology
Both the PRC and ROC created a special state agency to formulate and
regulate policy for science and technology.
In the PRC, the state controlled the domestic development of science
and technology through the Science and Technology Commission (STC). It
was inaugurated in 1958 by merging the former Science Planning Committee
and the State Technological Committee. The STC was directly responsible to
the State Council and accountable for the formulation of science policy, the
recommendation of fund allocation to the State Council, and the administration
and coordination of science and technology activities of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences and research institutes under different ministries including the
educational sector."
As in the PRC, the state of the ROC exercised its control over the
development of science and technology through the National Science Council
(NSC). This was established to replace the former National Council for Long-
Range Science Development in 1967. The NSC was accountable to the
Executive Yuan for the following tasks: the formulation and promotion of
policy about the development of science and technology; the promotion of
science education; the recruitment and training of science and technology
manpower; and the alignment of research work with the national economy."
The Committee for Guidance of Science Development under the National
Security Council advised the President on the policies of science and
technology. From 1979, an Advisory Team of Science and Technology
comprising foreign experts was also established to help the Premier to assess
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the policies of science and technology.'
These state agencies represented the highest authorities over the affairs
of science and technology in the PRC and ROC. They also helped the
respective states formulate national plans for science and technology.
5.3.5.2 Formulation of National Plans for Science and Technology
These plans of the FRC and ROC, it is argued in this thesis, indicated their
differences in emphases on the intended development of science and
technology in both countries: the PRC consistently emphasized heavy and high
technology; whereas the ROC attempted to move gradually from agriculture
to heavy and high technology.
Since 1956, the PRC authorities have proposed six specific science and
technology plans? However, the First Five-Year Plan (1952-1957) and other
national economic plans also described the policies of science and technology
development in the periods concerned.
From these plans, this thesis notes that the intended development of
science and technology in the PRC has been oriented towards capital-intensive
industry since 1949 (see Appendix 5.2). First, some fields of science and
technology (like electronics and computers, automation, laser technology and
genetic engineering) which were growing in developed countries were
included in most of the plans. Second, the plans were dominated by the needs
of heavy industry. Although top priority was given to highly sophisticated
industries such as atomic energy in the first economic and science and
technology plans," heavy industries including petroleum and mineral,
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metallurgy, and heavy machinery were also emphasized. Agriculture and
basic research were of the least importance. Light industry was totally
neglected in the plans. The Second Five-Year Plan admitted that the
orientation of the first national plans towards heavy industry was dominated
by the USSR model and the desire to catch up with world standards.'
Agriculture became first in the agenda only from the Eight-Year Plan
(1978-1985) onwards. However, the plans were still dominated by heavy
industries. Basic research, like high energy physics, disappeared from the
science and technology plans, but light industry became an important item
from the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985). Military technology reappeared in
the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) after its disappearance in the Eight-Year
Plan (1978-1985). The Eighth Five-Year Plan was revised in 1993 and priority
was given to 4 core industries: transportation and energy-related machinery,
electronics and telecommunications, automobiles, and construction.' All
these suggested that the PRC authorities took heavy industry and high
technology as foci of the development of science and technology for economic
modernization. Agricultural and light industries were not emphasized in these
national plans.
The bias towards heavy industry in the PRC was also reflected in the
state investment in the economic sector. The ratio of investment on the
infrastructure of heavy industry, light industry and agriculture was 36.1 : 6.4
: 7.1 in 1952-1957; 51.1 : 4.4: 10.7 between 1966 and 1970; 1
 and 60.7: 163
: 5.6 between 1981 and 1985.1'
In contrast to the PRC, the ROC, despite its development of science and
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technology determined by economic trends, did not start with heavy-industry
and had no detailed national plans for science and technology in the 1950s.
Instead, the ROC government, as H. J. Duller noted, developed its economy
with the strategy of "appropriate technology."°4 No plan concerning science
and technology development was drafted by the ROC government in Taiwan
until 1959. The first plan of science and technology, "A Guideline for the
Long-Range Development of Science," was promulgated in 1959. The
"Guideline" concerned the recruitment of scientists, but gave no specific
direction or emphasis for science and technology development.' But this
did not mean that the ROC had no direction for the development of science
and technology in the economic sector. In the 1950s, the ROC economy was
marked by the coexistence of agriculture and light industry. In 1956, Jiang
Jieshi proposed a modernization programme with emphases on four
dimensions: psychological, political, economic, and social.' The ruling elite
of the ROC, adopting the San's idea, promoted a slogan: "to foster industry
with agriculture, and to develop agriculture with industry" in the 1950s.
The need for a national science and technology plan arose in the late
1960s when the ROC began industrializing. In 1967, the President of the
National Science Council, WU DayOu, criticized the former Council of Long-
Range Science Development for its emphasis on pure science, and pointed out
that the development of science must be geared to overall planning for
national construction including the development of national defence.'° 7 Since
1969, six major national science and technology plans have been devised,
marking a shift from meeting the basic needs of the people to a technology-
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intensive economy!' These initial science and technology programmes,
according to the Taipei authorities, had two aims. First, the development of
natural and applied sciences should be geared to the modernization of Taiwan,
induding the creation of a pharmaceutical industry and the promotion of
electronics and sophisticated machinery industries. Second, the national
research capability should be raised through the strengthening of the training
and recruitment of scientific workers, active promotion of international science
cooperation, the improvement of the collection and exchange of science and
technology data, and the development and application of precision
instruments!'
From the late 1970s, the ROC attempted to orient its economy towards
high technology. In 1976, Premier Jiang jingguds indicated that the direction
of science development was being monitored by the state with a stress on
research in electronic science, material science, farm machinery, food science,
and environmental sdence.110
 He expected that these emphases would help
the ROC move smoothly from light industry into heavy and sophisticated
industry — capital- and technology-intensive industry. In 1977, Shien-siu Shu,
Chairman of the National Science Council, also pressed for the establishment
of more technology-oriented industries which were to be marked by four
characteristics: high technological mobility and competitive power;
environmental sensitivity; marketing know-how; and innovation to meet
market demand."'
In the early 1990s, eight types of technologies were singled out as core
industries in the Six-Year Plan of National Construction (1991-1996). These
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technologies are electro-optics, information, automation, materials, high-
technology sensing and detection, biotechnology, resource exploitation, and
energy.112
 Among them, technologies of information, automation and
materials had already received greater financial and manpower support from
the government between 1986 and 1990.' This indicated that the ROC as
a newly industrialized country attempted to sustain its economic growth with
the development of a high-level of science and technology.
Although the PRC and ROC had special state agencies and national
plans to develop science and technology for economic modernization, these
two Chinese counties adopted different strategies for changing the orientation
of their economy from agriculture to capital- or high-technology intensiveness
in the last forty-four years. It will be suggested in the next section that both
Chinese countries also used different strategies to import foreign science and
technology to help them make this economic change.
5.3.5.3 Importation for Foreign Science and Technology
This section identifies the countries from which the PRC and ROC imported
foreign science and technology, and describes the importation strategies used
by these two Chinese countries.
This thesis argues that the science and technology relations with other
countries in PRC and ROC followed their international political and economic
relations (which have been discussed in Chapter Three); and that the types of
imported science and technology were those emphasized in the respective
national plans of science and technology. In other words, the PRC changed
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its supplier country from the USSR to Western countries in the 1970s, and
consistently imported capital-intensive science and technology in the last forty-
four years. The ROC consistently introduced science and technology from
Western countries, but gradually changed the types of imported science and
technology from agricultural to high technology.
The PRC and ROC had different sources of science and technology
before the 1970s, but relied on the same group of supplier countries from the
1970s.
In the PRC, the importation of foreign science and technology can be
divided into two major phases: before and after the end of the Cultural
Revolution in 1976. The PRC imported science and technology from the USSR
before 1960, and from Western countries via (the former) West Germany
between 1960 and the middle of the 1970s. After 1978, the PRC directly
imported Western science and technology. In 1990, the top five Western
supplier countries for the PRC were the US, West Germany, Canada, Japan,
Italy and the United Kingdom. In 1991, the former USSR suddenly became the
largest supplier to the PRC.I" However, in 1992, the top five suppliers to
the PRC were Western countries and Japan. 115
In the last four decades, the ROC had two major suppliers of science
and technology, the US and Japan. The US and Japan were the two largest
trade partners of the ROC between 1952 and 1991.' Up to 1985, the ROC
made 64.5% of its technology-related agreements with Japan, and 22% with the
US.117
 In 1986, a ROC Minister, Li Kwoh-Ting, proposed to bridge the trade
deficit between the ROC and the US by buying more technology from the
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US.118 In contrast, the ROC's annual trade deficit with Japan was expected
to grow by 25% to US$ 16 billion in 1993. This huge gap was attributed to the
ROC's heavy reliance on Japanese technology and components."'
However, the PRC and ROC differed in their types of imported science
and technology over specific periods.
Owing to the weak domestic industrial infrastructure, alienation from
the West, and the adoption of the Soviet planning model based upon the
priority of heavy industry, the PRC imported heavy industrial plants, know-
how, blueprints, and experts from the former USSR before 1960. Between 1960
and 1976, the PRC imported indirectly Western science and technology to
sustain the heavy-industry oriented economy. Between 1979 and 1981, the
types of foreign science and technology covered five major areas: advanced
equipment or component parts; new and fine quality materials; new principles,
data and directions of science and technology; new technological processes and
scientific operational procedures; and managerial methods in the
implementation of science and technology policies.'" The Minister of the
Technological Import and Export Department, Wu Fengzhou, reported in 1985
that imported technologies were to include metallurgy, machinery, electronics,
petrochemistry, textile and building materials.' In 1990, electronic
technology for machines shared 47.33% in value of the imported technologies;
whereas light industry only shared 11.85%. Communication technology
(1.26%) was another significant item in the list of imports. 122
 In 1992, the
types of imported science and technology did not change significantly as
compared with those in the 1980s." Technologies for capital-intensive
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industry were a frequent item in the PRC's list of imported goods.
In contrast, the types of science and technology imported by the ROC
gradually shifted from agricultural, to light, and to heavy and knowledge-
intensive industries. In the 1950s, foreign science and technology were
imported mainly for the promotion of agriculture and light industry, and
included equipment for the mechanization of agriculture, food processing,
textiles, and light industry. These policies were oriented towards import-
substitution. In the 1960s, economic development was characterized by the
needs of technologies for electronics, export-led light industry, and the
processing of plastics, plywood and artificial boards. In the 1970s, the
emphases on importing science and technology switched to labour-intensive
heavy industry. In this period, the government's projects included the
establishment of a steel mill, petrochemical installations, a nuclear power plant,
and a shipyard.'"
In the 1980s, the ROC industry was marked by capital- and technology-
intensive industry. This was caused by three major factors: high domestic
demand; rising service sector; and the challenge of international market
competition. Besides, the labour wage in the ROC was higher than in other
Asian countries, like the PRC and Thailand. In response to these domestic and
international pressures, the ROC focused on 8 strategic areas of technologies:
information, energy, materials, automation, electro-optics, genetic engineering,
hepatitis control, and food.' In the early 1990s, the Taipei authorities
highlighted 8 similar areas of technology (mentioned earlier in this
chapter).'"
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In order to attract foreign capital and import Western science and
technology, the PRC and ROC set up special economic zones. In 1966, the
ROC established the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone (EPZ) to attract
foreign investment of capital and technology by the provision of low-wage
labour and low-cost land and power.' The Kaohsiung EPZ also offered
employment opportunity for 25,000 people." Two other EPZs were
developed at Nantze and Taichung in 1969. These three EPZs provided jobs
for 77,000 people in 1986. Though there was no restriction on the types of
manufacture in EPZs, products had to be mainly for export.'
In the late 1980s, the slow urban growth' and the rising cost of
labour forced the economy to develop technology, particularly high
technology, and service industries. Modelling upon the EPZ and aiming to
become an American Silicon Valley in the ROC, Hsinchu Science-Based
Industrial Park was set apart exclusively for the introduction of foreign high
technology in the ROC in December 1980. By March 1986, high technology
had been transferred from the Western world through 60 companies for
production: 6 were local, 19 US, 35 overseas Chinese. There were 8,530 people
employed by these companies. Amongst them, 5% have advanced degrees,
and 37% have bachelor degrees or the equivalent. The total export value of
the high-technology products was US$ 450 million in 1986."
In 1980, the PRC, like the ROC, began to establish special economic
zones (SEZs) as a "window" to import foreign science and technology,
management and administration, and knowledge. Up to 1993, there were five
SEZs (in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan) which
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implemented state plans but with authority devolved to provincial
governments. These SEZs emphasized the incorporation of foreign industrial
technology. Between 1980 and 1985, these SZ:Es imported 1,665 different items
of technology, and utilized foreign capital of US$ 1.17 billion.' In 1984, the
PRC guided by the experience of SF79 began to establish Economic and
Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) along the coast line. These ETDZs,
differing from SEZs, were administered directly by city governments and were
used to import high technology.' For example, these technologies in one
ETDZ included the integration of mechanics and electronics, electronic
information, new materials, genetic engineering, and computer software.'
Up to July 1993, there were 30 ETDZs. Many multinational corporations
with home base in the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan and Taiwan
established their firms in these SEZs and El iiZs of the PRC.
The policy of importing foreign science and technology into the PRC
and ROC also had different results in enhancing the domestic capabilities of
science and technology. Up to 1990, the PRC has spent about US$ 30 billion
on importing complete sets of equipment and whole plants!' The imported
science and technology, as noted by many domestic and foreign scholars, did
not produce the anticipated results. The reasons induded lack of planning and
coordination; massive duplication in importing technologies; a low absorption
rate; shortage of trained workers to operate the imported production and
assembly lines; underuse and misuse of foreign equipment and low
supporting service from foreign corporations!' The State Science and
Technology Commission even admitted that in some cities, 80% of research
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work were not related to technological knowhow. Between 1986 and 1990, less
than 10% of 2,000 state projects had developed capacities to absorb imported
science and technology.'
In contrast, the ROC, as observed by Denis F. Simon, had developed a
high absorption capacity, despite some difficulties like the importation of
obsolete technologies and miscommunication between local and foreign
corporations. From the early 1970s, the ROC used imported technology for
production and innovation, and re-exported the products to other countries.
Up to 1985, the ROC reinvested more than US$ 117 million in the US.'39
To sum up, the urgency, in the modernization policies of the PRC and
ROC, was based on the need to reduce the economic gap with Western
countries. Both Chinese governments followed the path of Stm Ylxian, and
identified science and technology as a means to improve the national economy.
Nevertheless, they lacked qualified manpower in science and technology.
Therefore, they centralized the development of science and technology through
the establishment of state commissions and the formulation of national plans.
Both Chinese countries also imported and accommodated foreign science and
technology from countries which had international political and economic
relations with the PRC or ROC. In other words, both Chinese countries have
accepted the economic functions and values of Western science and technology
in improving their economies.
However, the transfer of science and technology from foreign countries
to the PRC or ROC was an inter-cultural activity. Science and technology have
their own value systems, and represent the socio-economic and cultural
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relations and values in the society in which scientific and technological
activities are conducted. Both the PRC and ROC have strong cultural
traditions and their own central value systems. These systems, as discussed
in Chapter Three, represented the respective Chinese ruling elites' perceptions
about socio-political, and economic relations and values. The ruling elites of
the PRC and ROC re-interpreted from their own frameworks the socio-political
relations and values associated with the imported science and technology.
This will be discussed in the next section.
5.4 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE IN THE
PRC AND ROC
This section describes the relations of science and technology with society and
culture in the PRC and ROC. This thesis argues that despite the incorporation
of foreign science and technology for economic modernization, the ruling elites
of the PRC and ROC injected their socio-political values into imported science
and technology. In the PRC, Western science and technology which had been
formerly rejected was accepted on different grounds of ideological justification
after 1978. The ROC accepted Western science and technology, but linked
them with the mission of recovering mainland China before the late 1980s, and
afterwards with the struggle for international political identity.
This section begins with the discussion of the relations of science and
technology with society and culture in the PRC. The discussion is followed
by an examination of these relations in the ROC.
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5.4.1 Socio-political Nature of Science and Technology in the PRC 
This thesis argues that the ruling elite of the PRC re-interpreted the socio-
political relations and values of Western science and technology over specific
time periods.
In the PRC, modernization did not mean complete Westernization.
Wholesale Europeanization and Americanization had already been rejected by
Mao Zedeing since 1940.' Rather, the PRC has insisted that modernization
must take a "socialist road" within the socialist framework, i.e. under the
dictatorship of the working class and upon the alliance of workers and
peasants:141 Chinese socialist modernization was also the Party leaders'
attempt to show the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Liti Shaoqi
remarked in 1956 that the superiority of socialism in achieving economic
achievements should be demonstrated in quantity, quality and speed.' His
remark may be used to give an ideological explanation for the disastrous Great
Leap Forward Movement between 1958-1959 and many subsequent ambitious
plans of national construction.
In the PRC, science and technology were never neutral in the last forty-
four years. Rather, they were inseparable from domestic politics particularly
when it took command during the founding period and Cultural Revolution.
In the early 1950s, science was incorporated by Mao in economic
modernization as a means to liberate the PRC from nature and traditional
Chinese culture.' Science and technology imported from the former USSR
were accommodated on a national scale. In contrast, the ruling elite of the
PRC attempted to eliminate the influence of capitalism on Western science and
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technology which were imported into China before 1949" As academic
disciplines, science and technology could not be an "objective" for scientists;
they could not do research as a purely theoretical pursuit without considering
the needs of the people and the state. Moreover, the ruling elite of the
PRC labelled scientists and engineers as capitalist because most of them were
trained in Western countries before 1949. Many campaigns of class struggle
were launched against Western-trained scientists and technologists.' In
1958, the Chairman of the Scientific Planning Committee, Nie ROngzh-On, even
accused these technical cadres of possessing a bourgeois mindset of
individualism, and standards of scholarship.' The PRC authorities
demanded the conversion of intellectuals and professionals who were labelled
as the "products of the bourgeoisie" into the socialist road through self-
criticism and confession in intensive campaigns of thought reforms.'
The climax of the rejection of Western science and technology took place
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Science and technology activities
were further restricted in the PRC. Science and technology were denied as
part of productive forces, and the drive to realize the "Four Modernizations"
was denounced as "restoration of capitalism."' Basic research was accused
of being "divorced from the masses, production and reality." Learning from
foreign countries and international academic exchange of science and
technology were rejected as "worshipping things foreign and trailing behind
foreigners." Professional societies, meetings, and journals were banned. The
Science and Technology Committee was abolished, and its administration was
taken over by the Revolutionary Committee of scientists, officials of the Party
308
and state, and workers.' 5o This series of actions indicated that Western
science and technology were rejected on ideological grounds: they were
perceived by the Chinese socialist leaders to be associated with capitalism.
These actions, however, further weakened the science and technology
capabilities of the PRC, and widened its science and technology gap with
Western countries which advanced their science and technology base
tremendously in the same period.
However, Western science and technology was accepted on another
ideological ground after the late 1970s. In 1978, science and technology were
re-interpreted by Deng Xiäoping at the National Science Conference.' First
of all, Deng attempted to eliminate the ideological blockade of the PRC's
access to the science and technology of capitalist countries by treating science
and technology as "part of the wealth created in common" by all humankind.
Then Deng argued that science and technology were important productive
forces because they "liberated" and improved production techniques, and
because they determined the direction of economic development in the
technological world.
Moreover, Deng attempted to demolish the class struggle between
intellectuals and the working class by means of incorporating intellectuals into
the working class. He argued that most of the intellectuals including scientists
and technologists were "already part of the working class" because they were
trained by the working class in the PRC. Both mental and manual labourers
in the PRC, according to Deng, were engaged in "social division of labour."
However, a survey done by the Research Division of the Municipal Party at
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Beijing in December 1987 revealed that 46.3% of 1,630 respondent intellectuals
did not regard themselves as part of the working class.' Despite this
perception of intellectuals, Deng's assertions were, as Tony Saich noted, almost
equivalent to pronouncements on the withdrawal of science and technology
from the arenas of political struggle, and to a removal of the justification for
persecution of intellectuals.' The present ruling elite of the PRC no longer
emphasizes the relations of Western science and technology with capitalism at
the ideological level.
However, the re-interpretation of science and technology offered by
Deng to justify the importation of Western science and technology created a
new problem: if science and technology could be detached from capitalist
connotation, they could be dissociated from socialist connotations as well.
This thesis notes that up to 1993, the ruling elite of the PRC insisted on
the development of domestic science and technology within the framework of
Chinese socialism. In the late 1980s, this elite gave science and technology
four major socio-political tasks: to provide modern technical means for cultural
advances; to give impetus to and promote the development of Marxism and
other social sciences; to remould social concepts; to popularize the scientific
spirit and methods; and to fight ignorance and superstitions particularly
among over the 200 million illiterate people and those in rural areas.'
Moreover, although the PRC authorities conceded that science and
technology were no longer subordinate to socialism, they insisted that science
and technology and socialism were engaged in a dialectical relation. The
former President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Gua Möruk
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cautiously described in 1978 the relation between science and technology and
socialism: only socialism can liberate science and technology, and the
construction of socialism depends on the basis of science and technology.'
In 1992, the present President of the CAS, Zlitsu Guangshao, explained further
that economic needs stimulate the development of science and technology
which in turn accelerate economic progress; and that the strong "symbiotic"
interactions of science and technology with politics, culture, ideology and even
the lifestyle of people will be the prime mover of the progress of society and
human civilization.'
In other words, the ruling elite of the PRC, despite changing the
ideological ground for the acceptance of Western science and technology for
economic modernization, persisted in relating science and technology with the
central value system. In contrast, the ROC consistently welcomed Western
science and technology. However, the imported science and technology were
also embedded with the domestic socio-political values of the ROC.
5.4.2 Socio-political Nature of Science and Technology in the ROC 
This thesis argues that the ruling elite of the ROC linked science and
technology with the socio-political and cultural dimensions of their central
value system.
The ruling elite of the ROC attempted to relate Western science and
technology with traditional Chinese cultures. Jiang Jieshi perceived the
economic modernization of Western countries as a product of the advancement
of scientific knowledge and the popularization of scientific methods.' Jiang
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also argued that China had a long tradition of science. Jiang identified science
as knowledge gained through systematic analysis.' Drawing widely from
Chinese classical texts like the Great Learning and Mencius, Jiang further related
the scientific spirit with pragmatism, the pursuit of excellence, and
persistence.'
Before the late 1980s, the ruling elite of the ROC injected science and
technology with their socio-political values: anticommunist connotations and
the recovery of mainland China. Jiang Jieshi argued that the survival of the
ROC depended on the strength of the national defence which in turn rested
upon the foundation of science and technology.' He explicitly spelt out
that the ROC needed "revolutionary and anti-communist science," and this
science was based on the Principle of Livelihood.'
The establishment of Taiwan as a model province with the help of
science and technology was also seen by Jiang as a "blueprint for building a
new China" in accordance with the Three People's Principles after the recovery
of mainland China. Early in the 1950s, Jiang Yanshi argued that the
development of science and technology and the priorities and needs of society
were inter-related in Taiwan. He expected graduates of science and
technology in the ROC to reform farms and factories, to use science and
technology to produce more wealth, and therefore to strengthen the ROC as
a bastion to recover mainland China.' At the Ninth Congress of the CNP
held in November 1963, Jiang announced his comprehensive modernization
programme for constructing the ROC as a new China. The immediate goal of
the programme was to establish Taiwan as a model province and as a base for
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destroying Chinese Communists. To achieve this goal, the politics, economics,
society, people's life, education and national defence of the ROC needed to be
"modernized."'" The "modernization" of these dimensions, according to
JiAng, was their integration with scientific knowledge and methods.' He
had quoted Japan as a successful example of the application of Western
scientific knowledge and methods, and perceived them as an effective way to
revolutionize and construct China.'
The theme of using science and technology to recover mainland China
was carried through in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1974, JiAng ringgu6 equated
the reconstruction of Taiwan with the recovery of mainland China.' In
1981, he summed up why the CNP developed Taiwan: to strengthen the
courage and raise the hopes of the people in the PRC; to provide a successful
way to modernization for them; and to lay a firmer foundation for the
recovery of mainland China.' The promotion of science and technology
programmes in the 1980s was regarded by Jiang rmggue5 as one of the
foundations for the recovery of mainland China.
After the late 1980s, science and technology were linked by the political
leaders of the ROC with the struggle for its international political identity. The
ROC, as discussed in Chapter Three, made use of its economic influence to
maintain non-diplomatic relations with other countries. Science and
technology were a key factor contributing to the sustenance of economic
growth in the ROC. In an interview in 1988, President Li Dênghul suggested
the introduction of the "latest" high technology from abroad to sustain
economic and technological development' In another interview, he also
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expressed the view that in addition to trade, investment and cultural exchange,
the "technological channel" was one of the means to promote "substantive
relations" — flexible non-diplomatic relations — with other countries. But the
theme of developing Taiwan as a model for a "future unified China" remained
in his speech.' In 1990, Li further suggested that the ROC's trade and
exchange of science and technology with the PRC be used to build up the
basis of mutual trust and prosperity between these two countries.'
To conclude, science and technology as human activities are not socio-
politically neutral in the PRC and ROC. The choice of countries from which
the PRC and ROC importing science and technology had already been a socio-
political decision. In the PRC, imported science and technology from countries
which upheld conflicting value systems needed justification; whereas in the
ROC, science and technology was entrusted with an ideological mission.
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the relations of science and technology with the
economy, society, and culture in the PRC and ROC. It has been argued in this
chapter that both the PRC and ROC imported foreign science and technology
for economic purposes, and at the same time framed them with and injected
into them the socio-political values prescribed by the respective Chinese ruling
elites.
Both the PRC and ROC accommodated the economic functions and
values of imported science and technology. The PRC and ROC established
state agencies to centralize the development of domestic science and
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technology and direct the development with national plans. Both Chinese
countries also established specialized zones to incorporate foreign capital, and
science and technology. The external relations of science and technology in the
PRC and ROC followed their international political and economic relations.
In terms of the development of domestic science and technology and the
importation of foreign ones, the PRC stressed consistently capital-intensive
industries; whereas the ROC gradually changed its emphases from agricultural
to technology-intensive industries.
However, both the PRC and ROC re-interpreted the socio-political
relations and values of science and technology according to their respective
Chinese central value systems. In the PRC, Western science and technology
were first rejected but later accepted with different ideological justifications.
In the ROC, imported science and technology was linked with the recovery of
mainland China and the struggles for international political identity.
The next chapter will discuss the economic tasks of higher education in
the PRC and ROC in the production of technical cadres — scientists and
technologists.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ECONOMIC TASK OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN
THE PRC AND ROC: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
6.1 PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT
This chapter describes the economic task of higher education in producing
technical cadres of science and technology in the PRC and ROC between 1949
and 1993. The chapter will first highlight the domestic relations between
higher education and economic construction in the PRC and ROC; and second,
trace the external relations of these two Chinese higher education systems with
other countries for the importation of foreign science and technology.
This chapter argues that the higher education systems of the PRC and
ROC imported foreign science and technology for economic purposes_
However, they differed in strategies. In the PRC, science and technology
education preceded economic modernization; but in the ROC, it followed
economic modernization. In other words, the ruling elite of the PRC
attempted to create economic modernization by improving its higher education
system; whereas the ruling elite of the ROC adjusted its higher education
system to sustain the industrializing economy. Moreover, the external
educational relations of the higher education systems in the PRC and ROC
followed their international political and economic relations.
Four infrastructural indicators are chosen to demonstrate the
institutionalization of the transfer of foreign science and technology into the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC. These indicators are: the
337
establishment of institutes; the change in curriculum; the exchange of teaching
personnel and students; and international cooperation activities in the higher
education systems of the PRC and ROC.
The establishment of institutes and curriculum are chosen because their
changes reflect the influences of foreign science and technology education.
The exchange of teaching personnel and student and international cooperation
programmes at home are selected because through these activities human
technology transfer takes place. Human technology transfer is defined in this
thesis as those activities in which human beings are carriers of science and
technology expressed in the form of knowledge and skills. This thesis accepts
Leo A. Orleans' argument that technology transfer, as the "transplanting of
knowledge" in a country, can be conducted through its returnees who formerly
receive specialist training in foreign countries.' This thesis also proposes that
the recruitment of foreign experts of science and technology to teach or do
research in a host country is another form of human technology transfer.
This chapter will begin discussing the relations of higher education with
the economy and science and technology in the PRC and ROC. The discussion
will be followed in sequence by an examination of the establishment of
institutes, curriculum change, the exchange of teaching personnel and students,
and finally the activities of international joint programmes in the higher
education systems of PRC and ROC. Although this chapter focuses on the
training of technical cadres in both higher education systems, it should,
however, be noted that the ruling elites of both countries expected their
graduates to be "politically reliable" (as discussed in Chapter Four).
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6.2 HIGHER EDUCATION AND NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE
PRC AND ROC 
This thesis argues that like transitional Chinese higher education (between
1840 and the 1940s), the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC broke
away from classical Chinese higher education (before 1840) in two ways: an
emphasis on the economic tasks of higher education in the production of
technical cadres; and a stress on science and technology education.
Before the geo-political split between the PRC and ROC in 1949, the
higher education system in mainland China (as discussed in Chapter Two) had
been divided into two separate educational entities under the respective
leadership of the CCP and CNP in 1921. However, both higher education
systems emphasized education in science and tedhnology?
After the split, the PRC and the ROC continued to stress the training of
technical cadres in higher education for the purposes of economic construction.
In the PRC in the founding period, a general educational task was to
train personnel for national construction work; and this kind of training was
expected to be characterized by the integration of theory with practice? A
specific economic task of the PRC higher education was to train "high-level
specialized" personnel for national economic construction. 4 The first Minister
of Education of the PRC, MA XÜltin, suggested that "higher education must
meet national needs in industry, agricultural, and national-defence" and "must
serve economic construction." He also proposed that the teaching materials of
higher education institutions had to "meet the needs of national constr-uction."5
The emphasis on the training of technical cadres in higher education of
the PRC continued in the 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1985, the PRC
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authorities specified that education was to produce "socialist builders and
successors," and was related to socialist construction: in this way, "education
must serve the construction of socialism, and the construction of socialism
must depend on education." In the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990),
education and economic development were perceived as having equal
importance to socialist construction.'
The ruling elite of the PRC also maintained the 1911 Republican striving
for science in its higher education system, and gave different interpretations
over specific periods. According to Mao, education as part of "new
democratic" culture must be "scientific" in the sense that education must
oppose all feudalism and blind thoughts, and must stress practicality, objective
truth, and unity of theory and practice? In the First National Conference on
Higher Education in June 1950, Premier Thou Enlai explained that education
became scientific in its content by stressing scientific theory which raised the
experience derived from practice to the level of rationality, and which in turn
guided the practice? According to MA XiThin, the term "intellectuals" seems
to cover only "scientists and technical specialists," and the content of higher
education was also . one which should be "integrated with scientific
knowledge."1° In December, 1952, the new Minister of Education, Zhang
riruk suggested that the task of the newly established Ministry of Higher
Education was to train a large number of technical personnel in order to cater
for the needs of industrialization."
Under the leadership of Deng after 1978, the training of technical cadres
in higher education was perceived as part of the conversion process of science
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and technology into productive forces. The 1985 education reform emphasized
that the task of higher education was to train specialized personnel and to
develop science, technology and culture for socialist modernization.' This
theme was repeated in the 1993 reform plan.' In this plan, education was
given an economic task, which was first proposed by Deng, to "orient [the
PRC] towards modernization, towards the world, and towards the future.""
The ruling elite of the PRC speculated that economic competition between
countries in the future would be mainly a contest between their capacities in
science and technology.'
As in the PRC, higher education in the ROC was used to train high-
level technical cadres for economic purposes. Jiang Jieshf perceived that the
living power of a modern nation consisted of education, economics, and
military force. Among these three elements, education was the most
fundamental and was the coordinator of the other two." The Minister of
Education, Chên Ufa, further specified the aim of education: to make the
national economy prosperous and to strengthen national defence." Education
through the Principle of National Livelihood, according to the Ministry of
Education, aimed at the development of the national economy and the
enrichment of citizens' life in the ROC." In a report on the proposal of the
development of public higher education institutions between 1992 and 1995,
the Ministry of Education reminded these institutions of the importance of
gearing their curriculum to the needs of the industrialized economy in
Taiwan." Therefore, education was perceived as an important key in the
transformation of Taiwan from an agricultural to an industrial economy in the
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last forty-four years."
In particular, the ROC authorities inherited the pre-1949 Republican
emphasis on the use of science and technology to transform the agricultural
economy in Taiwan, and they continued to stress, according to Jiang, the
promotion of scientific methodology and technology." In the 1950s, science
was suggested by Jiang Jieshi as a basis to measure the "effectiveness" of
economic and social reforms.22 To him, all knowledge must converge to the
Three People's Principles and all sciences must rest on the strong foundation
of national morality.'
Moreover, the importance of science and technology education was seen
to be equivalent to that of revolution. This was reflected in the slogan, "to
save the nation with revolution, and to construct the nation with science.""
In 1955, Zhang Qfyfin, an official of the Ministry of Education, encouraged
students of science and technology to be agents of rural modernization in
Taiwan, and to share their knowledge and skills with peasants.'
Therefore, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC related their higher
education systems to economic modernization, emphasizing the importance of
science and technology education. However, the higher education systems the
PRC and ROC inherited from their predecessors were not equipped to supply
sufficient and qualified scientists and technologists for immediate economic
construction. The ruling elites of these two Chinese countries introduced
infrastructural changes in their higher education systems so as to incorporate
foreign science and technology for the training of domestic technical cadres.
This issue will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. The discussion begins
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with an examination of the establishment of institutes in the higher education
systems of the PRC and ROC.
6.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTES IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION 
SYSTEMS OF THE PRC AND ROC
This thesis argues that the higher education system in the PRC was built upon
the infrastructural legacy of the pre-1949 Republican government, but was
restructured after the manner of Soviet higher education. The higher
education system in the ROC was built upon the infrastructural legacy of the
Japanese colonial government, but was reshaped according to the pre-1949
Republican higher education system which was modelled upon American
higher education in the early 1920s. Moreover, these two Chinese higher
education systems differed in the emphases and pace of their production of
technical cadres over specific periods.
6.3.1 Institutional Reorganization in the PRC
This section describes institutional reorganization in the higher education
system of the PRC. This thesis argues that the PRC, despite the inheritance of
the pre-1949 infrastructural legacy, adopted the Soviet model of higher
education system so as to produce technical cadres as quickly as possible.
However, such adoption created struggles over the relations between science
and technology, and between research and higher education when the PRC
began to open up its economy to Western countries in the late 1970s.
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6.3.1.1 Basic Re-organization
In the early 1950s, the higher education system of the PRC inherited the
infrastructural legacy of Republican government. Before 1951, there were 49
general universities (which comprised at least 3 fields of study from arts,
science, law, commerce, engineering, agriculture, medical science, or
education), and 144 independent colleges (having not more than two fields of
study) and junior colleges.
However, the ruling elite of the PRC reshaped the institutional
combination within the higher education sector by transplanting the model of
Soviet higher education? Soviet higher education was marked by a division
of labour in the task of producing scientists and engineers? In 1951, some
deans of engineering institutions in the PRC perceived that the Republican
system could not supply enough scientific and technological manpower for
national construction, and proposed to reorganize engineering institutions after
the Soviet model of higher education? In 1953, the "Directive Concerning
the National Readjustment of Colleges and Faculties of Higher Education" was
issued to readjust faculties and institutions of higher learning "according to the
experience of the USSR" for the sake of training high-level personnel for
industrial construction and teaching?
During the process of restructuring, the government of the PRC
"moved" practical fields of study out from general universities into technical
institutes, and theoretical subjects and humanities from technical institutes into
general universities.' As a result, the pre-1949 Republican higher education
system was reorganized into a tripartite system: comprehensive universities,
single-faculty institutes; and multi-faculty institutes.
The training of science and technology personnel was shared among
these three types of institutions. Comprehensive universities (comprising only
basic or natural sciences,' humanities and some social sciences) were
responsible for training personnel for theoretical research, scientific
experimentation and teaching. Single- or many-faculty institutes were
responsible for the training of professionals, particularly engineers and other
technical personnel. Most of these institutes were directly supervised by the
related ministries of the State Council, rather than by the Ministry of
Education.
This tripartite higher education system of the PRC was marked by its
lopsided approach towards science and technology. This will be discussed in
the next section.
6.3.1.2 Bias Towards Science and Technology
The higher education system of the PRC was characterized by its orientation
towards science and technology at the expense of humanities and social
sciences. This was indicated by the percentages of both institutes and student
enrollment in the areas of science and technology.
In terms of the number of institutions, the higher education system of
the PRC has been dominated by science and technology for the last forty-four
years. Between 1950 and the early 1980s, the percentage of institutes of science
and technology remained over 60 (see Appendix 6.1). Take the distribution of
higher education institutes during the period between 1949 and 1957 as an
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example. In this period, all types of higher education institutions directly
related to the First Five-Year Plan (1952-1957) increased in number, except 4
types of institutes which mainly offered theoretical courses (see Appendix
6.2).3' The number of comprehensive universities dropped drastically from
49 in 1949 to 17 in 1957, while the number of colleges of finance and
economics decreased from 11 to 5. The other two types of colleges, institutes
of language and literature and institutes of political science and law, remained
comparatively low in number in the same period. Although the proportion
of science and technology institutes dropped from 1985, it still remained at a
level of just below 50%.
In terms of student enrollment, most students of the PRC took science
and technology as their majors. Between 1953 and 1990, the percentage of
students enrolled in the fields of science and technology was very high: 68%
in 1953; 75.8% in 1965; 72.4% in 1978; and 65.3% in 1990 (see Appendix 6.3).
As a natural result, the percentage of graduates was also dominated by
students of science and technology: 60.2% in 1953; 77.3 in 1965; 68.4% in 1978;
and 64.8% in 1990 (see Appendix 6.4). The percentages of student enrollment
and graduates in science and technology were higher than the figure suggested
by Frederick H. Harbison: 50% of students were enrolled in the fields of
science and technology in developed countries.'
In other words, since 1949 the PRC has stressed the training of technical
cadres in the areas of science and technology for the improvement of the
national economy. Although the ruling elite of the PRC attempted to use
higher education to foster economic modernization, the agricultural population
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of about 80% (out of the total population) has remained stable in the last forty-
four years. The ruling elite of the PRC expected in October 1992 that "socialist
modernization" would be achieved by 2050.'
6.3.1.3 Struggles Over the Relations Between Science and Technology
Despite the stress on science and technology, the PRC separated science from
technology in its higher education system, and this created struggles over the
relations between science and technology when the PRC opened up to Western
countries from the late 1970s.
Before the early 1980s, education in the natural sciences and
technologies was separated within the higher education system of the PRC
according to the Soviet model of higher education. Comprehensive
universities, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, were responsible for
education in the natural sciences, while other institutions of technologies were
accountable for education in the applied sciences.
The natural sciences were relatively neglected as compared with the
applied sciences in the higher education system of the PRC. The number of
comprehensive universities was decreased from 41.7% in 1950 to 12.7% in
1953, then went down to 8.6% in 1978, and slightly increased to 9.5% in 1990
(see Appendix 6.1). The student enrollment in natural sciences within the
science and technology sector also remained low: 13.6% in 1949, 9.1% in 1953,
12.2% in 1978, and 9.9% in 1990 (see Appendix 6.3). In 1990, the State
Education Commission announced that no new comprehensive universities
would be established between 1991 and 1995•'
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In contrast, engineering education was stressed within the science and
technology sector. The percentage of institutes for engineering education was
increased from 22.5% in 1950 to 54.2% in 1990. The percentage of students of
engineering was also increased from 45.7% in 1949 to 63.4% in 1990. Within
engineering education, mechanical engineering, and civil engineering and
architecture were emphasized. Their percentages were respectively 20.65
and 23.64 in 1953; 29.47 and 10.26 in 1978; 24.34 and 16.60 in 1990. Radio and
electronics has been a newly rising field of study since the 1970s. The
percentage of student enrollment in this new field was 6.1 in 1965, 20.51 in
1970, 18.74 in 1978, and 19.83 in 1990.38
However, the separation of science and technology in the higher
education of the PRC was first challenged at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet
split in the late 1950s. The PRC recognized the limitations of the tripartite
higher education system in the transfer of research results into technologies in
the late 1950s. Four universities of science and technology were established
from 1958 to bridge the gap between natural sciences and technology, and
were jointly supervised by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Ministry of
Education.' The Chinese University of gcience and Technology in Hefei
offered courses like nuclear engineering, technical physics, applied geophysics,
radio electronics, thermal dynamic engineering, high polymer chemistry and
physics, applied mathematics and computing technique, and automation.'
Despite the attempt to bridge natural sciences and technology, the PRC
authorities did not pay much attention to these institutions in the 1960s and
1970s.
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Conspicuous re-integration of science and technology education took
place only after the PRC was opened up in the late 1970s to Western countries
which emphasized interdisciplinary studies between natural sciences, applied
sciences and technology.
Some famous comprehensive universities re-introduced applied sciences
and social sciences into their institutions from the early 1980s. Some top
administrators of comprehensive universities expressed the view that in
addition to natural sciences, humanities and social sciences, their institutions
should begin to set up other fields of study such as technology and
management. They argued that comprehensive universities could provide
better theoretical foundations for technologies, and different kinds of
specialists for the development of inter-disciplinary studies and applied
research.' FÜdan University established the Institute of Technology in
1984.42 One year later, l36ifing University established the Institute of
Economics (comprising economics, economic management, and international
economics), and some departments of applied sciences such as environmental
science, sociology, and national economic and management. Many inter-
disciplinary studies were also established in comprehensive universities. Take
the Nankai University as an example. Between the early 1980s and 1992, this
university introduced 13 new fields of study like electronic technology,
biochemistry, biophysics and economic information management.'
Institutes of technology in the PRC also re-introduced fundamental
sciences and humanities into their institutions from the middle of the 1980s.
For instance, in 1987, the (Zringhua University and Huazhãng Institute of
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Engineering incorporated natural sciences and humanities into their
curriculum. 	 In 1992, the Nanjing University established institutes of
humanities, sciences, geology, technological science, and life sciences.'
The integration of science and technology education within individual
higher education institutions in the PRC indicated its gradual shift from the
Soviet model of the tripartite system to Western models. The higher education
system of the PRC also changed the relations of higher education with research
when it was opened up to Western science and technology from the late 1970s.
This will be examined in the next section.
6.3.1.4 Struggles Over Relations Between Higher Education and Research
This thesis argues that the institutionalization of research in the higher
education system of the PRC developed mainly after it was opened up to
Western countries in the late 1970s.
Before the late 1970s, "university-based research"v was de-emphasized
in the higher education system of the PRC, and most research activities were
conducted outside the higher education sector. There were three types of
institutions which would conduct research programmes: higher education, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and research institutes under related ministries
at various levels.
In the early 1950s, the PRC transferred research capacities from the
higher education sector to the Chinese Academy of Sciences which was
supposed to "direct and promote" science development." The Academy was
first subordinated to the Ministry of Education, but was later raised to the
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ministerial level. In 1949, fourteen institutes of science and technology were
moved from the higher education sector into the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
The number of institutes under the aegis of the Academy was increased to 106
by 1956, but reduced to 73 in 1973 because of the Cultural Revolution. In the
early 1980s, the number increased to 120.49
Both human and financial resources were also transferred from the
higher education sector to the Academy before the late 1970s. Many senior
and experienced scientists and researchers of the Academy were retrieved
from the higher education sector. Before 1963, no government fund was
available for research and development in higher education institutions. In
contrast, the Academy received per capita research funds of 9,000 yuan in
1956. Although the government allocated research funds for science and
technology in higher education from 1963, the amount was small and unstable
as compared with the Academy.'
Moreover, most research was conducted outside the higher education
sector. A large proportion of basic research projects was taken up by the
institutes of the Academy, and many of these projects (about 60%) were for the
central government and industrial enterprises.' Applied research was also
dominated by research institutes under related ministries at various levels.
Many research projects were taken up by these institutes which were designed
for a particular branch of industry and directly linked to some key enterprises.
There were reportedly 415 such institutes with 14,700 researchers and technical
staff in 1958.52
As a result, higher education in the PRC had a weak research
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infrastructure prior to the late 1970s. In 1982, a member of the ruling elite of
the PRC, Nie ROngzhen, admitted that the responsibility of turning science and
technology into productive forces was shared unequally among higher
education institutions, the Academy, and research institutes under related
ministries. Among them, higher education institutions were, according to
Tony Saich, the "weakest" in the contribution to research of science and
technology."
Claims from sections of the ruling elite of the PRC for the
institutionalization of research in its higher education were heard in the late
1970s. In January 1978, the i3e n j nnj autiloriteS suggested that the tasks of science
and technology research should be shared among higher education
institutions, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and other state research
institutes: higher education should emphasize both basic and applied research;
the Chinese Academy of Sciences basic and theoretical research; and other
research institutes applied sciences and technological studies.' The message
about the division of labour between scientific and technological research was
echoed at the National Science Conference in March 1978." The Chinese
Academy of Sciences was later asked by the PRC authorities to emphasize
applied research as well in 1985. Moreover, research institutes induding those
of higher learning were encouraged to set up various forms of partnerships
with enterprises and designing units on a mutually beneficial basis?
Graduate research work within the higher education system began with the
re-introduction of graduate programmes in 1977. The priorities of research
were determined jointly by universities and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.'
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University academics of the PRC also argued for the incorporation of
research into higher education. Li Enjing called for the re-emphasis on basic
and applied research in higher education, firstly, because national construction
demanded higher education to produce knowledge and creativity, and to
foster experts and economic achievements; secondly, because scientific and
technological research would enhance, in terms of content, the quality of
teaching; and thirdly because higher education had a manpower for science
and technology, and more fields for inter-disciplinary research than other
research institutes. The President of the JIlin University, Tang AoqIng,
indicated that in 1985, 300,000 teachers and eighty percent of graduates
students were enrolled in higher education institutes.'
However, the introduction of research to the higher education system
of the PRC faced structural constraints in the early 1980s. According to Leo
A. Orleans, these constraints were: overspecialization in curriculum, minimal
research funds and facilities, lack of formal graduate education before the early
1980s, and an over-emphasis on the role of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
as a central scientific and technological research organ.' Mang DIng
suggested that the low mobilization of research staff between higher education
institutes, and the difficulty in introducing inter-disciplinary science and
technology studies were also constraints on the promotion of research in
higher education of the PRC."
Despite these difficulties, the PRC began to emphasize the research
functions of higher education in the 1980s. Up to 1988, there were 1,715
research units (801 research institutes and 914 research divisions) established
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in the higher education system of the PRC. In terms of the fields of study,
15.7% of these research units were for natural sciences, 42% for engineering
and technology, 13.1% for agriculture, 25.9% for medical science, and 3.3% for
integrative research.' Moreover, the PRC stressed the training of
postgraduate students at home in the early 1980s. In 1991, 411 higher
education institutes offered courses for 80,500 postgraduates." The
proportion of contribution of higher education institutions for science and
technology research at the national and local levels was increasing. For
instance, the percentage of research projects in Shanghai taken up by its 50
universities was increased from 23.2 in 1988 to 39.4 in 1991." Thus research
is increasingly institutionalized in the current higher education system of the
PRC in the style of Western countries (as discussed in Chapter One).
To sum up, the higher education system of the PRC was twice
reorganized for the production of scientists and technologists. However, these
two reorganizations differed from each other. The first reorganization in the
early 1950s emphasized the separation of science and technology, and thereby
weakened the research capacities of higher education. The second
reorganization in the 1980s stressed the integration between science and
technology, and also between research and higher education.
In contrast to the PRC which rejected the pre-1949 Republican model of
higher education, the ruling elites of the ROC transplanted the pre-1949
Republican higher education system to Taiwan. This will be discussed in the
next section.
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6.3.2 Institutional Reorganization in the ROC
This section describes the institutional reorganization in the higher education
system of the ROC. This thesis argues that the ROC, despite the
infrastructural legacy from its predecessor, transplanted the pre-1949
Republican model of higher education from mainland China to Taiwan for the
production of technical cadres. However, the higher education system of the
ROC did not give any preferences to the development of science and
technology education before the 1970s, but was adjusted later because of the
increasing demands of the industrializing economy. In contrast to the PRC,
the ROC institutionalized research in its higher education system early in the
1950s.
6.3.2.1 Basic Re-organization
The higher education system of the ROC was moved from mainland China to
Taiwan in 1949, and built upon the infrastructures left by the Japanese colonial
administration in 1945. The ROC government started its higher education
system with the four institutions left by Japan in 1945. Each of them was
specialized in certain areas of science and technology: the National Taiwan
University (which was previously called the Taihoku Imperial University) for
training a variety of scientists and technologists; Provincial Taiwan College of
Technology for training engineers; Taiwan College of Agriculture for the
studies of farming and forestry; and Provincial Taiwan Normal College for
teacher training.
The ROC government also made use of the teaching personnel and
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material resources (such as books, equipment and facility) which moved
together with the CNP to Taiwan in 1949 to improve the "quality" of its higher
education." Seven mainland universities were also allowed to be re-
established in Taiwan. Among them, the National Tsinghua University was
designated specifically for recruiting science and technology personnel,
particularly for nuclear engineering.'
The basic institutional structure of the higher education system in
Taiwan was governed by the University Act adopted in mainland China in
1948. Despite several revisions of the Act after 1949," education in science
and technology was developed within the higher education system which was
inherited from pre-1949 Republican China, and which followed the American
model of 1922." This means that science and technology were not separated
within individual higher education institutions in the ROC as in the PRC
before the late 1970s. Many universities offered courses on both science and
technology as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Noted examples were the National
Taiwan University and Tsinghua University.
6.3.2.2 Gradual Development of Science and Technology Education
This thesis argues that the development of science and technology education
at the tertiary level in the ROC was gradually adjusted in accordance with the
development of the economy which moved from agricultural to capital- and
technology-intensive industry. This was indicated by the lack of planning in
the 1950s, the student enrollment in science and technology, the trends of
majors taken by students, and the establishment of public and private
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institutes for science and technology in the last two decades.
Although the ROC practised a planned economy and its ruling elite
frequently stressed the importance of science and technology for economic
modernization, the government had no plan for developing science and
technology education before the middle of the 1960s. It has been mentioned
in Chapter Five that the government also had no blueprint for utilizing science
and technology for improving the national economy until the late 1960s.
Manpower planning was first introduced in the Fourth Four-Year Plan (1965-
1968). An education plan, "A Preliminary Draft of the Long-range Educational
Plan, 1964-1982," was drafted by the Ministry of Education with the help of the
United Nations in 1964. The first manpower development plan occurred in
1966. These plans attempted to emphasize the development of science and
technology education for the industrializing economy in Taiwan. In 1967, the
ROC government began to stress basic science education at the tertiary level,
together with the development of vocational training in secondary schools."
Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, the structure of higher education of
the ROC was biased towards humanities and social sciences. The Ministry of
Education of the ROC had been reminded by the 1962 Stanford Report of the
imbalance in manpower training in Taiwan. The Report suggested that in the
1960s there would be a surplus of graduates from the humanities and social
sciences, but a shortage of graduates from science and technology.n• n
As a result of the bias towards the humanities and social sciences,
higher education in the ROC did not meet the increasing manpower demands
of its industrializing economy in the 1970s. The Ministry of Education had
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conducted a survey in 1964, and had found out that 70% of 1,238 respondent
graduates felt that their study did not match the needs of their current jobs.'
Later, the Economic Planning Council admitted in the proposal of the Sixth
Four-Year Plan (1976-1981) that economic development was hindered by
"backwardness in the industrial structure." Hou Chi-ming and Hsu Yu-chu
also predicated in 1976 that there was likely to be a shortage of high-level
manpower such as doctors, scientists, engineers, and of subprofessional
manpower, like technicians and nurses.' In 1991, the Economic Planning
Council expected that the demand for personnel of science and technology in
Taiwan would be increased from 142,065 in 1989 to 287,265 in 2000; i.e. an
annual increase of 6.6% in this decade.'
From the 1970s, the structure of higher education in the ROC was
adjusted to produce more scientists and engineers to meet the industrializing
needs. The percentage of students enrolled in science and technology (out of
all fields of study) increased slowly between the 1960s and the early 1990s.
But the figure was still below 50% (the approximate figure in developed
countries): 45.5% (including junior college students) in 1960;" 40.7% in 1968;
38.1% in 1975; and 42.7% in 1990 (see Appendix 6.5). In 1992, this percentage
was slightly increased to 46.1. 78
 The percentage of graduates of science and
technology was 43.9 (induding junior college students) in 1960, 42.2 in 1965,
and 46.6 in 1989 (see Appendix 6.6).
The trend of the choice of major subjects taken by ROC students also
indicated the shift of education towards science and technology in accordance
with gradual and progressive economic developments in Taiwan. Within the
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science and technology sector, engineering consistently had the largest student
population in the last four decades. The percentage of engineering graduates
was 21.7 in 1961; 15.3 in 1968; 20.5 in 1980; and 19.7 in 1990 (see Appendix
6.6). Agriculture was ranked second after engineering before the middle of the
1960s. When the ROC began industrializing in the late 1960s, the percentage
of graduates of agriculture dropped: 9.3 (including junior college students) in
1961; 7.2 in 1968; 33 in 1980; and 3.1 in 1990. In contrast, new fields of study
in the developing technological field became prominent in the higher
education system of the ROC in the 1980s. The percentage of graduates in
mathematics and computer science, was 6.4 in 1985 and 7.1 in 1990.
To speed up the production of more scientists and engineers, the ROC
established institutes of technology from the middle 1970s. In 1974, the
National Taiwan Institute of Technology was set up to recruit technicians and
engineers to enhance the speed of the development of heavy and sophisticated
industries." This institute offered 2-year and 4-year courses induding
electronic engineering, industrial management technology, and mechanical
engineering.' In 1993, the National Huadang University was established to
meet the local industrializing demands and to improve the quality of local
manpower in eastern Taiwan"' which had only 4% of all higher education
institutions in the whole island.'
The ROC government also utilized private resources to supply technical
cadres to the industrializing economy in Taiwan. Between 1982-1987, the
private sector contributed 54.8% (64,980) graduates out of the total population
of science and technology graduates (118,585)." Five private institutes of
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technology were established between 1989 and 1990•"
Therefore, the higher education system of the ROC was adjusted in
accordance with the change of economic structure from the agricultural to the
industrial mode in the last forty-four years. The relations between higher
education and research also reflect this trend.
6.3.2.3 Relations Between Higher Education and Research
This section describes the relations of higher education with research in the
ROC. This thesis argues that in the ROC institutionalized research in higher
education since the early 1950s, and the focus of research shifted in accordance
with economic development trends.
In the ROC, research has been shared among four types of institutions:
higher education institutions (including their graduate schools, departments,
and research centres) and the Academia Sinica which are responsible for
theoretical and pioneering applied research; and research institutes under
different ministries or run by the private sector which are responsible for
applied research and innovation.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the research projects of higher education were
mostly related to low-level technology. Between 1959 and 1967, the National
Council of Science Development (later called the National Science Council)
allocated US$ 12.16 million to universities and research institutes to develop
science and technology." The distribution of this fund was: 45% of its funds
for engineering and physical sciences; 35% for agricultural and medical
sciences; and 20% of humanities and social sciences." In particular, the
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colleges of agriculture served the dual function of teaching and research, but
did not provide an extension service as did American land-grant colleges."
In the 1970s, the ROC began to develop high technology, and increase
its capacities of research and development. The Institute of Industrial
Technology was established in 1973 to integrate scientific research with
economic construction. The site of the Institute was intentionally chosen to be
in Hsinchu so that the Institute could access the research personnel and
equipment of the National Tsinghua University and National Chiao Tung
University." In December 1980, the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park
was established in the same area so as to link higher education, research
institutes and industry.'
In the 1980s, the ROC could not afford "personal interest-based
research" and began to develop problem-oriented research projects."
Between 1986 and 1990, the government spent NT$ 7.4 billion on academic
research. Of this sum, 36.1% was allocated for biological and physical
sciences, 32.2% for applied sciences and engineering, 23.3% for natural
sciences, 6.0% for social sciences and humanities, and 2.4% for science
education. For theoretical and pioneering applied research in 1989, higher
education received NT$ 1.637 billion for 3,160 research projects; 10 research
centres within universities were allocated NT$ 323 million for 274 projects; and
Academia Sinica got NT$ 732 million for 251 research projects."
Research activities in the higher education system of the ROC were
intervarsity. In 1973, there were 6 research centres under the National Science
Council for mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, and
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agriculture. Each research centre was composed of two or three research
institutes of universities, with one of them as the host organization, and the
others as supporting (see Appendix 6.7).92 In the 1950s and 1960s, these
research centres were sponsored by American organizations such as the Sino-
American Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development
and the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction.
The research of higher education was also linked with other ministries
or their agencies. An example was the establishment of two research institutes
in universities to produce researchers and to conduct research activities for the
Ministry of National Defence. These two institutes are the Institute of Applied
Mathematics in the National Taiwan University, and the Institute of
Aeronautics and Space in the National Chengkung University. Graduates of
these two institutes were recruited to conduct further research in the Chung
Shan Institute of Science which was under the direct administration of the
Ministry of National Defence, or in state or private enterprises which had
contracts with the Ministry of National Defence.' Another example was the
joint research in geological studies by the Institute of Geology of the National
Taiwan University, the Department of Geological Science of the National
Cheng Kung University, the Taiwan Provincial Institute of Geological Survey
and the Chinese Petroleum Company."
Thus, the PRC and ROC adjusted their higher education structures in
the development of science and technology education for different economic
purposes. Higher education was used to quicken the emergence of economic
modernization in the PRC, and to sustain the industrializing economy in the
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ROC.
6.4 CURRICULUM CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE PRC
AND ROC 
This section describes foreign influences on the curriculum of science and
technology education in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC.
This thesis argues that these two Chinese higher education systems adjusted
their curricula — the scope of curriculum, foreign language policy, and the use
of teaching materials written by foreigners — so as to import foreign science
and technology.
6.4.1 Curricular Change in the PRC 
In the PRC, the curriculum in the areas of science and technology was changed
when the PRC shifted its international political and economic relations from
the USSR to Western countries in the 1970s.
In the founding period of the PRC, the curriculum of higher education
was marked by a Soviet characteristic — course specialization. The curriculum
of science and technology (and other fields of study) was modelled upon
Soviet higher education, and the number of specialties was drastically
multiplied to fulfill the specialization plans suggested by Soviet advisors."
In the fields of science and technology, there were 179 different specialties.
They included narrowly specialized courses such as the geophysical
exploration of metals and non-metals, mining and industrial structure, prime
mover installation in ships, operation and repair of automobiles, electric
measuring equipment, and dock crane and equipment' The numbers of
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specialties and sub-specialties were respectively 449 and 2,427 in 1962; 634 and
3,855 in 1978; 584 and 5,825 in 1985; and 841 and 7,167 in 1990. 97 Despite
occasional reduction in specialties, the higher education system of the PRC was
still marked by specialization in the 1980s and the early 1990s even though
Soviet higher education greatly reduced the number of specialties in the same
period." However, the specialties in the PRC from the late 1970s included
disciplines imported from Western countries such as bio-medical technology,
information sciences, optical fibre communications, and environmental medical
sciences."
The foreign language policy in the higher education system of the PRC
was changed when it switched the importation of science and technology from
the USSR to Western countries. In order to access the information of foreign
science and technology in periodicals and research materials, the PRC students
had to master the language of countries which provided the literature. During
the Sino-Soviet alliance period in the 1950s, English was downplayed because
it was perceived to be associated with imperialism. In contrast, Russian was
adopted by the Ministry of Eduction as the key language to access Soviet
science and technology (and culture).'® A two-week barely adequate
intensive course on Russian was devised for students and scientists to enable
them to read science papers in that language.'
However, from the late 1970s, the PRC educational authorities de-
emphasized Russian, and reinstated English as a popular foreign language to
access Western knowledge of science and technology. At the initial stage of
opening up to Western countries, the demand for foreign language teachers
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was higher than that for science and technology experts in the PRC. In the
academic year 1985-86, the higher education institutions of the PRC recruited
1,479 foreign teachers: 1,289 as language teachers; 82 as science and technology
teachers; and 108 in the humanities and social sciences. Most of these foreign
language teachers taught Western languages: 854 taught English; 75 French;
and 80 German. However, Japanese was the second favorite language, and
153 foreign language teachers were invited to teach Japanese.' The demand
for foreign language teachers increased in the late 1980s. A total of 2,002
language experts were recruited from 29 countries in 1988." In particular,
joint programmes between PRC institutions and Western counterparts for
teaching PRC students English were a characteristic of this new foreign
language policy. For instance, Yale University provided native English
speakers to Hunan Medical College for teaching Chinese students English, and
helping Chinese students and teachers to learn about "'contemporary American
science and culture.'"
A less direct way to access foreign science and technology was to
translate the literature into Chinese. In 1955, 620 Russian textbooks were
translated into Chinese. Up to 1957, there were 1,090 textbooks either
translated from Russian or written by Chinese but based on Russian teaching
materials.' Russian statistics recorded that 3,000 titles of Soviet technical
textbooks were in circulation with more than 20 million copies in the PRC
between 1949-1955." However, the opening up of the PRC to Western
countries reversed the type of translated material from Russian texts to English
ones.
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6.4.2 Curricular Change in the ROC 
Initially, the curriculum of science and technology in the higher education
system of the ROC, unlike the PRC, was broadly classified. Before 1954, there
were only 25 departments of science and technology in the four higher
education institutions. Interdisciplinary courses were mostly found in the field
of agriculture; they were agricultural engineering, agro-biology, agro-
chemistry, and agro-economics.' Courses of science and technology were
gradually diversified from the 1960s. In the 1980s, new disciplines,
particularly from Western countries, were introduced into the curriculum of
science and technology in the higher education system of the ROC. Between
1982 and 1988,18 higher education institutions produced graduates of 28 new
disciplines of science and technology (see Appendix 6.8).
These new courses reflected Western influences on domestic science and
technology education in the ROC. Courses like information science and
management were incorporated as part of the curriculum of mathematics and
computer science. Most of the new courses like Civil and Irrigations
Engineering were interdisciplinary. Some courses like Environmental Science
concerning global issues of protection of the Earth were established in the
higher education of the ROC as in Western countries.
Moreover, national and private institutions bore equal responsibility to
introduce new science and technology courses. Between 1982 and 1988, 18
institutions had their first graduates of these 28 new courses. Half of these
institutions were private, and responsible for half of the new disciplines (14).
New courses were usually introduced at the higher degree level. Among the
28 courses, only 12 courses were for undergraduates.
The Taipei authorities consistently adopted English as an essential
foreign language to access Western science and technology. English was a
compulsory subject carrying 8 units for all undergraduates before 1993."
From this year onwards, students would have more choices for the
compulsory foreign language course. The choices would include English,
Japanese, French, German, Spanish, and Russian.' For graduate studies in
the ROC before 1993, students were obliged by the Ministry of Education to
pass English in admission examinations. From 1993, individual graduate
institutions can determine whether to set English proficiency as an admissions
criterion!"
To reduce the language barrier against the access to Western science
and technology, the ROC translated many English textbooks of science and
technology into Chinese. Between 1955 and 1960, the Ministry of Education
provided 175 translated Western textbooks of science and technology for
undergraduate courses!" Western scientific works were also translated in
the US for the ROC's domestic use. Under the sponsorship of the Shu
Foundation established by a Chinese entrepreneur, five millions words of
English texts were translated into Chinese by more than 20 scholars between
1965 and 1967.1'
Therefore, the higher education systems of both the PRC and ROC
adopted foreign curriculum resources and a foreign language policy to enable
students access foreign science and technology. The emphases of the imported
curriculum and foreign language policy over specific periods reflected the
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influences of international political and economic relations on the development
of education in science and technology in these two Chinese higher education
systems. The next section will further illustrate how the international political
and economic relations of the PRC and ROC influenced their international
education relations.
6.5 EXCHANGE OF TEACHING PERSONNEL AND THE SENDING OF 
STUDENTS ABROAD BY THE PRC AND ROC
This section identifies the countries to which the PRC and ROC sent their
students and teachers to receive foreign training in science and technology
between 1949 and 1993, and from which these two Chinese governments
would recruit foreign experts. This section also describes the subjects which
the students of both Chinese countries studied abroad.
This thesis argues that despite the serious brain drain, the PRC and
ROC utilized the sending of teaching personnel and students abroad as a
means to access foreign science and technology. The countries to which the
PRC and ROC sent their students and teaching personnel depended on their
international political and economic relations with these countries.
6.5.1 International Educational Relations of the PRC
In the PRC, the practice and development of sending teachers and students
abroad in the pursuit of foreign science and technology, it is suggested in this
thesis, can be divided into three periods according to the PRC's international
political and economic relations: reliance on the former USSR (1950-1960),
diversification (1961-1966), and reliance on Western countries (from 1972
onwards).
During the period of 1950-1960, the PRC sent its students to receive
training in science and technology in socialist countries. In this period, 88.3%
of PRC students (total 9,298) went to the former USSR, and the rest mostly to
other socialist countries (see Appendix 6.9). Most of these students were
undergraduates.'"
Because of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the PRC reduced the number
of students sent to the former USSR and diversified the sending of students
into different countries between 1961 and 1966. The distribution of 1,374
students on a government-sponsored basis was: 206 (15.0%) in the former
USSR, 158 in Cuba; and 1,010 in other countries. In this period, the USSR still
ranked first in the list of target countries for PRC students. The Beijing
authorities suspended sending students to the USSR between 1966 and 1982.
However, this did not mean the PRC would send its students to Western
countries immediately after the Sine-Soviet split. No student was sent to the
US, West Germany, France and Canada; and only 1 went to the United
Kingdom between 1961 and 1966.
From the late 1970s, the PRC began to resume the practice of the late
Qing government and pre-1949 Republican government sending students to
Western countries to access their science and technology. In 1980, the Ministry
of Education stipulated that priority would be given to students who would
take up abroad those subjects helping improve scientific and technological
capacities, and the teaching quality of higher education at home. However,
included in this new policy was an ideological requirement successful
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applicants should "support the party line, ardently love the motherland, be
dedicated to the revolutionary cause."1" In 1987, the PRC spelt out that the
ideological requirement applied only to government-funded students."'
Among Western countries, the US was the first choice of many PRC
students." Between 1972 and 1983, 13,889 PRC students went for advanced
studies mostly in Western countries: 32.1% to the US; 14.5% to Japan; 10.7%
to (the former) West Germany; 8.9% to the United Kingdom; 8.1% to France;
and 7.0% in Canada."7
Science and technology were the favorite subjects of PRC students
abroad. Between 1972 and 1978, 93.7% of 1,548 government-funded students
learned Western languages; whereas 6.3% took science and technology as their
majors. After 1978, this trend was reversed. More than 80% of PRC students
abroad received science and technology education. For example, between 1978
and 1985, among 29,000 government-funded students (exduding 7,800 self-
financed students), most of them took science and technology as their majors:
28.5% in sciences; 39.6% in engineering; 7.7% in agriculture; 11% in medicine;
and only 13.1% in humanities."'
The Beijing government sent its students and teaching personnel abroad
to upgrade their professional qualifications. Between 1978 and 1985, 95.1%
(out of 29,000) students sponsored by the government pursued advanced or
postgraduate studies; and only 4.1% received undergraduate training." 9
 The
percentages of visiting scholars for advanced studies, postgraduates, and
undergraduates were respectively 82.1 (out of 7,290 students), 8.1, and 9.8
between 1979 and 1981;120
 and 71.1 (out of 7,321 students), 26.7, and 2.2 in
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1988.121
 In addition to upgrading their qualifications, the sending of teaching
and research personnel abroad by the PRC, this thesis suggests, was a quicker
way to absorb foreign science and technology; and to apply what they learnt
from Western countries when they returned home.
However, the brain drain from the PRC was very serious. The Beijing
authorities admitted that only 45.2% of 36,500 students and visiting scholars
sent by the government during the period of 1981-1985 had returned by
1987.122
 The overall brain drain between 1978 and 1992 was greater. The
PRC estimated that in this period, only 60,000 (31.6% out of 190,000) students
and teaching personnel returned to the PRC.' More than 90% of these
returnees were sponsored by the government.'" Despite this serious loss of
manpower, the PRC, this thesis suggests, has to continue sending their
students abroad to receive foreign training. The PRC estimated that the period
between 1993 and 2000 would be the climax of the retirement of those who
were trained before the middle of the 1960s.' In 1992, there were 2.2
million teachers and researchers in the higher education system of the PRC.
Among them, 22.9% were assessed by the Beijing authorities as incompetent
because they were trained during the Cultural Revolution. By 2000,52.3% of
these 2.2 million teachers and researchers would be expected to retire; and
only 24.8% would remain and would be capable of leading fresh and
inexperienced graduates.'
In addition to sending teachers and students abroad, the PRC recruited
foreign science and technology personnel for the purposes of enhancing the
domestic levels of science and technology. Between 1950 and 1952, 126 Soviet
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consultants helped Chinese educators develop new specializations, curriculum
and teaching in the higher education system of the PRC in line with the
specific needs of industry, agriculture and culture.' Between 1953 and
1962, 862 foreign experts worked on a long-term contractual basis in higher
education institutes of the PRC; 761 of them came from the USSR, and the rest
from other socialist (East European and Asian) countries and a few from
capitalist nations.'
After the restoration of the PRC-US relations in the late 1970s, Western
experts were at the top of the invitation lists of the PRC. In 1980, 1,700 foreign
scientists were invited by the Chinese Academy of Sciences to teach or give
their papers in the PRC. The figure was 50% more than that in 1979.' In
1992, 5,000 foreign experts were invited by the higher education institutions
in the Habèi Province alone to help train personnel of science and technology,
education, foreign affairs, and economics and trade. These institutions
expected to recruit experts and specialists in transportation, electricity, car-
maldng, metallurgy, medical sciences, agriculture and natural sciences in
1993."
There were four major reasons, as summed up by Edgar A. Porter, why
the PRC invited foreigners in the post-Maoist period: to raise academic
standards in science and technology; to use foreign educators as a bridge to
foreign university programmes and faculty; to enhance the status of local
institutions; and to narrow the gap of science and technology between the PRC
and developed countries created by the political turmoil during the Cultural
Revolution.'
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Therefore, the PRC sent students and teachers abroad to receive training
in science and technology, and recruited foreign scientists and technologists to
train PRC students at home. These foreign countries were those which had
international political and economic relations with the PRC. The ROC also
developed international scientific and technological relations with its political
and economic partners. This will be examined in the next section.
6.5.2 International Educational Relations of the ROC
Before July 1989, all students of the ROC who aspired to study abroad under
government sponsorships or on a self-financed basis must first seek approval
from the Ministry of Education. According to the 1972 "Regulation of
Studying Abroad," the grant of approval was based on the criterion that the
subjects to be taken by the applicants must meet the needs of national
construction and long-term science development. All candidates must pass
qualifying examinations administered by the Ministry of Education since 1954.
Qualifying examinations included general examinations on the "Teachings of
Sfin Ybdan," the CNP's version of "Chinese History and Geography," "Chinese
Language," and "Foreign Language" of the host country; and advanced
examinations on special subjects to be pursued abroad.' After 1976, self-
supporting applicants were no longer required to take these qualifying
examinations.'
The majors taken by ROC students abroad reflected the domestic
demands in Taiwan. Between 1952 and 1970, there were 12,944 (54.8% out of
22,241) students who took science and technology as their majors. Amongst
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the total student population abroad, 5,713 (25.7%) students majored in
engineering, 3,805(17.1%) in national sciences, and 2,605(11.7%) in agriculture
(see Appendix 6.10). However, the percentage of students taking agriculture
dropped to 7.3 between 1980 and 1989. In contrast, the field of mathematics
and computer science became prominent among student choices in this period.
The percentage of students taking mathematics and computer science increased
from 4.1 between 1981-1985 to 6.6 between 1986-1989. The decrease in
agricultural studies and the increase of computer studies corresponded to the
economic structural change of the ROC from agriculture in 1950s and 1960s to
heavy industry and high technology in the 1980s.
Most students opted to go to the US, and some to Japan. In 1955, 195
students (86.6%) out of 225 went to the US; 18 (8%) to Japan; 6 (2.7%) to
Canada; 5 (2.2%) to West Germany; and 1 (0.4%) to the Philippines.' In
1989, 2,116 students took science and technology studies. Among them 2,009
(94.9%) students went to the US; 41 (1.9%) to Japan; 18 (0.8%) to West
Germany; and the rest to other countries in Western Europe and Asia."
The brain drain from the ROC was as serious as in the PRC. Between
1952 and 1960, 4,602 ROC students were sent abroad, but only 417 (9.1%) of
them returned.' Between 1962 and 1989, 119,929 ROC students studied
abroad, but only 20,939 (17.5%) students returned.' However, in the early
1990s, more students returned to the ROC from the US. Overall, between 1990
and 1992, 11,284 students returned to the ROC.1." It was suggested that the
ROC students who graduated in the US were finding it difficult to secure jobs
in the US because of its high unemployment rate. In contrast, they could find
374
jobs more easily in the ROC and enjoy a higher salary (on the average, US$
500 more) for the same post than in the US.'
Moreover, teachers of science and technology in the higher education
system of the ROC were sent abroad by the government for advanced studies
in order to upgrade their academic qualifications or enhance their exposure to
new developments in science and technology. Up to 1989, 3,642 faculty
members (of natural sciences and mathematics; engineering and applied
sciences; biological, medical and agricultural science; science education; and
humanities and social scientists) studied abroad under government
sponsorships: 380 between 1960 and 1969; 1,117 between 1970-1979; and 2,145
between 1980-1989.1' In contrast to the return rate of students, most
teachers sent by the government returned to render their services to the ROC;
for instance, in the period of 1961-1981, 97.4% of 1,501 government-sponsored
teachers reportedly returned.'
The ROC also imported foreign science and technology through the
recruitment of specialists from developed countries. Since the promulgation
of the "Guideline for Long-Range Development of Science" in 1959, overseas
scientists and technologists were incorporated into the higher education system
of the ROC as special-chair lecturers, as national research professors to guide
research work and hold research seminars on a yearly contractual basis; or as
visiting professors to give lectures on a short-term basis.' The demand for
overseas scientists was increased sharply from the 1960s to 1970s; 413
expatriate scientists were employed between 1963 and 1970, and 2,783 between
1971-1980.' In 1987, 399 foreign experts were invited to teach or supervise
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research work in higher education institutions of the ROC.'"
The governments of the PRC and ROC have practised the policy of
human technology transfer for more than four decades by sponsoring students
to receive science and technology education abroad, by selecting teaching
faculty members for overseas study to upgrade their professional capacity, and
by inviting foreign experts to teach or conduct research at home. The PRC
and ROC also attempted to increase the research capacities of their higher
education systems through joint programmes with foreign institutions. This
will be examined in the next section.
6.6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PRC AND ROC
This section describes the international joint programmes of the PRC and ROC
with other countries. This thesis argues that the PRC and ROC utilized
international joint programmes conducted at home to increase their research
capacities. Through joint programmes, particularly relating to research, local
staff or students worked with or under the guidance of foreign specialists. In
these cooperation projects, it was expected that physical facilities and
equipment, design of experiments, and research capacity of the science and
technology workers in the PRC and ROC would be improved.
6.6.1 International Programmes in the PRC 
Except during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC has developed relations with
foreign countries through joint programmes since 1949.
During the Sino-Soviet affiance period in the 1950s, Soviet advisors
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guided the readjustment of faculties and institutes, helped develop research
institutes and create specialized studies which emphasized engineering
education.
After 1978, Sino-Soviet cooperation programmes were replaced by those
between the PRC and US. During the visit to the US, Deng Xidoping signed
an agreement with President Jimmy Carter on cooperation in science and
technology in January 1979. Fields such as agriculture, energy, space, health,
environment, earth science, and engineering were suggested for educational
and scholarly exchange between the PRC and US.' Since the agreement,
the PRC has established vital links with Western universities.
Three significant changes concerning the importation of foreign science
and technology, this thesis suggests, took place in the higher education system
of the PRC after its opening up to Western countries. These changes involved
the joint programmes between PRC's institutions and their foreign
counterparts; the involvement of international organizations; and the
participation of overseas Chinese scholars in developing science and
technology in the PRC.
At the inter-institutional level, joint programmes have been conducted
between the PRC institutions and Western counterparts since 1978. Between
1978 and 1985, 151 Chinese universities and colleges established relations with
320 foreign higher education institutes of more than 22 countries. The joint
activities involved the exchange of scholars and students, the exchange of
delegations and visiting groups, the conduct of collaborative research, and the
provision of short-term training courses.'
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These inter-institutional activities were channels for the PRC to access
Western science and technology and to learn related skills. For instance, the
Institute of Nuclear Technology of the Qinghud University cooperated with the
German Federation of Electric Stations to build a small-scale thermal reactor
at the University. The German counterpart promised to invest 55 million
Deutsche Mark on the project according to the contract signed on 23
December, 1988."
Moreover, international organizations contributed to enhancing the
research capacity of higher education institutes in the PRC. The World Bank
has played an important role in the improvement of science and technology
education of the PRC since 1980. Five priority sectors of the PRC were
designated by the specialists of the World Bank: human resources, agriculture,
transportation, energy, and industry. 1" Two major projects were launched.
The first one was to improve the quality of graduates and research capability
of teaching staff of 28 higher education institutes under the Ministry of
Education.' The second Development Project aimed at the rectification of
unbalanced undergraduate enrollment which emphasized engineering. The
total cost for the whole project was estimated to be US$ 1,457 million.'
Another type of World Bank project concerned agricultural education
and research in the PRC. Eleven key agricultural universities and six
agricultural research institutes were involved. An institute for rice research
was established under this project!' In 1990, a joint programme to train
personnel in information technology and management at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong was co-sponsored by the United Nations and the
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Shun Fling Education Charity Fund of Hong Kong. In 1991, 25 people from
20 provinces of the PRC were sent to the Chinese University of Hong Kong to
receive a module of training in areas such as macroeconomic analysis,
economic planning, information systems, and economic management.'
The involvement of overseas Chinese scientists in universities of the
PRC has become an important part of its science and technology exchange
activities since the late 1970s. A joint research project on water pollution
control was conducted under the guidance of Zheng Weiming of the Qrmghua
University and Kan Chen of the University of Michigan in the early 19805."
In 1987, the Nobel-Prize Chinese Physicist, Yang ZhennIng, led a four-year
basic research team of Chinese mathematicians and physicists from the Beijing
University, FÜdan University, Chinese University of Science and Technology,
Mei University, and Nankai University. In contrast to other local science and
technology research units, this project under Yang received a vast fund
amounting to 450,000 yuan from the PRC government.' Other Nobel-Prize
Chinese scientists were also invited to visit the PRC. The famous Chinese
mathematician, Chen Xingshen, from the US was appointed to be the director
of the Institute of Mathematics in the Nankai University in the early 1990s.1'
6.6.2 International Programmes in the ROC
In contrast to the PRC, the ROC developed international cooperation
programmes with Western countries at a much earlier stage than the PRC did.
The industrial base of higher education in the ROC was gradually built up
through opening up to international cooperation with the West, particularly
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the US, between 1950 and the early 1960s. An American science and
technology team was sent by President Johnson in September 1967. The team
comprised experienced American scientists and was headed by Donald F.
Hornig, a senior science advisor to the American President.' The team
helped the scientists and officials of the ROC develop graduate programmes
and intensify research capacity so as to curb the brain drain.
Moreover, educational contracts were signed between selected higher
education institutes of the ROC and foreign counterparts, with mediators such
as the Council of Mutual Security Mission and the Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction. Common to international higher education cooperation was
the improvement of curriculum, pedagogy, and physical facilities of selected
higher education institutes in the ROC.
In the 1950s and 1960s, some fields of study strategically useful for
economic construction were selectively chosen for the joint programmes
between key higher education institutions of the ROC and foreign counterparts
(see Appendix 6.11).' These fields were to indude teacher education,
engineering education, agricultural education, and atomic energy research.
The first strategic field was teacher education. The contract between the
Provincial Taiwan Normal University (PTNU) and the Pennsylvania State
University (PSU) in 1953 involved the establishment of the Department of
Industrial Education at the PINU for prospective teachers of vocational
industrial shop courses. The courses were intended to supply skilled
technicians for the ROC's growing industries. Two advisors, on average
within the contract period from the PSU, helped the Department to prepare
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workshop curriculum and outlines, and to select books on vocational
education to be translated into Chinese. The second contract was made in
1956 to develop the curriculum and physical facilities of the existing
Department of Home Economics.' The PTNU was also helped by UNESCO
to establish the first National Educational Materials Centre in 1955.
Engineering education was another important focus of the international
cooperation projects in the ROC. The contract between the Provincial Cheng
Kung University (PC1CU) and the Purdue University was two-fold. The
immediate need for the PCKU in the 1950s was to improve the teaching
facilities and physical plant for engineering education in the PCKU. The far-
reaching goal was to help the ROC industry through the improvement of
engineering education.' Purdue advisors to the PCKU made a
comprehensive survey of PCKU ranging from its administrative structure,
recruitment and training of teaching staff, curriculum, laboratory equipment,
and classroom activities.' By the end of 1957, twenty-two PCKU lecturers
were sent to receive advanced engineering training at the Purdue University,
and fifteen different kinds of educational specialists from the Purdue
University worked at the PCKU.1"
Agricultural education of the ROC was the third dimension to be
strengthened in the higher education system of the ROC through several
important international contacts mediated by the Sino-American Joint
Commission on Rural Reconstruction KRR). Between 1954 and 1957, the
University of California provided advice and assistance to the College of
Agriculture, National Taiwan University. Five advisers from the University
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of California assisted the ROC counterparts to install agricultural facilities and
to provide services in Taiwan, and conducted personnel training and research
work in the National Taiwan University.' Another college, the Provincial
Taiwan College of Agriculture was first helped in 1955 by the International
Cooperation Administration in the training of teachers for vocational
agricultural schools in the ROC, and in 1960 by the Michigan State University
in the design of programmes for specialized agricultural personnel.'
Between 1953 and 1978, 6,162 agricultural technicians were trained locally, and
another 1,341 technicians were sent abroad to receive further training. Among
them, 883 people went to the US or Japan. In the same period, 226 foreign
consultants came to the ROC to give advice or seminars. Among them, 50%
came from the US and 35% from Japan.'"
The ROC government also actively participated in international
cooperation projects on agricultural education. A seed research programme
was initiated by the JCRR to link the National Taiwan University (NTU) with
the State Department of Agriculture and Forestry in 1956 for the establishment
of a research centre and laboratories, and for training seed workers. Another
joint program in 1972 was to improve aquaculture under the cooperation
among the JCRR, the NTU, the National Taiwan Normal University (formerly
PTNU), the Institute of Fishery Biology and the Institute of Biology.'
Atomic energy research was the fourth area to be improved in the
higher education system of the ROC. Cooperative atomic research for peaceful
purposes was conducted under the joint programme between the National
Tsinghua University of the ROC and the National Argonne Laboratory of the
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US. The American counterpart provided equipment, literature, and scientists
for the research conducted in the National Tsinghua University.'" Further
cooperation between these two institutions was encouraged by Wang Shih-
chieh, the President of the Academia Sinica.'
Inter-institutional cooperation also involved the highest research
institution, Academia Sinica, in the ROC. In January 1969, the National
Science Council of the ROC, after three meetings with Dr. Walter Hodge, a
representative of the National Science Foundation in the US, drafted plans to
further Sino-American science cooperation. The scope of cooperation was
quite extensive and covered five major areas: natural sciences and
mathematics; engineering sciences and technology; biological, medical and
agricultural sciences; social sciences; and education. Cooperation activities
included seminars, research and exchange of personnel for observation,
training workshops, and lectures."8
 The cooperation plans expected ten to
twelve American scientists per year to visit Taiwan for a period of 6 months.
They were expected to provide leadership for advanced research in six
research centres under the Sinica Academia and selected graduate
institutes.' After two years' experience, the cooperative areas were re-
grouped under 5 categories: earth science; bio-economical science; socio-
economic technology; science and engineering; and biological science.'" In
the areas of research, the local situation of the ROC was also taken into
consideration; for example, pest control, forest ecology, and Taiwanese flora
and aquaculture were incorporated into the bio-economical science.
After the ROC was expelled from the United Nations in 1971,
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international cooperation in the ROC did not come to a halt. The international
academic activities of the ROC were moved to a non-governmental level, and
became part of the "flexible relations" (which were discussed in Chapter Three)
to keep the ROC in the international academic community. Although
UNESCO withdrew its participation from the ROC, the Society for
International Education, Science and Culture was established immediately to
take over the UNESCO's functions in the ROC. In 1972, the American
President, Richard Nixon, sent a team of 8 scientists, headed by Edward E.
David, to the ROC. The team discussed the development of plant genetics and
disease control, geology and seismology, marine science, standardization and
environmental pollution in Taiwan.' In 1973, the American Philco Ford
Corporation granted US$ 52,631 to support for a joint study on industrial
health by the University of Washington and National Taiwan University.'
The American Bureau for Medical Aid to China also pledged in 1975 to
continue its support for cancer research in the ROC.'
However, the international cooperation of the ROC with other countries
could be affected by the PRC after it returned to the international community
in 1972. In the middle of the 1970s, the training programme for ROC
engineers in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was suspended
after the PRC accused MIT of training ROC engineers to produce missiles that
could be used to attack the PRC.1'
The higher education systems of the PRC and ROC developed
international cooperation programmes of science and technology with foreign
countries in the last forty-four years. Through these programmes, the PRC
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and ROC incorporated the curriculum of foreign science and technology,
imported advanced teaching facilities and equipment, and invited foreign
scientists and technologies to teach or do research in these two Chinese higher
education systems.
6.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the importation of foreign science and technology
into the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC. It has been argued
in this chapter that unlike classical Chinese higher education, the ruling elites
of the PRC and ROC related higher education to the national economy, and
stressed the production of technical cadres for economic purposes.
However, the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC adopted different
strategies for developing domestic science and technology education_ The PRC
attempted to create economic modernization with higher education; whereas
the ROC established courses in higher education to meet the demands of the
industrializing economy, and to sustain economic modernization.
Common to the higher education systems of both the PRC and ROC
was the incorporation of foreign resources to develop their domestic scientific
and technology capacities. Both Chinese higher education systems adjusted
their institutions, changed their curriculum of science and technology, sent
students and teachers abroad to receive foreign training, recruited foreign
experts, and conducted international joint programmes of science and
technology at home. These were the channels used by the PRC and ROC to
transfer science and technology from countries which had developed
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international political and economic relations with these two Chinese countries.
The next chapter will conclude this thesis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS
7.1 PURPOSE 
This chapter concludes the thesis. Firstly, the chapter highlights the
similarities and differences of the higher education systems in the PRC and
ROC, and presents the concept of "fortress" states to re-interpret the patterns
of these two higher education systems. Secondly, the chapter revisits the
theoretical themes which have oriented the thinking of this thesis, including
the educational convergence thesis, modernization theories, dependency
theories, Wallerstein's idea of the world system, and Cowen's concept of
educational isomorphisms. Thirdly, the chapter explores the broader
implications of the thesis.
7.2 PATTERNS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE PRC AND ROC
This comparative study of the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC
suggests that they had many similarities and differences. Before outlining the
patterns of higher education in the PRC and ROC, it is useful to summarize
these similarities and differences, in point-form for the purposes of clarity.
7.2.1 Similarities and Differences of the Higher Education Systems in the 
PRC and ROC 
The evidence of this thesis suggests that the higher education systems of the
PRC and ROC shared many similarities with pre-1949 Chinese higher
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education. Chinese higher education (before the 1840s, between the 1840s and
1940s, and after 1949) was marked by five common characteristics.
(1) Chinese higher education was institutionalized in paternalistic
socio-political cultures demanding the loyalty of people
(including university academics and students) to numerically few
political leaders.
(2) Chinese higher education was dominated, although with
moments of struggle, by a monolithic, state-supported, official
central value system despite the change of contents over specific
periods.
(3) Ideological and political education was emphasized in the
university curriculum.
(4) The state was a principal actor, particularly in exercising political
control, over university administration like the appointment of
top university executives, and over curriculum for ideological
and political education.
(5) One of the major tasks of higher education was to recruit
officials to staff the state.
Moreover, the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC were
similar to each other by diverging from "classical" Chinese higher education
(before the 1840s) but converging to "transitional" Chinese higher education
(between the 1840s and 1940s) in four aspects.
(1) Higher education was increasingly geared to economic
development.
(2) The type of state officials recruited by higher education was
changed from the literati of Imperial China to those who were
trained with skills to manage state affairs, and formulate and
implement economic policies.
(3) The university curriculum of Chinese higher education was
marked by numerous fields of study like science and technology.
(4)	 Foreign knowledge, particularly science and technology, was
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imported into Chinese higher education.
However, the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC diverged
from each other in five areas.
(1) The contents of the central value systems transmitted in the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC differed from
each other in their emphases on past Chinese Confucian
traditions. The PRC rejected Confucian traditions particularly
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976); whereas the ROC
drew widely from Confucian traditions.
(2) The PRC attempted to create economic modernization through
improving higher education; whereas the ROC adjusted higher
education to the needs of its industrializing economy.
(3) In the area of improving the domestic infrastructures of science
and technology in the last forty-four years, the ROC has
consistently turned to Western countries, particularly the US;
whereas the PRC first turned to the former USSR before their
diplomatic break in the early 1960s, and then to Western
countries, particularly the US, after the late 1970s.
(4) The higher education systems in the PRC and ROC were training
centres to recruit personnel for top government posts: in the
PRC, party and state cadres; and in the ROC, technocrats
(holders of higher degrees and with political powers).
(5) From the late 1980s, the recent higher education reform in the
PRC was driven mainly by domestic economic forces (the
introduction of market forces), and in the ROC by domestic
political forces (the institutionalization of opposition).
The thesis further elaborates two similarities which both contemporary
Chinese higher education systems have: graduate education, and
centralization.
Despite the institutionalization of research, the competition for a
postgraduate place in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC is
higher than Western countries. The ratio of graduates conferred with doctoral,
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master and bachelor degrees was 1: 12.4 : 95.5 in the ROC in 1991, 2 and 1:
16.2: 155.3 in the PRC in 1990. 2
 In other words, for postgraduate studies,
students in the PRC are facing more competition than those in the ROC. But
the competition for higher degrees in the ROC is still higher than in Western
countries. The corresponding ratio was 1 : 3.2 : 9.6 in the United Kingdom in
1991;3
 1 : 8.5 : 27.5 in the US in 199W and 1 : 6.6 : 41 in Canada in 1990.5
Moreover, the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC have been
marked by centralization — close administration and supervision by the state.
Before the introduction of market forces in the PRC in the 1980s, no significant
institutional powers were devolved to higher education despite some
oscillations between centralization and decentralization between state and
regional governments. The "president responsibility system" started in the
mid-1980s was the first attempt to give powers to the presidents of about 100
(1%) higher education institutions in the PRC. However, this "president
responsibility system" had been suspended since the student movement in
1989, and is now replaced by the "president responsibility system" led by the
CCP as discussed in Chapter Four.
Despite this replacement, higher education institutions in the PRC are
caught by a tension between decentralization over practical matters under the
drive of market forces and centralization over political affairs. After the
gradual replacement of the socialist economy by the "socialist market"
economy in the mid-1980s, individual higher education institutions can
restructure themselves. For example, traditional comprehensive universities
can include engineering colleges, management and administrations, and
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engineering universities can establish humanities and social sciences.
Universities and colleges, as suggested by some university executives whom
the writer of this thesis interviewed in the PRC, can establish new courses
under the banner of the "socialist market" economy. In 1993, more than 1,000
enterprises were established by universities to improve their financial
resources and teachers' salaries.' Many university academics in the PRC
supported themselves and their institutes by taking a new economic role: to
do commercial business (xiandi). 7 Public universities can exercise their limited
powers over student admissions and tuition fees. The private sector of higher
education re-emerged in the early 1990s,
However, the government of the PRC still regulates the administration
of higher education. The amount of tuition fees is standardized by the State
Education Commission. The offering of new specializations is controlled by
the Commission according to its standardized catalogue. The CCP strictly
controls the appointment of top university executives. Their relations with the
state and the CCP are still inseparable. Courses of ideological and political
education are also stipulated by the CCP. One of the assessment criteria of the
performance of universities and teachers is their political attitudes towards the
CC?.
As compared with the PRC, higher education in the ROC has been
marked by "stronger" centralization. The ROC did not devolve power to its
higher education until 1993. In May 1993, Minister of Education, Gu6
expressed the idea that the "democratization" of higher education is an
"inevitable trend." At the same time, he pointed out that the ROC state would
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gradually devolve powers to higher education in four major aspects: personnel
management; academic freedom; finance; and curriculum.'
However, the "academic autonomy" of university faculty members, as
suggested by GuO, would be "protected," but limited within campuses. The
publications of university academics have to be examined and assessed by the
Ministry of Education even though universities themselves were given powers
to do preliminary assessment in October 1993." Higher education institutions
(including private ones) also have only very limited power to allocate their
finance, and their budgets have to be examined by the Ministry of Education
and approved by the Legislative Yuan. On university curriculum, GuO
admitted that freedom to change university curriculum without state approval
is hard to implement." All higher education institutions, both public and
private, have to offer the same compulsory courses including ideological and
political education prescribed by the Ministry of Education.
Moreover, the establishment of institutes, departments and courses in
higher education is still regulated by the Ministry of Education. Individual
higher education institutions can set up new institutes and departments
according to the conditions laid down by the Ministry, and can offer those
courses, at least (as suggested by one of the university academics this thesis
interviewed in the ROC) in terms of course titles, approved in the catalogue
of specializations standardized by the Ministry.
These similarities and differences of the higher education systems in the
PRC and ROC will be used (with minimum repetitions) in the next two
sections to define the patterns of these two Chinese higher education systems,
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and to state the specific implications of the thesis for theorizing about those
theories of development and education with which this thesis began.
7.2.2 "Fortress" States and Higher Education In the PRC and ROC 
In this section, the thesis will present the concept of "fortress" states,' and
their social transformation and educational patterns to re-interpret the tensions
of the higher education systems in the PRC and ROC between the preservation
of political and cultural identity, the terms on which they defined economic
modernization, and the establishment of external links with other countries for
economic purposes.
7.2.2.1 Basic Concepts of "Fortress" States
From the analysis of this comparative study, the thesis suggests that the higher
education systems in the PRC and ROC may be understood through the
concept of "fortress" states. Such states have the following four characteristics.
(1) "Fortress" states are under external threat: economic competition
with, and potential economic exploitation by, other states in the
world economy; and frequently alleged socio-political threats
from external enemies designated by an extremely small number
of political leaders — the ruling elites.
(2) These "fortress" states have relatively weak infrastructures of
science and technology (in terms of the number of scientists and
technologists per 10,000 inhabitants and the percentage of GNP
on research and development) for economic development.
(3) These "fortress" states have dominant central value systems
adopted by the ruling elites at the constitutional level as a moral
mandate to govern the people, and as a basis of their national
identity.
(4)	 The socio-political cultures in these "fortress" states are "emperor-
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oriented" — characterized by norms demanding people's loyalty
to numerically few political leaders.
In the world economy, the PRC and ROC compete with other states for
the accumulation of capital. Both Chinese states have a common history of
economic exploitation by foreign countries in the second half of the 19th
century. The PRC state even uses the term, "semi-colonial", to describe China
in this period.' To prevent potential economic exploitation, both Chinese
states adopted differential strategies to resist the formation of socio-economic
structures controlled by foreign countries.
However, the PRC and ROC inherited weak infrastructures of science
and technology from their predecessors. The number of scientists and
technologists and the percentage of GNP spent on research and development
in the PRC and ROC, as mentioned in Chapter Five, were smaller than those
in the US and Japan. This forced the PRC and ROC to establish economic ties
with foreign countries, and to import their science and technology for
economic modernization.
Moreover, the PRC and ROC have seen themselves to be under socio-
political threat by foreign countries in the past forty-four years. For example,
the PRC (as discussed in Chapter Three) accused the US of having a
conspiracy to "democratize" China; whereas the US frequently used the
improvement of human rights records in the PRC as a condition for granting
it the Most-Favoured Nation status, particularly after the military suppression
of student movement in 1989. Since 1949, the ROC had declared that its "civil
war" with the PRC had not ceased. The claim was withdrawn only in the
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early 1990s. Up to now (1993), the ROC state still demands that the PRC
renounce the potential use of military forces to take back Taiwan, as a pre-
condition for talking about the future unification of the PRC and ROC. As a
result, both Chinese states establish cultural defences against these alleged
threats, and against the diffusion of the values of their enemies which conflict
with official beliefs, and to affirm their own central value systems: Chinese
socialism interpreted by Mao ZêdOng and Deng Xiaoping; and the teachings
of Sun Ybdan and Jiang Jieshi.
The central value systems of the PRC and ROC are located in an
"emperor-oriented" socio-political culture — the personality cult of extremely
few (living or dead) political leaders. The "emperor" figures, this thesis
suggests, are Mao and Deng in the PRC, and Stm and Jiang in the ROC. Their
speeches and ideas are frequently quoted in the respective government reports
and official mass media, and are incorporated as part of the contents of
ideological and political education in all levels of education.
7.2.2.2 Double Transformation of the PRC and ROC
This thesis has demonstrated in Chapter Three that the PRC and ROC have
undergone two major transformations of their domestic and international
relations: between the 1950s and early 1970s; and between the late 1970s and
early 1990s.
At the first transformation (1950s - early 1970s), the two Chinese
"fortress" states totally redefined their domestic relations with their own
citizens, economy and social structures, and their international relations with
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other states. In particular, in the 1950s, the revolutionary ruling elites in the
PRC and ROC replaced their former ruling classes: the feudal class in the PRC;
and those trained by the Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan. Leninist
political and state structures were institutionalized in both Chinese countries.
The private sector was banned in the PRC, but was allowed to exist in the
ROC. The international relations of the PRC and ROC during the first
transformation were marked by diplomatic dichotomy: friends or foes. No
diplomatic or economic ties, as discussed in Chapters One and Three, were
established by the PRC and ROC with their enemies: the US for the PRC; the
former USSR and the PRC for the ROC.
At the second transformation (late 1970s - early 1990s), the former
domestic and international relations of the two Chinese "fortress" states were
partially revised. Under increasing international economic pressure on, and
weak domestic economic performance by the PRC, this "fortress" state allowed
market forces to emerge under the banner of the "socialist market economy"
from the 1980s. The ROC state, despite its economic improvement, suffered
from having no recognition of its political and cultural identity by many other
states, and attempted to regain its international political support by
introducing Western forms of democracy — the institutionalization of
opposition — in its political structure after 1987. At the international level,
both Chinese states gradually established economic or even diplomatic links
with their former enemies.
In relating the "fortress" state and these two social transformations in
the PRC and ROC, this thesis agrees with the argument of Martin Carnoy and
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Joel Samoff about the central role of the state. They argue that the state is a
"principal shaper of social structures" during the transition from revolutionary
to post-revolutionary societies in countries including the PRC, Cuba, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua." Carnoy also perceives education as a
"fundamental instrument of change in revolutionary societies," and argues that
the states of these countries stress both economic transformation and the
development of a "new sense of nation and history" during the transition
stage.'
However, in the cases of the PRC and ROC, this thesis rejects Carnoy
and Samoff s argument that in the post-revolutionary transition, "economic
conditions and changes influence political change." Rather, this thesis has
argued that political and economic forces were not mutually exclusive in the
two social transformations in the PRC and ROC at both domestic and
international levels.
Moreover, this thesis has demonstrated that the "fortress" state of the
ROC stressed both economic modernization and the preservation of national
identity before and after transforming itself into a newly industrialized country
in the late 1980s. The CNP has been the ruling party in the ROC for the last
forty-four years. The thesis has argued that the ROC state and its higher
education still emphasize the furtherance of economic growth and the struggle
for the international recognition of its political and cultural identity (at the
moment of writing up this thesis).
In the case of the PRC, whether the argument of Carnoy and Samoff
would be valid remains to be seen, because the PRC political structure is still
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publicly monolithic and is still dominated by the CCP.
Developed in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC during
these two social transformations were patterns, as discussed in the next
section, which were shaped by the respective "fortress" states.
7.2.2.3 "Fortress" State Patterns of Higher Education in the PRC and ROC
The first basic pattern in the higher education systems in the PRC and ROC
in the last forty-four years is that these two Chinese "fortress" states are
principal socio-political actors in giving and interpreting the respective
definitions of higher education on their own terms, and in shaping the
curricular and institutional structures of the respective higher education
systems over specific periods. Universities and colleges in the PRC and ROC
have been state institutions closely supervised and administered by the
respective Chinese "fortress" states; and they have not been individual legal
entities which have their own rights to administer themselves according to
their charters. In other words, the higher education systems in the PRC and
ROC were shaped by the respective "fortress" states in accordance with their
own economic and socio-political priorities in the world system.
A second basic pattern of the higher education systems in the PRC and
ROC in the last forty-four years is that they have exhibited two opposite
characteristics: ideological closure; and utilitarian openness. The ideological
dosure of the higher education system in the PRC or ROC is its relative
inflexibility, in curricular and institutional structures, to safeguard certain
moral virtues and socio-political values prescribed by leaders for the
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preservation of cultural and political identity. In contrast, the utilitarian
openness of the higher education system in the PRC or ROC is its flexibility
in curricular and institutional structures for the incorporation of fast-growing
knowledge (such as science and technology) from abroad for economic
purposes.
In other words, the higher education systems in both countries have
been agents of the state for both political socialization and economic
modernization. The "fortress" states expected their graduates to be technical
cadres, but with "ideological reliability" — the passing of courses in ideological
and political education.
For the transmission of socio-political values to students, the two
Chinese "fortress" states have established cultural defences in their higher
education systems.
Curriculum control over ideological and political education by the
Chinese "fortress" states has been an essential means to regulate cultural
transmission in their higher education systems for the last forty-four years.
These two states have imposed on their students the academic requirements
of passing courses of such education before admission and before graduation.
Teachers of these courses directed students to focus on the worldviews of the
political leaders. Textbooks and reference materials for such courses followed
the ideas of the respective political leaders and were used to promote
personality cults in both "fortress" states. Examinations (joint college entrance
examinations and those offered in these courses) in both states measured
students' performance in mastering these ideas over specific periods.
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In other words, the curriculum of ideological and political education,
this thesis suggests, is a political arena used by the two Chinese "fortress"
states to transmit their own official beliefs and to defend against conflicting
ones at home or from abroad. This kind of education in both Chinese higher
education systems is part of national mobilization in the creation of social
cohesion and political harmony amongst their people, particularly the high-
level personnel who would be recruited to staff the respective states. Despite
student movements in both countries in the late 1980s which indicate that the
building of complete political consensus through higher education was not
successful, the two Chinese "fortress" states keep on using the formal
curriculum to train students with "ideological reliability."
The control of the medium of instruction in the higher education
systems (and other levels of education) in both Chinese "fortress" states, this
thesis suggests, is another form of socio-political defence at two levels: inter-
cultural, and intra-cultural. The national language, Mandarin, of both Chinese
countries is adopted as the sole medium of instruction across all levels of
education. Despite the needs to have access to foreign science and technology
and despite the risk of being cutting off, at least partially, from international
academic networks, the adoption of Mandarin in both Chinese states is part
of their politico-cultural resistance against the infiltration of foreign cultures
in the world system. Languages are cultural products, and are embedded with
the values of societies in which they are developed.' This means that
different languages may encode various cultural messages. The identification
of Mandarin as the medium of instruction in the PRC and ROC also means the
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preferential transmission of certain cultural messages and at the same time the
restriction of others. For both Chinese "fortress" states which have
longstanding civilization, the use of the national language as the sole medium
of instruction represents part of their cultural identity.
Moreover, Mandarin, one of the spoken forms of Chinese, was adopted
as the medium of instruction in the PRC and ROC for communication and
domestic socio-political purposes. At the intra-cultural level, the adoption was
an educational and political choice. Taiwan was ruled by Japan between 1895
and 1945 and then by the CNP which moved from mainland China after 1949.
At the beginning of the rule of the new "colonizer" — the CNP — in Taiwan,
Mandarin was mainly the language of mainlanders (less than 15% of the
population), and two other local dialects for native Taiwanese (about 85%).
Despite facing the pressures from the opposition party, the Ministry of
Education still resisted in April 1993 using local dialects as a medium of
instruction in the Taiwanese education system."
In the PRC, Mandarin (with a pronunciation system different from
Taiwan) was promoted among a huge population comprising 56 nationalities:
the majority Han grouping (about 92% of the total population) and 55 minority
nationalities.'9 All these nationalities have their own history and cultures,
and many have their own written languages. Even amongst Han people who
have the same written form of Chinese characters, there are dozens of dialects
like Cantonese and Shanghaiese.
Both Chinese states attempted to ease intra-cultural conflicts over
economic and political interests by enhancing the social mobility of "local"
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people — those with mother-tongue dialects different from Mandarin. In the
ROC, more native Taiwanese, as discussed in Chapter Three, were
incorporated into the state structures. In the higher education system of the
PRC, more places were given to minority students in the 1980s than the
1950s."
Despite linguistic multiplicity and despite the attempts to enhance the
social mobility of "local" people in both Chinese countries, all local dialects or
native languages as medium of instruction have been banned in both Chinese
higher education systems for the last forty-four years. Mandarin is the
medium of instruction for the transmission of the central value systems
invoked by the ruling elites to students in both Chinese "fortress" states. The
centralized educational practice of using the national language, rather than
native languages, in classrooms across the PRC and ROC indicates the political
domination of the "fortress" states over their people, and particularly of the
ruling elites at the capital over ethnic groups for the purposes of strengthening
the central leadership.
Cultural transmission in both Chinese "fortress" states has also been
conducted within a centralized administration hierarchy dominated by political
forces. Top university executives, particularly presidents, are mediators
between the state and their subordinates and students, and also implementers
of central educational policies on campuses. In other words, university
executives can form a power core against the state by, for example, filtering
the influences of the state on their universities and colleges. However, both
Chinese "fortress" states attempted to reduce their power conflicts with
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university executives, particularly presidents, by controlling their appointment,
and defining their powers and limits in internal university administration.
Moreover, political organs are established on campuses in both states to
"supervise" universities executives to implement state policy, coordinate extra-
curricular activities for the promotion of the official beliefs and the recruitment
of students into the ruling parties.
On the other hand, owing to the economic threat from other states and
weak domestic infrastructures of science and technology, the "fortress" states
of the PRC and ROC defend their economic interests by institutionalizing
utilitarian borrowing of foreign knowledge, particularly science and technology
in their higher education systems and economies.
To solve immediate development needs, both Chinese "fortress" states
have broadened the respective university curricula by incorporating numerous
and ever-changing fields of study, mainly science and technology, from other
countries for the training of high-level personnel since 1949. However, both
states, as discussed in Chapter Five, injected their own domestic socio-political
values into science and technology.
In contrast to the great development of the fields of science and
technology in both Chinese higher education systems, their humanities and
social sciences have been under-developed for both economic and socio-
political reasons. For example, sociology was seen by the PRC government as
a "product of capitalism" particularly before the 1980s.' Although most of
its sociologists were trained in the US, indigenous sociological studies in the
ROC were perceived by its government as a leadership challenge particularly
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before the lifting of martial law in 1987.n
However, the broadening of the university curriculum did not solve one
common problem which both Chinese higher education systems faced from the
1970s: their graduates did not meet the needs of the respective economies. The
PRC attempted to create economic modernization with higher education by
over-specialization and over-emphasis on heavy industry before the 1980s;
whereas the ROC adjusted higher education slowly to its industrializing
economy.
In balancing the quantity and quality of graduates for economic
modernization, the "fortress" state of the ROC expanded the tertiary quota, but
without enlarging senior secondary education. The Ministry of Education
controlled the academic performance of university graduates by imposing
stricter promotion criteria in the early 1990s? As a result, more students
were expelled for academic reasons than before. The number of expelled
students was increased from 951 (0.42% of the student population) in the
second term of 1990-1991 to 2,170 (0.86%) in the first term of 1992-1993.24
In contrast to the ROC, the quantity of graduates in the PRC is
insufficient for the increasing needs of its incipient industrializing economy.
The tertiary graduate ratio as a percentage of the corresponding age group in
the PRC between 1987 and 1990 was 0.5, which was lower than the average
ratios of developing countries (1.2) and industrialized countries (9.4) .75 All
these graduates of both countries, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, have to
pass all tests or examinations on ideological and political education. In other
words, despite increases in student enrollment and fields of study, both
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Chinese higher education systems balanced the production of technical cadres
with cultural transmission.
As a result of weak infrastructures of research, both the PRC and ROC
used a quicker way to solve their development needs by exchange of students,
scholars and experts with countries with advanced science and technology.
Both Chinese states have sent thousands of students to pursue graduate
studies or teachers to upgrade their qualifications abroad. Some university
academics (whom this thesis interviewed in late 1993) in both countries
suggested that their countries have the capacity to train research students at
home, but would keep on sending postgraduate students to receive advanced
training particularly in science and technology in foreign countries. Western
countries, notably the US, are main centres for the PRC and ROC to train their
high-level personnel. Both Chinese states also invited experts from these
countries and conducted joint projects with them. However, both Chinese
"fortress" states, particularly during the first transformation period, placed
checks on the importation of foreign knowledge by controlling its types and
sources, and by exercising visa control over people engaged in international
academic exchange activities.
To access foreign science and technology, both higher education systems
also offer general courses to train students to master a second language in the
last four decades. One of the major foreign languages emphasized in the PRC
and ROC was English, except that the PRC stressed Russian before the PRC-
Soviet break in the early 1960s. However, in both Chinese countries, reading
translated foreign textbooks or reference books was common for both teachers
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and students — they thus bypass language barriers.
To conclude, the tasks of the higher education systems in the PRC and
ROC have been double: socio-political, and economic. Both "fortress" states
have utilized their higher education systems as part of national mobilization
to transmit official socio-political values to high-level personnel during the
period of training; and on the other hand, as means to import foreign science
and technology to solve immediate development problems.
The "fortress" state patterns of higher education in the PRC and ROC
provide specific implications for criticizing those theories which the thesis
outlined in Chapter One. These patterns also provide general implications for
understanding higher education in other developing industrializing countries,
particularly those with public monolithic state structures.
The specific and general implications of the thesis will be discussed in
sequence in the next two sections.
7.3 THE SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS FOR THEORY
This section firstly offers critiques of theories of educational convergence,
modernization, and dependency; and it secondly refines Wallerstein's concepts
of the world system and Cowen's ideas of educational isomorphisms.
7.3.1 Critiques of Theories of Educational Convergence, Modernization, 
and Dependency 
This thesis suggests that the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC
exhibit a pattern which contradicts the theories of educational convergence,
modernization, and dependency. The curricular and institutional structures
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of both Chinese higher education systems are marked by two characteristics:
flexibility for the purposes of economic improvement; and relative inflexibility
on social-political values.
This thesis argues that all three theories are deficient in explaining the
"fortress" state patterns of the higher education systems in the PRC and ROC
because these three theories have made a common shaky assumption: the
prevalence of international (economic, political and cultural) factors over
domestic (economic, socio-political and cultural) ones. In particular, these
three theories under-estimate domestic socio-political actors such as the state.
Educational convergence theorists assumed the prevalence of the
technology factor embedded in international economic and political relations
over domestic factors. They detached higher education from its domestic and
international contexts, and reduced developing industrializing countries to a
replication of industrialized countries under the influence of rapid knowledge
growth, particularly in science and technology.
Although theorists of modernization and dependency set the
development of developing countries in context, they also assumed the
domination of international (cultural, political and economic) factors over
domestic ones. Modernization scholars predicted the dissolution of indigenous
cultures of developing countries at the endpoint of the modernizing process;
whereas dependency theorists projected a pessimistic picture of
underdevelopment in Third World countries as a result of their reliance on
core countries.
Thus, theorists of educational convergence, modernization, and
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dependency under-estimated the ways in which higher education in any
country is framed by and takes its shape from three inter-related contexts:
historical, contemporary international, and contemporary domestic contexts.
The complicated interplay of these influences, this thesis has argued, does not
necessarily produce convergent effects on higher education in the PRC and
ROC, nor does it simply transplant those relations of higher education with
economy, society and culture in Western countries into these two Chinese
countries. To the PRC and ROC which have long-standing cultural traditions
and strong national beliefs, the preservation of national identity (as claims of
separateness from other peoples) is as important as economic modernization.
Therefore, in the cases of the PRC and ROC, the thesis has proposed a
perspective which sees higher education systems as institutional and
knowledge enterprises rooted in and affected by historical, domestic, and
international contexts. The state is a principal indigenous actor in shaping
higher education in accordance with domestic economic and socio-political
priorities.
In contrast to theories of educational convergence, modernization and
dependency, this thesis has argued that the higher education systems in the
PRC and ROC were framed by their historical and cultural continuities. In
particular, the struggles for a balance between economic tasks and cultural
transmission in their higher education systems are an extension of the tensions
between Chinese learning for morality and Western learning for utility in
Imperial China and early Republican China before the 1940s. The higher
education system of "China" (including Imperial China, the PRC and ROC)
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were marked by three characteristics: paternalistic socio-political cultures; the
domination of a single central value system; and the political control of the
state.
This thesis suggests that, although different generations of ruling elites
have come and gone, "emperor culture" — socio-political norms demanding
people's loyalty to a few political leaders — has not ceased in "China." This
"emperor culture" was institutionalized in the Leninist political structures of
the PRC and ROC with powers centralized in the hands of the respective
ruling parties, and particularly their leader(s). The demand for loyalty to
emperors in Imperial China was expressed in different forms, but with the
same meaning, as in the PRC and ROC in the last forty-four years. Loyalty to
the nation in the PRC and ROC was made equivalent to allegiance to the
respective ruling parties. Allegiance to the ruling parties in these Chinese
countries was frequently personified as loyalty to extremely few political
leaders?' Up to 1993, the PRC, as in Imperial China, as noted by Gary H.
Jefferson, was ruled through a "highly personalized authoritarian system."'
Whether the institutionalization of opposition in the political structure of the
ROC under the leadership of President Li Denghui in the early 1990s will
dissolve the "emperor culture" remains to be seen.
This thesis has also demonstrated that, despite several major changes
in content for more than two millennia, "China" and its higher education have
been publicly dominated by a monolithic, state-supported, official central value
system prescribed by the respective Chinese ruling elites. In these "Chinas,"
moral education and civic education were inseparable from each other. The
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teachings of personal values and the duties of citizenship were incorporated
into courses for ideological and political education which was intended to
transmit the worldviews and political beliefs of the respective Chinese political
leaders: Confucian traditions in Imperial China; the teachings of San Ybdan
and the interpretations of his successors in the ROC; and Chinese socialism
interpreted respectively by Mao Zedông and Deng Xiaoping in the PRC. In
other words, higher education in these "Chinas" has never been ceased to be
a channel for the transmission of socio-political values prescribed by political
leaders to students.
The third continuity of higher education in "China" was its domination
by indigenous socio-political actors, particularly the state and ruling elites.
The role of these actors, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, is also understated
in the theories of educational convergence, modernization, and dependency.
These socio-political actors in "China" shaped the respective higher education
systems, very much on their own, and not international, terms.
Unlike modernization theories (which predicted the dissolution of
indigenous cultures), this thesis has argued that, within the "emperor culture"
for more than two thousand years, higher education in "China" has been
utilized as an agent of political socialization by the respective "fortress" states
to transmit to students official values and norms prescribed by the respective
Chinese ruling elites.
As in the former USSR, the former East Germany," and Iran, the two
contemporary Chinese "fortress" states under the command of numerically few
political leaders, linked their higher education systems with official beliefs,
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defined the curriculum for cultural transmission, and allocated teachers for
ideological and political education. However, this made the two Chinese
higher education systems different from other centralized higher education
systems in countries like France, and from those decentralized higher
education systems in countries like the US and Britain. In these two types of
countries, there are no compulsory ideological and political courses for college
students.
Through ideological and political education, students in "China" were
helped to conform to the socio-political status quo, particularly when they
served in the state structures. In other words, the Chinese ruling elites have
been using higher education as an agent of the state to create social cohesion
and political conformity amongst their people, and thereby maintaining the
bases of their political support.
Also unlike dependency theories (which predicted the economic
underdevelopment of Third World countries as a result of their reliance on
core countries), this thesis has demonstrated that the PRC and ROC, despite
their reliance on the science and technology of Western countries, had good
economic performances in the early 1990s. Since the 1840s, Chinese higher
education has been an agent of the state for the purposes of economic
modernization under the impact of international political and economic
pressures, rather than an agent to strengthen economic exploitation by foreign
countries. The states of Imperial China, the PRC and ROC used higher
education and science and technology to help improve their respective Chinese
economies. Owing to their weak infrastructures of science and technology, the
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states of Imperial China, the PRC (except the 1950s and the early 1960s) and
ROC, like Japan and South Korea, imported science and technology from
Western countries, and developed economic and academic links with them for
practical purposes. The development of utilitarian borrowing of foreign
science and technology in the higher education systems and economies of the
PRC and ROC did not lead to their economic underdevelopment, but
development.
However, the late economic development of the PRC as compared with
the ROC, this thesis suggests, can be partly interpreted in terms of the sources
of their imported science and technology. The borrowing of science and
technology in the PRC and ROC followed their international political and
economic relations. The ROC, with American financial and technological aid,
developed gradually its economy with emphases on labour-intensiveness in
the 1950s to capital- and technology-intensiveness in the 1980s and early 1990s.
In contrast to the ROC, the PRC is still struggling to improve its
economy despite its attempt to create economic modernization with the help
of higher education from the 1950s. The PRC state attributed this slow pace
mainly to the size of its population and the destruction done to the education
system during the Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976).
However, this thesis suggests that the choices of foreign economic and
educational models by the "fortress" state of the PRC played an important role
in the way its economy developed. For socio-political purposes, the PRC
turned to the former USSR and rejected the US in the 1950s. Some university
academics (whom the writer of this thesis interviewed) in the PRC insisted
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that the borrowing of Soviet economic and educational models by the PRC in
the 1950s and 1960s was "necessary" and "appropriate." But this thesis argues
with hindsight that the adoption of Soviet economic and educational models
by the PRC slowed down its economy in the last four decades despite some
increases in economic production in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Like many
former socialist countries which followed the Soviet economic model, the PRC
stressed heavy industry. However, the economy of the PRC was labour-
intensive, with about 80% rural population and with a weak infrastructure of
science and technology.
The utilization of the Soviet model of higher education in the PRC, this
thesis suggests, also could not help the PRC state train its manpower to cope
with the challenge of the global growth of science and technology in the 1970s
and 1980s. As in the former USSR in the 1950s, higher education in the PRC
was marked by the domination of science and technology over other
professional studies (including social sciences) and by over-specialization
before the 1980s. Graduates were so specialized that they could not change
their careers or gear to the trends of a technological world demanding
personnel with inter-disciplinary knowledge and skills.
After turning to Western countries in the late 1970s, the PRC modified
its university curriculum for professional studies by stressing inter-disciplinary
studies between the branches of science and technology, and between science
and technology and other subjects like economics, management and
administration. Extra material and human resources are now needed for short
courses, in-service courses, or adult vocational education for re-training people
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who graduated before the 1980s. Despite the serious brain drain, mentioned
in Chapter Six, the PRC keeps on sending people, particularly middle-aged
scholars, abroad to update their knowledge and to upgrade their qualifications.
However, to the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, the importation of
foreign science and technology and the incorporation of foreign education
models also meant the possible infiltration of those foreign values which were
perceived as antagonistic to the respective official value systems. The
international educational relations of these two Chinese countries were
complicated by their international political and economic relations, and, on the
other hand, by their domestic economic and socio-political priorities.
The complexities of the interactions between domestic and international
factors in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC also suggest
possibilities for refining Wallerstein's concepts of the world system and
Cowen's ideas of educational isomorphisms.
7.3.2 Wallerstein's Theory of the World System Revisited 
This thesis has supplemented Wallerstein's theory of the world system with
the specificities of the PRC and ROC in two aspects: the introduction of the
concept of ruling elite and state-driven central value system; and the
understanding of politico-cultural resistance.
7.3.2.1 Ruling Elite and Central Value System
In addition to using Wallerstein's concept of state, this thesis has also
introduced the ideas of ruling elite and the social construction of monolithic,
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state-supported, official central value system in this comparative study of
higher education in the PRC and ROC. It has also been argued in this thesis
that the use of the central value system by the ruling elite in the PRC and
ROC as a strategy to resist foreign economic exploitation imposed political
limits on state policy formulation when new international and domestic
situations emerge.
The economic improvement of the PRC and ROC was a result of the
performance of their states. These two Chinese states functioned as defenders
of national interests against foreign exploitation. The imposition of high taxes
on foreign goods and limitations on foreign exchange are methods to prevent
the flight of domestic capital. The officials of the PRC and ROC also used
their national belief systems as part of their strategies to resist foreign
exploitation?
This thesis, however, suggests that the utilization of a central value
system by the ruling elites of the PRC and ROC to resist foreign penetration,
in turn, limited the flexibility in the formulation of state policy. The legitimacy
of their political leadership derived partly from the respective central value
systems. When conflicting values or new practices related to official beliefs
were introduced, both Chinese states would offer ideological justification for
such changes. The PRC announced that it was in the primitive stage of
socialism in the early 1980s. This helped the Chinese communist leaders
rationalize their access to the capital and technology of capitalist countries, and
their introduction of market forces into the Chinese socialist economy in the
late 1980s. The ROC treated the PRC as a chief ideological enemy and banned
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its commercial activities with the PRC before the 1980s. From the 1980s, the
ROC utilized the cheap labour of the PRC and penetrated its economy. The
Taipei authorities rationalized this adjustment of economic practice as a
strategy for dissolving the monolithic political structure in mainland China.
The adoption of central value systems as part of the bases for political
leadership in the PRC and ROC also created difficulties for the shift of the
basis of leadership from moral to institutional supports. In these two
countries, charismatic leaders (living or dead) shaped and commanded the
respective states. The first-generation ruling elites of the PRC and ROC
derived their mandates to rule from the moral claims prescribed in the
respective central value systems. The current ruling elites of both countries
still rely on these revolutionary claims, despite the attempts to shift the basis
of leadership legitimacy to institutional ones (e.g. the legalization of the
domination of the CCP in the PRC in 1993; and the direct election of the
members of important political organs in the ROC in the early 1990s).
In both countries, this thesis suggests, the shift of the bases of political
leadership is further hindered by the structural constraints deeply embedded
in the Leninist party and state structures which have been extended from the
central authorities to almost all dimensions of people's life for the last four
decades. Another obstacle would be the ruling elites' potential resistance to
give up the special material privileges and property which accompany party
posts in the current socio-political situations. For example, in the ROC, the
ruling elite, as estimated in 1993, controls property amounting to about US$
3 billion.' In the PRC, some members of the ruling elite were allegedly
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involved in the exchange of political power for economic benefits. The sons
and daughters of many members of the ruling elite hold key party and state
positions, and some were directly involved in business enterprises. Moreover,
the CCP can sell land which was confiscated from the people in the 1950s to
the private sector for monetary return using the principle of developing the
"socialist market economy."
7.3.2.2 Politico-Cultural Resistance in the PRC and ROC
This thesis has demonstrated that the pattern of politico-cultural resistance to
foreign penetration in the PRC and ROC contradicts that outlined by
Wallerstein in two major aspects: the commencement of this resistance with
their first-generation leaders; and their increasing toleration of more foreign
values.
The politico-cultural resistance against foreign culture in the higher
education systems of the PRC and ROC did not start with the masses against
the foreign-trained elites, nor with the second or third generation leaders as
suggested by Wallerstein. Rather, the fight against the infiltration of
conflicting foreign values in the political structure began much earlier than the
founding of the PRC and ROC in 1949; for example, in Imperial China,
Buddhism was purged in the 9th century, and Christian culture was rejected
in the Boxer Rebellions in the late 19th century. Furthermore, in the PRC and
ROC, the suppression of the diffusion of foreign values conflicting with the
official ones started with the extremely few political leaders of the first
generation in 1949: for the PRC, Mao ZedOng (1949-1976); and for the ROC,
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Jiang Jieshf (1949-1975). The study of their thoughts was incorporated as part
of the compulsory courses in these two Chinese higher education systems.
The struggles against the diffusion of opposing values were carried by second
or third echelons of political executives: for the PRC, Deng Xiäoping (after
1978);31
 for the ROC, Jiang rmggus5 (1978-1988), and Li DZnghtif (after 1988).
This thesis suggests that the politico-cultural resistance against the
diffusion of opposing values into the higher education systems and society of
the PRC and ROC was led by the respective "fortress" states, rather than
initiated from the masses. The ruling elites of the PRC and ROC, like Japan,
acted as guardians of national beliefs and attempted to utilize some existing
national values, like faithfulness to the teachings of national leaders and the
realization of the ideal world prescribed by them, to promote national
development. On the other hand, these ruling elites of the PRC and ROC
rejected only those foreign values which were perceived and designated by
national leaders as antagonistic to official beliefs. The PRC accepted Russian
values in the 1950s, and some of the market values of capitalist countries after
the late 1980s, although Western ideas of individualism and democracy have
been rejected in the PRC since 1949. The "fortress" state of the PRC currently
condemns the spread of "extreme individualism" and "profit-orientation"
amongst those people who sacrifice the state's interests for their own as a
"negative" result of the institutionalization of market mechanisms. The
"fortress" state of the ROC still refuses communist values, and does not accept
all Western values. For example, although the form of Western democracy has
been instituted in the political structure of the ROC, its politics is still
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paternalistic and is built up on massive relational, rather than institutional,
networks.
The selective rejection of foreign values by higher education of the PRC
and ROC also contradicts Wallerstein's prediction about the increasing politico-
cultural resistances against core countries by non-core ones as leaders of new
generations come into power.
In contrast to Wallerstein, this thesis suggests that as more party leaders
of the first generation pass away, the degree of the toleration of conflicting
value system in higher education of the PRC and ROC has increased. For
example, the private sector of higher education, formerly abolished in the early
1950s, was allowed to re-emerge in the early 1990s. From the late 1980s, the
ROC allowed the publication and sale of Marx's writings, and their display in
public and university libraries in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the recent toleration
of previously banned practices in the PRC and ROC does not necessarily mean
the replacement of the original official value system with a conflicting one.
The two Chinese "fortress" states still emphasize the importance of their
respective national beliefs in policy formulation.
The specificities of the PRC and ROC also suggest that Cowen's concept
of educational isomorphisms is not precise in understanding higher education
in both countries.
7.3.3 Cowen's Concept of Educational Isomorphisms Revisited 
This thesis has supplemented Cowen's concept of educational isomorphisms
in revolutionary states with the specificities of the tension between cultural
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transmission and economic modernization in higher education in the PRC and
ROC in two major aspects: the relation between revolution and this tension;
and the struggles between intellectuals (including university academics) and
the state.
7.3.3.1 Revolution and Educational Tension
The analysis of the tension between the preservation of national identity and
economic modernization in the PRC and ROC shows that this tension in the
Chinese higher education system preceded the two social revolutions in China
(1911 and 1949). This contradicts the relations between revolution and this
kind of tension as suggested by Cowen. He assumes that revolution as a
creation of new socio-political structures leads to a redefinition of educational
aims and policies, and that the redefinition includes this tension as part of the
revolutionary process.
In contrast to Cowen, the thesis suggests that this tension in the PRC
and ROC is not necessarily a result of social revolutions, but a result of an
ongoing social transformation. This thesis has demonstrated that this tension
does not disappear in both Chinese higher education systems even after the
partial revision of the revolutionary definitions of their international relations
with other countries, and their domestic relations between the ruling party, the
state, the people, economy and society after the 1970s. Despite the reliance on
science and technology from Western countries and despite the introduction
of market forces, the ruling elite of the PRC still insists that the CCP is the
only ruling party and that "only socialism can save China ... and develop
China."' The ROC, despite having a newly industrialized economy with per
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capita GNP of more than US$ 10,000, still attempts to pursue international
recognition of its cultural and political identity. Common to higher education,
in pre-1949 China, the FRC and ROC, were their attempts to preserve those
"core" moral virtues and socio-political values and relations which were
deemed important to the definition of national identity and to the maintenance
of political legitimacy and political support.
7.3.3.2 Struggles between Intellectuals and the State
This thesis further advances Cowen's idea of educational isomorphisms by
introducing a pair of socio-political actors — intellectuals and the state — as
important components in the creation of educational patterns in the PRC and
ROC. This thesis suggests that higher education is a political arena for
struggles between intellectuals (including university academics and students)
and the state, and that the political locations of intellectuals in countries like
the PRC and ROC with monolithic political structures are different from
Western countries marked by political pluralism.
Intellectuals, this thesis suggests, are important actors in transforming
the economic or socio-political structures in their societies. Intellectuals, as
defined by Robert J. Brym, are those (such as scholars, artists, reporters, and
students in tertiary institutions) "who, occupationally, are involved chiefly in
the production of ideas."' These ideas, this thesis further suggests, are
particularly related to public issues (like social, environmental or political
affairs), and are expressed through public channels (like interviews in TV,
publication in the form of books or articles in newspaper, or performance on
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a stage).
However, the political attitudes of intellectuals towards the state are not
necessarily dipolar — to support or to fight against the state as suggested by
Robert Michels. This thesis suggests that the relations between intellectuals
and the state can be broadly classified into three major categories: a minority
of intellectuals who are incorporated as state officials by the ruling elite into
the political and state structures; a silent majority of intellectuals who observe
the socio-political norms prescribed by the ruling elite, but who may discuss
public issues on private occasions; and a minority of opposition intellectuals
who openly challenge, not necessarily on a regular basis, the policy and
leadership of the ruling elite.
Scholars in "China" (Imperial China, the PRC and ROC) have never been
able to survive as a public independent force apart from the state structure.
In contrast to intellectuals in Britain, France' and Germany,' university
academics, like their students, in "China" were requested to conform to socio-
political norms prescribed by the ruling elites. University academics in both
Chinese "fortress" states can influence policy formulation by serving "within"
the state.' However, most of the state officials or university academics who
served and survived in the political and state structures of the PRC and ROC,
this thesis suggests, were those who would not openly express ideas
contradictory to the respective Chinese ruling elites. This is owing to different
kinds of relations established between higher education, the state and the
rulers in both countries.
First of all, one of the traditions of higher education in "China" was to
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recruit high-level personnel to staff the government: the literati in Imperial
China; the state and party cadres in the PRC; and the technocrats in the ROC.
This educational practice in "China" is a reflection of the mentality of Chinese
scholars to serve the state, and can be summed up in a Chinese saying: "to
become state officials after being excellent scholars" (xue er you shl ze).
In the PRC, intellectuals are incorporated by the CCP into the massive
state structures across the country. Some of the basic political requirements
for state officials are to support the CCP and to persist in the socialist road.
Although the ROC government, as mentioned in Chapter Three, has been
known as technocratic since the 1950s, the state officials basically formulated
and implemented state policy within the framework prescribed by the
Taiwanese ruling elite. The current Prime Minister of the ROC, after being
elected as a Deputy Chairman of the CNP, admitted that it is the duty of the
ROC government to implement the policy of the ruling party, the CNP. In
the last forty-four years, the education policy of transmitting the revolutionary
ideals and values prescribed by the political leaders was implemented and
supervised by Ministers of Education, although most of them received higher
degrees from Western countries and were formerly university academics. The
current Minister of Education, Guff) Wenn, was also elected to be a member
of the Central Committee of the CNP in the 14th Party Congress in 1993.
Many former and current university presidents were also elected in the same
Congress. Even six of the seven "rebels" of the CNP who formed the New
Party just before the Congress are university academics. These "rebels",
though criticizing the administration under President Li DenghuI, attempted
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to revive the CNP,4° but still played, this thesis suggests, according to the
rules and terms defined by the CNP.
Secondly, the influence of university academics on state policy in
"China" is further limited by the fact that higher education institutions have
never been independent legal entities governed with their own charters. The
state is not only their patron in financial backing (except private universities
or colleges), but also the definer of their powers and limits. As in Germany
and Switzerland,' national and provincial governments of the PRC and ROC
are the legal entities of higher education institutions, and the appointment of
their presidents are subject to state endorsement. Although proposals were
recently put forward by both Chinese states to change this pattern in the early
1990s, how much autonomy in administration and curriculum individual
higher education institutions will have remains to be seen.
However, up to 1993, the relations between higher education, the state
and the ruling party have not been totally separable in the PRC and ROC.
Political organs of the ruling party are still operating on university campuses
in both countries. Despite the lifting of martial law in the ROC after 1987, no
opposition party is allowed to establish its organizations on campus as the
CNP does. University academics and students in both countries have been
major targets for recruitment into the respective ruling parties. It is not
uncommon for university academics, particularly those at the top of the
administrative hierarchy, to have another post in the party structures whether
outside or on campuses.
Finally, unlike the former West Germany,' there are no job security
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in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC to protect scholars,
particularly those in the highest administrative posts, who express views
contradictory to the political leadership. In the PRC, the dismissal of
university presidents and academics for political purposes is not uncommon.
The suspension of Fang Llzhi as the Vice-president of the Chinese University
of Science and Technology in the late 1980s was one of many similar cases.
Although annual contract systems for teachers were recently introduced, the
conditions of reappointment indude both job performance and political
attitudes towards the ruling party.
As in the PRC, no job security is granted to university academics in the
ROC according to the existing biannual contract system. Such a contract
system creates no "space" for university academics, if they want to keep their
posts, to challenge and express ideas contradictory to their internal superiors
and external party leaders. The University Act passed in December 1993
introduces the practice of tenure in higher education. How this new practice
will affect the influence of university academics on the state remains to be
seen."
From the late 1980s, the political treatment of opposition intellectuals
differed in the PRC and ROC. Before 1987, both countries suppressed
opposition intellectuals, and banned the publication of their works. In the
ROC, opposition intellectuals, like Chen Qtlying (former professor of the
National Taiwan University) and his colleagues, who publicly criticized the
CNP and the state, were dismissed from their teaching posts for political
reasons in the late 1970s. Chen was then "exiled." Chen was permitted to
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return to visit Taiwan in April 1993 after 14 appeals to the Taipei
authorities. This could never have happened before the beginnings of
political pluralism in Taiwan in the late 1980s. However, this does not mean
that the teachings of Sun Ybdan and Jiang Jieshf are abandoned. Their ideas
are still taught in all levels of education in the ROC. In contrast to the ROC,
opposition intellectuals of the PRC during the student movement in 1989
remain fugitives and dissidents in countries other than their motherland.
Thus, in exploring the specific implications for re-thinking the ideas of
Wallerstein on world system and Cowen on educational isomorphisms, this
thesis has introduced the concepts of ruling elite, monolithic, state-supported,
official central value system, state-led politico-cultural resistance, and
intellectuals in understanding the struggles between cultural transmission and
economic modernization in the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC.
Finally, some suggestions are made about the broader implications of
the work of this thesis in understanding higher education in other developing
industrializing countries.
7.4 ME BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE THESIS FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 
This thesis has proposed that the higher education systems of the PRC and
ROC are institutional and knowledge enterprises rooted in and affected by
historical, domestic, and international contexts. This thesis suggests that this
perspective can be tested in future research on the struggles between cultural
transmission and economic modernization in the higher education systems of
other developing industrializing countries.
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One sub-group of these countries is that which are similar to the PRC
and ROC (for example, probably Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) with
monolithic, state-supported, official central value systems.
To obtain access to the rapid growth of foreign knowledge, particularly
in science and technology for economic modernization, these higher education
systems will be marked by an increase in specializations, often open to student
choice, and by the rapid establishment of research institutes and graduate
schools.
In contrast, these higher education systems will institutionalize the
preservation of national identity (as daims of separateness from other peoples
and nations). Such institutionalization will include the use of the national
language as the medium of instruction, the introduction of compulsory courses
on the version of national history prescribed by political leaders, the studies
of their thoughts, the incorporation of the publidy defined national cultural
legacy, moral education or the national religion in the formal curriculum. In
general, decision-making power over the formulation and implementation of
political and ideological education will be centrally controlled by the
government. In other words, direct political control over the curriculum for
cultural transmission is an essential characteristic of higher education in
countries in this sub-group.
More generally, in a wider range of developing industrializing
countries, there is, this thesis further suggests, heterogeneity among the higher
education systems in their balance between the training of technical cadres and
cultural transmission. The spectrum ranges from countries which emphasize
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the economic imperative more than cultural transmission to those which stress
the maintenance of national identity more than economic improvement.
At one end of the spectrum are those countries or city-states whose
higher education emphasizes the supreme importance of its economic
functions. Examples of these can be seen in the higher education systems of
Hong Kong" and Singapore. The majority of citizens in these two
countries are predominantly Chinese. However, English is superimposed as
one of their official languages alongside Chinese both because of the colonial
legacy and entrepreneurial needs. No compulsory courses on moral education
or national history are imposed on higher education in these two countries.
The task of the transmission of social and cultural values through the informal
curriculum was entrusted by these two governments only to primary or
secondary schools, and mainly from the 1980s."
At the other end of the spectrum are examples offered by higher
education in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1977,
and in Iran between 1978 and 1989." In these periods, the PRC and Iran,
affected by domestic political struggles, strove to maintain their national
identity against Western influence. The state of the PRC put "politics in
command" in higher education, whereas the Iranian state put "religion in
command";' at the expense of domestic economic development. Both
countries gave a lower priority to the economic task of higher education in
training technical cadres including scientists and technologists.
Between these two ends of the spectrum are those countries whose
governments stress the dual functions of higher education: the training of
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professional manpower and the propagation of national values to students.
Examples of these are South Korea, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia.' Higher
education in these three countries aims at the training of technological cadres
to improve their economies. However, compulsory courses such as national
history and national ethics have been established in South Korean higher
education to help students preserve their "cultural identity.' Religious
courses have been established in Malaysian higher education institutions to
transmit the Koranic worldview to Muslim students, and to help them to resist
"secularization" in the process of economic modernization. All students of
higher learning in Saudi Arabia are also compelled to take religious courses
throughout their study.' There is a preferential allocation of students for
Islamic studies, particularly for higher degrees in Saudi Arabia.'
The divergences between the higher education systems in developing
industrializing countries and Western countries, this thesis suggests, partly
arise from differences in their contexts which shaped their higher education
systems. In particular, the relations of higher education with economy, society
and culture in developing industrializing countries differ from those in
Western countries in three aspects: the chronological sequence of resistance to
the technology-oriented educational model; the level of struggles against
technology-oriented culture; and challenges to political leadership.
Higher education in many developing industrializing countries, it is
suggested, did not offer resistance to the initial incorporation of foreign
disciplines of science and technology. This was contrary to Western European
societies in which their universities impeded the emergence of professional
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and technological education in the 19th and early 20th centuries.'
Developing industrializing countries, this thesis observes, attempt to
improve their economies by importing science and technology (directly or
indirectly) from industrialized countries. The governments of developing
countries believe that the production of technical cadres would contribute to
industrialization. This has led to an influx of resources including knowledge
and personnel from industrialized countries, particularly Western ones. The
curriculum in the areas of practical knowledge is diversified into numerous
specializations. The infrastructure and enrollment of higher education are also
expanded in those developing countries (like Hong Kong, Jordan and
Singapore)" which can financially afford such vast investment. The training
of technical cadres for economic improvement has become one of the major
tasks of higher education in developing countries. However, the reliance
of developing countries on Western knowledge has led to inter-cultural clashes
in their value systems with Western ones.
Higher education in developing industrializing countries differed from
Western countries, this thesis secondly suggests, in their levels of struggles
against technology-oriented culture: for Western countries, intra-cultural; and
for developing countries, inter-cultural.
The technology-oriented culture was evolved endogenously within
Western societies. The resistance by some academicians against this culture
at its emergence in Western countries, e.g. the United Kingdom,' in the late
19th century was an intra-cultural conflict between long-standing and newly
emerging institutions (and institutional cultures in universities). However,
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developing industrializing countries usually did not reject the importation of
Western science and technology per se, but those Western political and moral
values which were deemed challenging to the creation and maintenance of
national identity by local leaders.
The resistance of developing countries to accepting Western culture, it
is argued in this thesis, is an inter-cultural clash between the value systems of
developing and Western industrialized countries. The political leaders of
developing countries usually interpret this clash as the withering of local
traditional culture; or "secularization" of traditional religion by the "pernicious
effects of various decadent aspects of contemporary Western culture.'
This proposition can be exemplified in the cases of China and Japan in
the 19th century, countries in Southeast Asia after the World War II," and
Iran particularly under the rule of Ruhollah Khomeni from 1979. 62 The South
Korean Ministry of Education still regarded Western culture as "alien" in
1990.63
 Tham Seong Chee interprets the resistance of Asian countries against
part of Western culture as a confrontation between the value systems of Asian
and Western countries, i.e., between the "materialist-utilitarian-instrumental"
values of Western societies and the "moral-ethical" values of Oriental
societies." Willy Wielemans and Pauline Chan further treat this inter-cultural
dash as the undermining of the customary values and traditional order of
Asian countries by the "technological-economic-industrial activities" imported
from Western countries."
Thirdly, higher education in developing industrializing countries and
developed ones, it is suggested in this thesis, differed in the political
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consequences of the clashes between traditional and technology-oriented
cultures. Western governments have not faced a threat to their political
leadership by the technology-oriented culture because it was evolved
endogenously, rather than being coming from overseas.
In contrast, the threat of a potential change offered to political structures
in developing industrializing countries by Western cultures, it is suggested, is
a factor which deepens the resistance of developing countries to Western
cultures. The transplantation of Western knowledge in many developing
countries is likely to challenge the political leadership of the local leaders.
Philip Altbach has noted that universities are "politically important institutions
and are often centres for dissent and intellectual ferment' This thesis adds
the idea that universities are also politically sensitive arenas in which socio-
political values embedded in knowledge of lending countries interact with
those of borrowing countries. The introduction of mass higher education and
Western educational ideas and practices into developing industrializing
countries creates a new socio-political structure in which technocrats and
middle-class people demand power sharing with existing local leaders.
In particular, the existing political elite in developing industrializing
countries, as argued by James S. Coleman, was threatened with displacement
by a new class of technocrats.' The existing political elite, though less
educated, was politically dominant, and attempted to defend their leadership.
In contrast, the technocrats as a "better-educated" political elite no longer
perceived the revolutionary or founding ideals as the bases of the legitimation
of the existing leaders.
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Moreover, the domination of the existing political elites in developing
industrializing countries was, as noted by Coleman, further weakened by the
increasing participation of the educated masses in political activities." The
masses demanded "rational-legal norms for governmental behaviours," respect
for "democratic values," and "the minimum sense of encouraging mass
involvement in political activities."69
Thus, higher education in developing industrializing countries evolved
in contexts different from Western countries. The inter-cultural conflicts and
political threats offered by Western culture in many developing industrializing
countries, this thesis suggests, complicate the cultural and economic tasks,
rather than simply dissolve the indigenous cultures, or subordinate cultural
transmission to the production of technical cadres, in their higher education
systems.
7.5 FINAL WORDS 
This thesis has argued in considerable detail the propositions that since 1949,
the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC have been marked by the
tension between cultural and political identity, economic modernization, and
foreign influences; that these tensions arise from the special circumstances of
the PRC and ROC: they have common history up to 1949, but developed
different social systems and different international relations; and that the
"fortress" states of the PRC and ROC are adjustors of the balances between
their external relations with other countries, their maintenance of cultural
identity and political conformity at home, and the different terms on which
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they defined modernization.
However, this thesis has not discussed the effects of higher education
on the states of the PRC and ROC, and their students' reception of the
respective central value systems over specific periods. These issues are worth
further research in Chinese education.
Moreover, at the moment of finishing this thesis, the PRC and ROC are
still facing new international and domestic challenges. In the international
arenas, the PRC is defending itself against the US's alleged charge on the
issues of, for instance, human rights and weapons proliferation. Domestically,
the PRC economy is suffering from overheating (including a double-digit
inflation rate, speculative investment and serious corruption) after the
incorporation of market mechanisms in the 1980s." There are signs
indicating that the CCP has begun to resume its control over the economy.
For example, in July 1993, ma ROngjr, Vice-Premier and a member of the
Politburo, was assigned to replace the former Director-General of the China's
Central Bank.' The Politburo also launched anti-corruption campaigns
within party and state structures on a national scale.' In November 1993, the
Central Committee of the CCP decided to launch a national campaign across
the party and state structures to study the selected speeches of Deng Xiaoping
(delivered between 1982 and 1992) as in the era of Mao &clang. Higher
education institutions were also required to improve their ideological and
political courses in accordance with this decision.'
In the ROC, both the ruling and opposition parties are looking forward
to rejoining the United Nations. In July 1993, the preparatory committee for
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the 14th Party Congress of the CNP passed proposals for the revision of the
party constitution. According to the proposed revised version, the CNP would
no longer call itself a revolutionary party, but a "democratic party.'" Yet the
"revolutionary spirit" of the CNP was re-affirmed in the 14th Party
Congress." The Three People's Principles remain as the central value system
of the CNP and the ROC, and the political structure created by the
revolutionary leaders of the first generation is preserved in the ROC.
However, the political arenas in Taiwan, this thesis suggests, will be
complicated by the emergence of the third party, the New Party, comprising
rebels from the CNP, and the Taiwanese higher education by the opposition
party and the New Party. Higher education in the ROC, as suggested by Yang
Kuo-Shih (the Director of the Department of Higher Education of the Ministry
of Education whom the writer of this thesis interviewed in October 1993), will
be further complicated by the increasing demands of students as a "third force"
to participate in university administration.
How the balance between the cultural and economic tasks of the higher
education systems in the PRC and ROC will be affected by these respective
recent developments remains to be seen. "In the final analysis," educational
convergence may occur; dependency theories may begin to explain these two
Chinese states?" n and their indigenous cultures and central value systems
may begin to dissolve.' But for the moment, it is suggested that the
theorizing in this thesis offers a more delicate understanding of some very
complex relationships than these classical theories.
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75. "Revised Party Policy of the CNP," in ZheIngyang Ribdo (Central Daily
News, International edition), 22 August, 1993, p.1.
76. The per capita GNP of the ROC was steadily increased in the last four
decades and attained US$ 10,000 in 1992. This economic performance
of the ROC, it had been suggested by Richard E. Barrett and Martin K
Whyte, was a deviant case of dependency theory. Barrett and Whyte
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APPENDIX 1.1
FIELDWORK IN THE PRC AND ROC:
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
1. INTRODUCTION
The appendix describes the use of semi-structured interviews in this research,
explains the interviewer's choice of interviewees and their institutions,
highlights the constraints encountered in such interviews, and delineates the
objectives in setting those questions which were raised in interviews.
2. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
This thesis adopted semi-structured interviews as means to exchange ideas
based on some of its conclusions with selected respondents. By the time the
financial support from the Central Fund Research (University of London) was
available to make a trip to the PRC and ROC possible in September and
October, 1993, this thesis has completed its first draft. The interviews in the
PRC and ROC were conducted with a basic list of simple condusions of the
thesis and followed by pre-set questions. During interviews, supplementary
questions were asked when necessary. In other words, these semi-structured
interviews provided extensive opportunity for this thesis to ask "interpretive"
questions, and for selected interviewees to express "interpretive" answers. The
results of the interviews were used to refine the conclusions of the thesis,
rather than for making generalizations.
3. SELECTED RESPONDENTS AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS 
During the field trip to the PRC and ROC in late 1993, a total of 10 interviews
were conducted. All interviewees were arranged through personal links, and
therefore, the target respondents were more specified, though lesser, than
those in other forms of interview such as questionnaires. In particular, the
presidents, vice-presidents, or deans of academic affairs of selected higher
education institutions in the PRC and ROC were interviewed. Government
officials of the State Education Commission in the PRC and of the Ministry of
Education in the ROC were also consulted. These university executives and
government officials who were policy-makers and decision-makers faced, on
a regular basis, challenges from the preservation of their respective cultural
and political identity, and at the same time from a rapid global growth of
knowledge, particularly science and technology.
In the PRC, 5 interviews were arranged. Four university executives
from different universities were interviewed in Shanghai. An official of the
519
State Education Commission in Beijing also offered his personal opinions to
this thesis. Among these five interviewees, only the president of Shanghai
University allowed this thesis to identify his name if necessary. In order to
keep the identity of the other four interviewees confidential, they would not
be identified in this thesis by their names and posts.
The interviewer visited four universities in Shanghai: the East China
Normal University, Fudan University, Shanghai University, and Shanghai
University of Technology. In spite of the fact that the interviews with
university executives were done in one city, Shanghai. It is one of the cities
in which many state pilot tests in economic and educational reforms have been
conducted or are being conducted.
These four universities in Shanghai have many changes in their
curricular and institutional structures which this thesis concerns.
In particular, East China Normal University is one of the top teacher
training centres in the PRC, and has exchange activities with the Department
of International and Comparative Education (Institution of Education,
University of London) in which this research was conducted. This university
exceeds its traditional role of teacher-training institution; it offers courses in
training personnel for the non-educational sector, such as finance and stock
exchange.
Fudan University was formerly a comprehensive university
emphasizing humanities and natural sciences before the 1980s, but now has
established other colleges of technological sciences, and management sciences.
Fudan University also established academic links with more than 60
universities in foreign countries including the US, United Kingdom, Germany
and Japan. Moreover, after the 1989 student movement, this University was
chosen by the state in 1990 as a second pilot university to test the one-year
military training programme for new students. From 1993-1994, the period of
military training was reduced to about two months.
In contrast to Fudan University, Shanghai University of Technology was
formerly a single-discipline engineering university. Now this University has
established colleges of humanities, social sciences, and international exchanges;
and it offers inter-disciplinary courses including industrial management,
industrial trade economics, and accounting information management.
Moreover, this University fully implemented American credit and grading
systems from 1993-1994. This University, together with Fudan University, was
chosen in 1993 as a "civilized unit" in the construction of "spiritual civilization"
by the municipal authorities.
Shanghai University was chosen by the municipal authorities to pilot
the "assessment scheme for new universities and colleges" in the early 1990s.
The interviewee was the President of this university, Professor Yang Dequang,
who is also the Deputy Director of Shanghai Bureau of Higher Education. He
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agreed to be identified if needed in this thesis.
In addition to interviewing university executives, this writer held a
personal "talk" with an official of the State Education Commission of the PRC
in his office in Beijing. The State Education Commission is the highest
government educational institution responsible for the formulation and
implementation of educational policies across the country. The interviewee is
one of state policy makers. He specified that his opinions represented his
own, not the State Education Commission.
As in the PRC, 5 interviews were arranged in the ROC. Three
university academics and two government officials (who are at the same time
part-time university professors) were interviewed. All of them permitted this
thesis to identify them if necessary. However, one of them did not want to be
identified if this writer would quote materials from the interview relating to
the development of higher education in the ROC before the lifting of martial
law in Taiwan in 1987.
Three universities were visited in Taipei, the ROC. They were National
Taiwan Normal University, National Taiwan Normal University, and Fujen
Catholic University. The last one is a private university. In Taiwan, private
universities and colleges play a significant role in training professionals; for
example, in 1990-1991, about 55% of students graduated from the private
sector of higher education.' Both public and private universities and colleges
have the same curriculum of ideological and political education stipulated by
the Ministry of Education, and at the same time are given the tasks to train
professionals for economic modernization.
In particular, National Taiwan Normal University as the first university
(1928) in Taiwan was one of few universities which experienced most of the
political changes in Taiwan in the last six decades: the retrocession of Taiwan
from the Japanese colonial administration to Republican China in 1945, the
domination of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and the institutionalization of
opposition in the political structure in 1987. Now National Taiwan University
is the largest public university and receives usually the largest financial
support from the government. This University has many famous institutes of
science and technology in the ROC. Moreover, this University was the first
higher education institution which broke the traditional practice — the
appointment of its president by the government. The current president was
selected by university academics in 1993. The Dean of Academic Affairs,
Professor Te-Son Kuo who is also from a professor of the Department of
Electrical Engineering and Research Center for Medical Engineering, was
interviewed by this writer.
1 ZhOnghurfmtngu6 litloyil TOngji (Statistics of the Republic of China, 1992) (Taipei:
Ministry of Education, 1993), p.115.
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National Taiwan Normal University selected its president after the
manner of National Taiwan University few months later. National Taiwan
Normal University is one of the most significant higher education institutions
for training teachers in Taiwan, and has established the Center of Educational
Research for more than two years. Although the President and Dean of
Academic Affairs were not arranged for interview, Dr. Chen Shun-Fen, one of
the academics in this University, was interviewed instead. Dr. Chen published
a book about higher education in Taiwan in early 1993.
In contrast to the previous two public universities, Fujen Catholic
University is a private institution in the ROC. Although no religion as a
subject is allowed to be propagated in classroom, Fujen University was the
first higher education institution allowed by the authorities to establish
bachelor and master courses for comparative religion in the early 1990s. The
Dean of Academic Affairs, Professor Bernard C. C. Li, was interviewed by this
writer. Li is also a professor of the Department of Philosophy.
In the ROC, this writer also interviewed two government officials of the
Ministry of Education which is the highest educational organization in the
ROC. These two interviewees are responsible for the educational policy and
its implementation at different educational levels in Taiwan: Professor Kuo-
Shih Yang, the Director of the Department of Higher Education; and Professor
Ching-Ji Wu, Director of the Department of Secondary Education.
Except for one, all interviewees in the PRC and ROC were given a
Chinese version of a structured question list (see Appendix 1.2) several days
before the interview took place. The exceptional case was the "personal" talk
with a state cadre of the State Education Commission in Beijing. The talk was
successfully arranged only half an hour before it took place.
4. CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED IN INTERVIEWS 
The interviewer faced 3 major constraints in conducting semi-structured
interviews in the PRC and ROC. They were language barriers, limited
reliability of such interviews, and personal biases of both interviewer and
interviewees.
One of the major difficulties the interviewer faced in this field trip was
communication. It was because all interviewees speak Mandarin which is the
"third language" of this writer. The writer can speak Cantonese and English,
but cannot speak fluent Mandarin. Despite this limitation, the writer can
understand spoken Mandarin with little difficulty, and the interviewees were
kind enough to speak slowly. Moreover, Chinese, though having many
dialects, has one form of written characters. During interview, all interviewees
had a list of 9 pre-set questions before them, and were asked to respond to
these questions in sequence. Such a written list helped reduce language
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barriers between the writer and interviewees. Supplementary questions were
also added when necessary.
Despite this communication problem, nine of the ten interviews were
allowed to be taped so that this writer could listen to the tapes and check the
contents of the interviews later. The "talk" with the Beijing official (who
was mentioned earlier) was not allowed to be recorded. Fortunately, he spoke
Cantonese and the "talk" was conducted in Cantonese. Major points of the
"talk" were written down by the interviewer without language barriers.
Moreover, this thesis acknowledges the limited reliability of semi-
structured interviews. The small number of respondents would limit the
generality of the results generated from these interviews. Only five academic
executives were interviewed in each country owing to time, spatial and
financial constraints. The number of interviewees is not crucial to this thesis
because the results of these interviews would be treated as specific, rather than
general, cases. Moreover, the interviews, as mentioned earlier in this
appendix, were conducted after the first draft of this thesis was made. The
results of these interviews were used only to refine the condusion of the
documentary research of the thesis.
Finally, personal biases of both interviewer and interviewees would also
affect the validity of this survey as in other types of interviews such as
questionnaires. The preconceptions of the interviewer in setting questions and
coding responses were minimized by asking questions which, this thesis
believes, provided opportunity for the 10 interviewees to express their answers
in their own framework.
Moreover, in order to enhance the validity of the results of interviews,
each interviewee was sent a transcription of the interview through registered
air mail services in late November 1993. Each interviewee was also asked to
give the interviewer, if any, his or her comments on the transcription by the
end of December, 1993. Up to the writing up of this thesis, the interviewer
received comments from Professors Te-Son Kuo and Kuo-Shih Yang, and Dr.
Chen Shun-Fen.
Interviewees would also affect the validity and reliability of this survey.
The sources of error may come from interviewees' preconceptions,
understanding of the questions raised, and socio-political constraints probably
imposed on them. All interviewees were asked the same set of basic questions
during interview. Moreover, before the interview, each respondent was given
a covering letter stating the aims of this research and a set of questions (in
Chinese) which would be asked later. At the beginning of all interviews, all
respondents were briefed again about the aims of this survey, and were asked
whether they would permit the interviewer to record the conversation. Also
asked in all interviews was whether the respondents would allow the
interviewer to identify them and their institutions in the thesis.
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5. AIM AND OBIECT1VES OF SELECTED QUESTIONS 
In each interview, 9 major pre-set questions were asked (see Appendix 1.2).
Behind them was one broad aim: to see how in recent domestic reforms the
higher education systems of the PRC and ROC responded to challenges by the
rapid growth of knowledge, particularly science and technology, and at the
same time preserved their cultural and political identity.
In particular, 9 common questions were set to help differentiate the
higher education systems (and societies) of the PRC and ROC. These
questions can be broadly classified into 4 groups: Questions 1 -4 relating to
the utilitarian borrowing of knowledge in both higher education systems;
Questions 5 - 7 relating to the institutional defence for the preservation of
cultural and political identity; Question 8 about recent mutual interactions
between both higher education systems; and Question 9 relating to the
interviewees' speculations about the future development of their higher
education systems.
Questions 1 and 2 were asked to find out the current strategies used by
both higher education systems to meet challenges from the global growth of
knowledge, and the difficulties encountered by both higher education systems.
Curriculum and the establishment of institutes, as mentioned in Chapter Six,
were chosen as indicators of utilitarian borrowing.
Question 3 asked about which factors would the higher education
systems of the PRC and ROC consider in borrowing knowledge and
experience from other countries.
Question 4 tested whether the higher education systems of the PRC and
ROC would stop utilitarian borrowing of knowledge from other countries if
both Chinese countries could train their research students at home.
Question 5 tested the limits of the devolution of power to higher
education institutions in the PRC and ROC by their governments. Curriculum
choice and university administration were used to see which areas the central
governments would give power to higher education institutions.
Question 6 followed up the previous one, and further tested whether
the higher education systems of the PRC and ROC had powers over political
and ideological education in recent reforms.
Question 7 asked about the role of private higher education in the PRC
and ROC In particular, the idea that private higher education institutes like
public ones were agencies of the state for political socialization was tested.
Question 8 was to find out the evaluation of the interviewees in the
PRC and ROC on their mutual academic exchange activities. Obstacles to such
activities were expected to be identified.
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Question 9 was to identify what factors would affect the higher
education systems of the PRC and ROC in the next 10 years. In particular, this
question was used to speculate about any possible change in factors affecting
the tension between the production of technical cadres for economic
modernization and cultural transmission for the preservation of cultural and
political identity in both higher education systems.
Both English and Chinese versions of these 9 questions are in Appendix
1.2. The transcription of the 10 interviews was not included in the thesis for
two reasons. The writer of this thesis has obligation to protect those
interviewees who did not want to be identified in this research. Moreover, the
results of the interviews did not affect the main argument and findings of this
thesis (which was originally based on documentary evidence). The writer
accepted the formal advice of his supervisor, and did not incorporate the
transcription of the interviews into this thesis.
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APPENDIX 1.2
Questions for Interviews in mainland China and Taiwan
(English Version)
MAINLAND CHINA
1. Higher education systems in many countries are facing a rapid global
growth of knowledge particularly in science and technology, and
attempt to make some adjustments, such as the modification of
curricula and establishment of new universities, colleges and
departments, to cope with this challenge.
A. In your opinion, what strategies is the higher education system
in your country using in adjusting the curriculum to cope with
the global rapid growth of knowledge?
B. In your opinion, what strategies is the higher education system
in your country using in the establishment of new universities,
colleges and departments to cope with the rapid global growth
of knowledge?
2. In making such adjustments in curricular and institutional structures,
higher education systems in many countries also faced difficulties in
linldng the new and former polices and practices.
A. In your view, how do the new policies in curriculum fit with the
old patterns of curriculum?
B. In your view, how do the new policies in the establishment of
new universities, colleges and departments fit with the old
patterns of institutional arrangements?
3.	 To exchange ideas about higher education and its reform between
countries is a common practice in the international academic network.
When your government looks overseas, which countries, do you think,
would interest your government most in higher education reform?
4.	 Your country has sent many students to receive postgraduate training
abroad for a long time.
Do you think that it is the time for your country to train postgraduate
students at home?
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5.	 There have been reforms in your country from the 1980s, and power
has been devolved to the higher education system of your country.
A. In your opinion, what kind of choices in curriculum has been
made in the higher education system of your country to reflect
the devolution of power?
B. In your opinion, what kind of choices in university,
administration has been made in the higher education system of
your country to reflect the devolution of power?
6.	 The world is changing rapidly. Education in Values has become
increasingly important in many countries.
A. In the higher education system of your country, have the courses
covering moral education and civic education been changed
recently?
B. In your opinion, what are the new emphases, if any, in these
courses?
7. In many countries, private higher education institutions have become
increasingly important. Their courses are usually determined by market
and labour needs.
A. What do you think about the impact of private higher education
institutions to the higher education system in your country?
B. In your opinion, how should private higher education
institutions in your country balance their curriculum between
technical studies and moral education?
8. There are many cross-strait activities taking place between your country
and Taiwan. Both governments emphasize and are cautious about the
development of these cross-strait activities.
A. Has your university participated in cross-strait academic
activities?
B. In your opinion, what obstacles, if any, would hinder the
development of cross-strait academic activities?
9. Apart from (international and domestic) economic factors, what other
major factors (international and domestic), do you think, will affect the
development of higher education in your country in the next ten years?
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TAIWAN
1. Higher education systems in many countries are facing a rapid global
growth of knowledge particularly in science and technology, and
attempt to make some adjustments, such as the modification of
curricula and establishment of new universities, colleges and
departments, to cope with this challenge.
A. In your opinion, what strategies is the higher education system
in your country using in adjusting the curriculum to cope with
the global rapid growth of knowledge?
B. In your opinion, what strategies is the higher education system
in your country using in the establishment of new universities,
colleges and departments to cope with the rapid global growth
of knowledge?
2. In making such adjustments in curricular and institutional structures,
higher education systems in many countries also faced difficulties in
linking the new and former polices and practices.
A. In your view, how do the new policies in curriculum fit with the
old patterns of curriculum?
B. In your view, how do the new policies in the establishment of
new universities, colleges and departments fit with the old
patterns of institutional arrangements?
3.	 To exchange ideas about higher education and its reform between
countries is a common practice in the international academic network.
When your government looks overseas, which countries, do you think,
would interest your government most in higher education reform?
4.	 Your country has sent many students to receive postgraduate training
abroad for a long time.
Do you think that it is the time for your country to train postgraduate
students at home?
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5.	 There have been reforms in your country from the 1980s, and power
has been devolved to the higher education system of your country.
A. In your opinion, what kind of choices in curriculum has been
made in the higher education system of your country to reflect
the devolution of power?
B. In your opinion, what kind of choices in university
administration has been made in the higher education system of
your country to reflect the devolution of power?
6.	 The world is changing rapidly. Education in Values become
increasingly important in many countries.
A. In the higher education system of your country, have the courses
covering moral education and civic education been changed
recently?
B. In your opinion, what are the new emphases, if any, in these
courses?
7. In many countries, private higher education institutions have become
increasingly important. Their courses are usually determined by market
and labour needs.
A. What do you think about the impact of private higher education
institutions to the higher education system in your country?
B. In your opinion, how should private higher education
institutions in your country balance their curriculum between
technical studies and moral education?
8. There are many cross-strait activities taking place between your country
and mainland China. Both governments emphasize and are cautious
about the development of these cross-strait activities.
A. Has your university participated in cross-strait academic
activities?
B. In your opinion, what obstacles, if any, would hinder the
development of cross-strait academic activities?
9. Apart from (international and domestic) economic factors, what other
major factors (international and domestic), do you think, will affect the
development of higher education in your country in the next ten years?
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APPENDIX 4.1
A comparison of four major directives concerning the leadership of higher education
in the PRC between 1950 and 1953.
CLASSIFICATION 1950
MAY
1950
JULY
1950
AUG
1953
MAYGENERAL I	 SPECIFIC
GENERAL
By
Region
North China ME
Other part REAC
By
Type
Universities ME MEH
Multi-F Colleges ME MED
Mono-F
Colleges
ME/
RAC
CSp
POLICY
AND
SYSTEM
Policy and System ME ME MHE
Approved adjustment
allowed
ME ME ME/
SAC
ESTABLISH-
MENT
OR
ABOLITION
Universities ME ME ME MHE
Special Colleges ME ME ME MHE
Colleges by
Universities
ME ME ME MHE
Departments and
Research Institutes
ME MIIE
Training courses ME
PERSONNEL:
Appointment
of
Principals
Universities CCCP ME ME MHE
Special Colleges SAC ME ME MHE
Technical Colleges SAC ME ME MHE
Private REAC
PERSONNEL:
Appointment
of
other
posts
General Executive ME MHE
Directors of Research Institutes P MHE
College heads of
Universities
P MHE
Teaching Staff P MHE
Librarians P MHE
Clerical & minor staff, guards P MHE
FINANCE
Budget/Expenditure REAC ME MHE
Teacher and Student treatment ME
TEACHING Plans, Curricula and Outlines ME MHE I
(See keys and source on the next page.
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Key: CCCP = Central Chinese Communist Party
SAC = State Administrative Council
ME = Ministry of Education
(Before November 1952)
MHE = Ministry of Higher Education
(after November 1952)
REAC = Regional (provincial and/or municipal)
Education Administrative Council
P = Principals of higher education institutes
F = Academic faculty (subject)
/ = Either organization had the final say.
Blank= Not mentioned in the directive
Sources: Zhönghud Jiaoyis Nianjian, 1949 - 1981 (China Education Yearbook,
1949 - 1981) (Beijing: China Encyclopedia, 1984), pp.775-777, 781;
and Zhengu6 Yuan (ed.), ZhingguO Dangdai JiaoyA Stchko, 1949 -
1989 (China's Contemporary Education, 1949 - 1989) (Shanghai: Joint
Publishing Co., 1991), pp.2-4.
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APPENDIX 5.1
Number of students by college, and nationality in Taiwan in 1944.
College and Course of
Study To tal
Nationality
Taiwanese Japanese I	 Others
College of Medicine 360 122 237 1
College of Agriculture 268 14 249 5
College of Economics 437 123 313 1
College of Technology 752 109 643
Science 42 1 40 1
Agriculture 75 74 1National
Imperial Medicine 157 80 77
University Engineering 49 2 47
Humanities 34 2 30 2
Science and technology 1,703 328 1,367 8
(Sub-total) (100%) (19.3%) (80.3%) (0.4%)
2,174 453 1,710 11
Total
(100%) (20.8%) (78.7%) (0.5%)
Source: Zhiting Wang, Taiwan Jiaoyll Shiliao Xtnbian (The History of
Education in Taiwan: a New Collection) (Taipei: Commercial Press,
1978), pp. 129-130, 134-145, 143, and 152-153.
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APPENDIX 6.2
Number of comprehensive universities, and institutes of finance & economics,
language & literature, and politics & law in the PRC between 1949 and 1957.
YEAR
NUMBER OF INSTITUTES BY FIELD OF STUDY
Comprehensive
University
Finance &
Economies
Language &
Literature
Political
Sciences & Law
1949 49 11 11 7
1950 50 12 6 3
1851 47 19 8 1
1952 22 12 8 3
1953 14 6 8 4
1954 14 5 8 4
1955 14 5 8 5
1956 15 5 8 5
1957 17 5 8 5
Source: Ministry of Education, Department of Planning, Achievement of
Education in China: Statistics, 1949-1983 (Beijing: People's Education
Press, 1984), p.51.
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APPENDIX 6.8
New Courses of Science and Technology Established in the
Higher Education in the ROC between 1982 and 1988.
Field of Study New Course Higher Education Institutroo
First raduates]
I No./Quid.
30 B
_ N I P Year
Natural Science
Meteorology University of Chinese Culture P 1983
Environmental Science Fengchia University P 1983 24 B
Research Centre of Water Resources &
Environment Control
Tanchiang University P 1985 4 M
Life science Tsinghua University N 1985 6 M
Mathematics &
ccnipinei. science
Information science Cluao*	 Tung University N 1983 40 B
Information Management Pupa University P 1984 50 B
Information & Electronic Engineering Central University N 1985 24 M
Medical Science
Research Centre of Biochemistry Yang Ming Medical College N 1983 4 M
Medical Technology ICaoshitmg Medical College P 1984 37 B
Research Centre of Drugs and Chemistry China Medical College P 1984 5 M
Research Centre of Medical Management China Medical College P 1985 9 M
Post-Bachelor of Medicine
Taiwan University
Yang Ming Medical College
_ Kaoshiung Medical College
N
N
P
1987 158 B
I
Craft & Industry	 (Research Centre of Paper Printing	 (University of Chinese Culture I I 
P 119841
1	 7 M	 I
Engineering
Agricultural Mechanical Engineering Chung Hun University N 1983 30 B
Civil and Irrigation Engem:ern Chtmgruin University P 1983 4 M
Automobile Engineering Taiwan University N 1984 1784
Aerospace Engineering Chen Kung University N 1984 28 M
Research Centre of Applied Mechanics Taiwan University N 1985 19 M
Research Centre of Engineering Technology Taiwan Institute of Technology N 1985 2 PhD
Architecture &
Town Planning
Garden Design and View Um' crafty of Chinese Culture ' P 1984 45 B
Landscape Architecture Tunghai University P 1985 36 B
Interior Design Chungyuan University P 1988 42 M
I Agriculture,
Forestry & Fishery
I Aquatic Products Science I Taiwan Ocean University N I I 1982 I 76 B; 9 M 
Economics Niitriticat Chungshan Medical College 1984 30 B
TramPollabon &
Communications
Ocean Transportation Taiwan Ocean University N 1988 34 B
Notes: N = National; P = Private; No. = Number; Qua]. = Qualification; B = Bachelor; M = Master;
PhD = Doctor of Philosophy.
Source: ZhOnghuarningueS Göngstli Delthuan Yuanxiao Biyt Rinsha TOngji (71-77 Xutnidnda) (Statistics
of Graduates of Public and Private Tertiary Institutions of Republic of China, 1982 - 1988)
(Taipei: Statistics Department, Ministry of Education, 1990), pp.93-136.
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APPENDIX 6.9
Number of Students Sent by the PRC to Receive Advanced Studies Abroad
Between 1950 and 1983 by Host Countries.
Country
1950-1960 1961-1965 1972-1983
No.	 I	 % No. % No.	 I	 %
13,8891 100.01I Total	 I 9,2981 100.0 1,374 100.0
Former Soviet Union 8,208 88.3 206 15.0 10 0.1
Former East Germany 261 2.8 39 2.8
Former Czechoslovakia 223 2.4 32 2.3
Poland 149 1.6 45 3.3 1 0.0
Hungary 84 0.9 9 0.7
Romania 68 0.7 55 4.0 113 0.8
Bulgaria 58 0.6 32 2.3
Cuba 158 11.5
United States 4,457 32.1
Former West Germany 1,482 10.7
United Kingdom 1 0.1 1,232 8.9
France 1,121 8.1
Canada 977 7.0
Australia 232 1.7
Sweden 7 0.1 215 1.5
Belgium 1 0.0 186 1.3
Switzerland 15 0.2 9 0.7 175 1.3
I Japan I I 2,0141	 14.51
I Other countries I	 2241	 2.4 788 57.3 1,6741	 12.01
Source: Department of Planning of the Ministry of Education, Achievement of
Education in China: Statistics, 1949 - 1983 (Beijing: People's
Education Press, 1984), pp.126-127.
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APPENDIX 6.10
Distribution of ROC Students Receiving Science and Technology Training Abroad
between 1952 and 1989.
Field of Study
1952-1961 1962-1970 1971-1980 1981-1989
No.	 I	 % No. % No.	 I	 % No.	 I	 %
I Total I	 5581	 100.0 21,683 100.01	 35,2421	 100.01	 53,0041	 100.01
Natural Sciences 47 8.4 3,758 17.3 6,852 19.4 4,170 7.9
Engineering 177 31.7 5,536 25.5 8,458 24.0 15,507 29.3
Medical Science 22 3.9 799 3.7 1,624 4.6 2,188 4.1
Agriculture 60 10.8 2,545 11.7 2,516 7.1 2,054 3.9
Transport &
Communication
599 1.1
Home Economics 438 0.8
Architecture 708 1.3
Mathematics &
Computer
2,431 4.6
S&T Sub-total 1	 3061	 54.8 12,638 58.21	 19,450 1 55.11	 28,095 1	 53.01
Source:	 Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1991 (Taipei: Council for Economic
Planning and Development, 1991), pp.290-291.
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APPENDIX 6.11
International Cooperation at the Level of Higher Education
Between the ROC and the US, 1953-1958.
ROC INSTITUTE FOREIGNCOUNTERPART
TYPE OF
EDUCATION
Provincial Taiwan Normal
University
Pennsylvania State University
(US)
Vocational Industrial
Education (1953) and Home
Economic Education (1956)
UNESCO Audio-visual Education (1955)
Provincial Cheng Kung
University
Pardue University (US) Engineering Education (1953)
National Taiwan University University of California (US) Agricultural Education (1955)
Provincial College of
Agriculture
Michigan State University (US) Agricultural Education (1955)
Sources: U. S. Mutual Security Mission to China, Economic Progress of Free
China, 195 1-1958 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1970), pp.58-
62; Yanshang Tin, "l3énsheng Zlii Gdodèng Jiaoyie (Higher Education
in the Republic of China), sliaoyes Faddo Yuekän (Educational
Counselling Monthly), 1959, pp.33-34; and Milton A. Berger,
Investment in Taiwan (Formosa): Basic Information for United States
Businessmen (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1959), p.34.
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